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Abstract
The major goal of this dissertation is to enhance software security by provably correct
enforcement of in-depth policies. In-depth security policies allude to heterogeneous
specification of security strategies that are required to be followed before and after sen-
sitive operations. Prospective security is the enforcement of security, or detection of
security violations before the execution of sensitive operations, e.g., in authorization,
authentication and information flow. Retrospective security refers to security checks
after the execution of sensitive operations, which is accomplished through account-
ability and deterrence. Retrospective security frameworks are built upon auditing in
order to provide sufficient evidence to hold users accountable for their actions and po-
tentially support other remediation actions. Correctness and efficiency of audit logs
play significant roles in reaching the accountability goals that are required by ret-
rospective, and consequently, in-depth security policies. This dissertation addresses
correct audit logging in a formal framework.
Leveraging retrospective controls beside the existing prospective measures en-
hances security in numerous applications. This dissertation focuses on two major
application spaces for in-depth enforcement. The first is to enhance prospective secu-
rity through surveillance and accountability. For example, authorization mechanisms
could be improved by guaranteed retrospective checks in environments where there
is a high cost of access denial, e.g., healthcare systems. The second application space
is the amelioration of potentially flawed prospective measures through retrospective
checks. For instance, erroneous implementations of input sanitization methods expose
vulnerabilities in taint analysis tools that enforce direct flow of data integrity poli-
cies. In this regard, we propose an in-depth enforcement framework to mitigate such
problems. We also propose a general semantic notion of explicit flow of information
integrity in a high-level language with sanitization.
This dissertation studies the ways by which prospective and retrospective secu-
rity could be enforced uniformly in a provably correct manner to handle security
challenges in legacy systems. Provable correctness of our results relies on the formal
Programming Languages-based approach that we have taken in order to provide soft-
ware security assurance. Moreover, this dissertation includes the implementation of
such in-depth enforcement mechanisms for a medical records web application.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Academic Programming Languages-based security researchers have mostly consid-
ered security controls intended to avoid violations before the execution of sensitive
operations. This type of enforcement is called prospective security throughout this
dissertation. Well-established instances include authorization, authentication, and
information flow control tools.
In an authorization system, for example, sensitive operations are defined as ac-
cesses to the system resources. A reference monitor mediates such operations for any
resource that is requested by a user. Therefore, user’s eligibility is studied by the
reference monitor before that user gains access to a resource. The reference monitor
implements a prospective measure in the enforcement of authorization policy as the
eligibility check precedes the access [1].
Information flow control is another major example of prospective security. Infor-
mation flow analyzers aim to prevent the flow of data in specific circumstances. For
instance, for the sake of confidentiality such tools prevent the assignment of “public”
data to “secret” data containers. To this end, a flow analyzer needs to mediate every
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assignment and check the confidentiality level of both sides of an assignment in order
to either permit or prevent such action, and thus implements a prospective measure.
Retrospective security is the enforcement of security, or detection of security vi-
olations, after program termination or at least after the completion of certain op-
erations in non-terminating processes, e.g., operating systems and server-side pro-
grams. [2, 3, 4]. Many real-world systems use retrospective security. For example,
the financial industry corrects errors and fraudulent transactions not by proactively
preventing suspicious transactions, but by retrospectively correcting or undoing these
problematic transactions. Another example is a hospital whose employees are trusted
to access confidential patient records, but who might (rarely) violate this trust [5].
Upon detection of such violations, security is enforced retrospectively by holding re-
sponsible employees accountable [6].
Retrospective security cannot be achieved entirely by traditional computer secu-
rity mechanisms, such as access control, or information-flow control. Reasons include
that detection of violations may be external to the computer system (such as consumer
reports of fraudulent transactions, or confidential patient information appearing in
news media), the high cost of access denial (e.g., preventing emergency-room physi-
cians from accessing medical records) coupled with high trust of systems users (e.g.,
users are trusted employees that rarely violate this trust) [7]. In addition, reme-
diation actions to address violations may also be external to the computer system,
such as reprimanding employees, prosecuting law suits, or otherwise holding users
accountable for their actions [6].
Auditing underlies retrospective security frameworks and has become increasingly
important to the theory and practice of cybersecurity. By recording appropriate
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aspects of a computer system’s execution an audit log (and subsequent examination
of the audit log) can enable detection of violations, and provide sufficient evidence
to hold users accountable for their actions and support other remediation actions.
For example, an audit log can be used to determine post facto which users performed
dangerous operations, and can provide evidence for use in litigation.
However, despite the importance of auditing to real-world security, relatively little
work has focused on the formal foundations of auditing, particularly with respect to
defining and ensuring the correctness of audit log generation. Indeed, correct and
efficient audit log generation poses at least two significant challenges. First, it is nec-
essary to record sufficient and correct information in the audit log. If a program is
manually instrumented, it is possible for developers to fail to record relevant events.
Recent work showed that major health informatics systems do not log sufficient infor-
mation to determine compliance with HIPAA policies [8]. Second, an audit log should
ideally not contain more information than needed. While it is straightforward to col-
lect sufficient information by recording essentially all events in a computer system,
this can cause performance issues, both slowing down the system due to generating
massive audit logs, and requiring the handling of extremely large audit logs. Exces-
sive data collection is a key challenge for auditing [9, 10, 11], and is a critical factor
in the design of tools that generate and employ audit logs (e.g., spam filters [12]).
Retrospective security is usually employed as an additional controlling mecha-
nism to enhance the effectiveness of prospective enforcement, rather than being used
in isolation. For example, audit logging is used in authorization systems to study the
details of access to resources in a post facto manner. This helps identifying potential
vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of access control, the authorization
3
policy, etc. In this regard, combining prospective and retrospective security needs to
be investigated in its effectiveness, i.e., the guarantees provided by the combination
of these two approaches is required to be studied. To this end, we formally specify the
correctness notions for prospective and retrospective measures and provide a frame-
work to enforce both in a unified fashion such that the enforcement is correct. This
facilitates establishing formal guarantees for combined prospective and retrospective
enforcements and paves the way for correct implementations.
To avoid confusion in our formal presentation and discussion we define some ter-
minology. These definitions are also intended to better isolate and describe elements
of auditing, in particular we note that auditing of processes typically involves two
distinct policies: one for generating the audit log itself, and one for analyzing the
audit log. An execution trace is a complete record of program execution in a formal
operational semantics. An audit log is a record of program execution. The format
of audit logs varies, but essentially comprises the information derived from the full
execution trace. A log query is any question that can be asked of the audit log, though
it is typically said that the program execution is “being audited” in this case. This
reveals an implicit understanding that audit logs bear a knowable relation with pro-
cesses. A logging specification specifies how audit logs should be generated, that is,
what would be the relation between the information contained in the execution trace
and in the audit log. Logging specifications should typically ensure that audit logs
contain enough information, and in an appropriate form, to answer a given log query
(or set of log queries). A logging specification is enforced by a program if execution
of the program produces an appropriate audit log. In this dissertation, we are inter-
ested in formally defining logging specifications, and automatically enforcing them.
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A rewriting algorithm takes a logging specification and a program, and instruments
the program to enforce the logging specification. A rewriting algorithm may support
only a limited class of logging specifications. An auditing policy is the combination
of a log query and a logging specification. Thus, an auditing policy describes both a
logging specification to enforce, and a query to ask of the resulting audit logs. We
refer to the combination of prospective and retrospective measures in the enforcement
of security policies as in-depth (or, heterogeneous) policy enforcement.
In the following, we introduce different aspects of this dissertation. The reader is
referred to Section 1.5 for a summary of the technical results.
1.1 Foundations of Audit Logging
A main goal of this dissertation is to establish a formal foundation for audit log-
ging, especially to establish general correctness conditions for audit logs and logging
instrumentation. We define a general semantics of audit logs using the theory of
information algebra [13]. We interpret both program execution traces and audit logs
as information elements in an information algebra. A logging specification defines
the intended relation between the information in traces and in audit logs. An audit
log is correct if it satisfies this relation. A benefit of this formulation is that it sep-
arates logging specifications from programs, rather than burying them in code and
implementation details.
Separating logging specifications from programs supports clearer definitions and
more direct reasoning. Additionally, it enables algorithms for implementing general
classes of logging specifications. Our formal theory establishes conditions that guar-
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antee enforcement of logging specifications by such algorithms. As we will show,
correct instrumentation of logging specifications is a safety property, hence enforce-
able by security automata [1]. Inspired by related approaches to security automata
implementation [14], we focus on program rewriting to automatically enforce correct
audit instrumentation. Program rewriting has a number of practical benefits versus,
for example, program monitors, such as lower OS process management overhead.
This approach would allow system administrators to define logging specifications
which are automatically instrumented in code, including legacy code. Implementa-
tion details and matters such as optimization can be handled by the general program
rewriting algorithm, not the logging specification. Furthermore, establishing correct-
ness of a program rewriting algorithm provides an important security guarantee. Such
an algorithm ensures that logging specifications will be implemented correctly, even if
the rewritten source code contains malicious code or programmer errors. The reader
may refer to Chapter 2 for the details of logging semantics. In what follows, we
introduce two major applications for our framework.
1.2 Application 1: Temporal Properties
of Function Calls and Break the
Glass Policies
As mentioned in Section 1.1, separating logging specifications from program code
enables support for classes of logging specifications. A general class of logging spec-
ifications that supports different auditing policies is the one that captures temporal
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properties of function invocations. Function call as an event is a key factor in logging
and is considered as the fundamental unit of “secure operations” in many systems,
e.g., in OpenMRS [15], which is a popular open source medical records software sys-
tem. Break the glass policies, for instance, can be specified in terms of temporal
relation between function calls and therefore this particular class of logging specifica-
tions includes this set of policies.
Break the glass policies enable users to temporarily boost their authority in the
system and thus access to system resources, for which they do not possess the required
access rights according to the authorization policy. However, break the glass policies
associate such unrestricted access with retrospective checks, i.e., by breaking the
glass, the user asserts her consent to be audited in a later stage. Therefore, breaking
the glass entails audit log generation for the given user from that point forward.
This per se represents a temporal relation between system events, in particular the
action of breaking the glass by some user and the subsequent recording of what user
does. Indeed, these policies can be extended with additional preconditions, e.g.,
certain users may only gain a limited extent of authority. Break the glass policies are
common in critical systems, e.g., information systems that are employed for medical
and firefighting purposes extensively use these policies in critical cases. For more
information on break the glass policies the reader may refer to [16]. Section 1.2.1
gives an example break the glass policy.
We provide a program instrumentation algorithm that rewrites programs to sup-
port logging specifications that pertain to temporal properties of function invocations.
We consider a case study of our approach, a program rewriting algorithm for correct
instrumentation of logging specifications in OpenMRS. Our tool allows system ad-
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ministrators to define logging specifications which are automatically instrumented in
OpenMRS legacy code. Implementation details and optimizations are handled trans-
parently by the general program rewriting algorithm, not the logging specification.
Formal foundations ensure that logging specifications are implemented correctly by
the algorithm. In particular, we show how our system can implement break the glass
auditing policies. The details of formalization and deployment for logging specifica-
tions that address temporal properties of function calls is given in Chapter 3.
In the following we informally discuss a motivating example that introduces break
the glass policies, and identify our threat model.
1.2.1 A Motivating Example from Practice
Although audit logs contain information about program execution, they are not just
a straightforward selection of program events. Illustrative examples from practice
include break the glass policies used in electronic medical record systems [16]. These
policies use access control to disallow care providers from performing sensitive oper-
ations such as viewing patient records, however care providers can “break the glass”
in an emergency situation to temporarily raise their authority and access patient
records, with the understanding that subsequent sensitive operations will be logged
and potentially audited. One potential accountability goal is the following:
In the event that a patient’s sensitive information is inappropriately leaked,
determine who accessed a given patient’s files due to “breaking the glass.”
Since it cannot be predicted a priori whose information may leak, this goal can be
supported by using an audit log that records all reads of sensitive files following glass
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breaking. To generate correct audit logs, programs must be instrumented for logging
appropriately, i.e., to implement the following logging specification that we call LSH :
LSH : Record in the log all patient information file reads following a break
the glass event, along with the identity of the user that broke the glass.
If at some point in time in the future it is determined that a specific patient P’s
information was leaked, logs thus generated can be analyzed with the following query
that we call LQH :
LQH : Retrieve the identity of all users that read P’s information files.
The specification LSH and the query LQH together constitute an auditing policy that
directly supports the above-stated accountability goal. Their separation is useful since
at the time of execution the information leak is unknown, hence P is not known. Thus
while it is possible to implement LSH as part of program execution, LQH must be
implemented retrospectively.
It is crucial to the enforcement of the above accountability goal that LSH is im-
plemented correctly. If logging is incomplete then some potential recipients may be
missed. If logging is overzealous then bloat is possible and audit logs become “write
only”. These types of errors are common in practice [8]. To establish formal correct-
ness of instrumentation for audit logs, it is necessary to define a formal language of
logging specifications, and establish techniques to guarantee that instrumented pro-
grams satisfy logging specifications. That is one of the concerns of this dissertation.
Other work has focused on formalisms for querying logs [17, 18], however these works
presuppose correctness of audit logs for true accountability.
Another practical goal of our work is to allow logging specifications that minimize
logging overhead. In the case of LSH , this requires that program trace characteristics
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be expressible. Later (see Example 2.6.1) we revisit this and show how LSH can be
formally specified and enforced in a proposed system. However, given the diversity
of auditing practice, another goal is generality, so that our foundations have breadth
and support reasoning about the interoperations of different systems. We return to
this discussion in Section 2.6.
1.2.2 Threat Model
With respect to program rewriting (i.e., automatic techniques to instrument existing
programs to satisfy a logging specification), we regard the program undergoing instru-
mentation as untrusted. That is, the program source code may have been written to
avoid, confuse, or subvert the automatic instrumentation techniques. We do, however,
assume that the source code is well-formed (valid syntax, well-typed, etc.). Moreover,
we trust the compiler, the program rewriting algorithm, and the runtime environment
in which the instrumented program will ultimately be executed. Non-malleability of
generated audit logs, while important, is beyond the scope of this work.
1.3 Application 2: Direct Information
Flow and Dynamic Integrity Taint
Analysis
Dynamic taint analysis implements a “direct” or “explicit” information flow analysis
to support a variety of security mechanisms. Similar to information flow, taint analy-
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sis can be used to support either confidentiality or integrity properties. An important
application of integrity taint analysis is to prevent the execution of security sensitive
operations on untrusted data, in particular to combat cross-site scripting (XSS) and
SQL injection attacks in web applications [19]. Any untrusted user input is marked as
tainted, and then taint is tracked and propagated through program values to ensure
that tainted data is not used by security sensitive operations.
Of course, since web applications aim to be interactive, user input is needed for
certain security sensitive operations such as database calls. To combat this, saniti-
zation is commonly applied in practice to analyze and possibly modify data. From
a taint analysis perspective, sanitization is a precondition for integrity endorsement,
i.e. subsequently viewing sanitization results as high integrity data. However, while
sanitization is usually endorsed as “perfect” by taint analysis, in fact it is not. Indeed,
previous work has identified a number of flaws in existing sanitizers in a variety of
applications [19, 20]. For instance in a real-world news managements system, user
input is supposed be a numerical value, but due to erroneous implementation of input
sanitizer, the flawed sanitization mechanism admits a broader range of data. This
results in SQL command injection vulnerability. We call such incomplete sanitizers
partially trusted or imperfect throughout the dissertation. Algorithm 1 refers to such
imperfect sanitization in a real world news manage system, written in PHP [20]. In
this code excerpt, the low integrity input is stored in the variable userid. This data
needs to be sanitized before being used as part of SQL query in line 16. The saniti-
zation must ensure that userid refers to a string of digits. The programmer aims to
do so in line 12, by checking whether the string identified by userid is in the regular
language defined by regex [0-9]+. However, [0-9]+ refers to the regular language
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of strings in which at least one digit exists. The programmer has mistakenly missed
to use $ and ˆ in the regex definition to limit the language corresponding to that
regex to only contain strings of digits. This bug results in SQL command injection
vulnerability.
Algorithm 1: A Real World Example of Imperfect Sanitization [20].
1 isset ($_GET[‘userid’]) ?
2 $userid = $_GET[‘userid’] : $userid = ‘’;
3 if ($USER[‘groupid’] != 1) then
4 // permission denied
5 unp_msg($gp_permserror);
6 exit;
7 end
8 if ($userid == ‘’) then
9 unp_msg($gp_invalidrequest);
10 exit;
11 end
12 if (!eregi(‘[0-9]+’,$userid)) then
13 unp_msg(‘You entered an invalid user ID.’);
14 exit;
15 end
16 $getuser = $DB->query(“SELECT * FROM ‘unp_user’ WHERE
userid=‘$userid”’);
17 if (!$DB->is_single_row($getuser)) then
18 unp_msg(‘You entered an invalid user ID.’);
19 exit;
20 end
Thus, a main challenge we address is how to mitigate imperfect sanitization in
taint analysis. Our solution is an in-depth approach [21]– we propose to use a combi-
nation of prospective and retrospective measures to reduce false positives while still
providing security measures in the presence of imperfect sanitization. We are con-
cerned about both efficiency and correctness– our taint analysis model is intended
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to capture the essence of Phosphor [22, 23], an existing Java taint analysis system
with empirically demonstrated efficiency, and our approach to retrospective security
is aimed to minimize the size of logs. The theoretical foundations we establish in
this dissertation support a Java rewriting algorithm that is specifically intended to
instrument security in the legacy OpenMRS medical records system with acceptable
performance overhead. This would extend upon our previous in-depth security tools
for OpenMRS (introduced in Section 1.2). However, the formulations proposed here
could be applied more broadly.
An important feature of our approach is a uniform expression of an in-depth secu-
rity policy, that combines the typical blocking (prospective) behavior of taint-based
access control with audit logging (retrospective) features. Furthermore, our policy
specification for both prospective and retrospective analyses are separate from code,
rather than being embedded in it. We also establish correctness conditions for pol-
icy implementations. We propose a rewriting algorithm that instruments code with
support for in-depth integrity taint analysis in the presence of partially trusted sani-
tization, and prove that it is “operationally correct” with respect to the prospective
policy specification and sound and complete with respect to the retrospective policy
enforcement. This algorithm and the proofs of operational correctness for prospective
enforcement and soundness/completeness of retrospective enforcement are formulated
with respect to an idealized language model.
Beside operational correctness, we propose a semantic framework to model direct
flow of data integrity enforced by integrity taint analysis techniques, called explicit
integrity. Explicit integrity defines the security property that dynamic integrity taint
analysis tools need to enforce. In this regard, explicit integrity is related to (but
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incompatible) noninterference. This framework is based on explicit secrecy [24], which
studies direct flow of information for confidentiality purposes. We use this semantics
to establish provable correctness conditions for rewriting algorithms that instrument
integrity taint analysis in the presence of input sanitization. This way an underlying
semantic framework is provided to study numerous other integrity taint analyzers in
the future. We prove that our rewriting algorithm is correct using explicit integrity.
Explicit integrity demonstrates an underlying model for direct flow of information in
functional calculi, which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied before.
1.3.1 Vulnerability and Countermeasures
Our work is significantly inspired by a previously unreported security flaw in Open-
MRS. This flaw allows an attacker to launch persistent XSS attacks1. When a web-
based software receives and stores user input without proper sanitization, and later,
retrieves these information to (other) users, persistent XSS attacks could take place.
OpenMRS uses a set of validators to enforce expected data formats by implementa-
tion of the Validator interface (e.g., PersonNameValidator, VisitTypeValidator,
etc.). For some of these classes the implementation is strict enough to reject script tags
by enforcing data to match a particular regular expression, e.g., PersonNameValidator.
However, VisitTypeValidator lacks such restriction and only checks for object fields
to avoid being null, empty or whitespace, and their lengths to be correct. Thus the cor-
responding webpage that receives user inputs to construct VisitType objects (named
VisitTypeForm.jsp) is generally not able to perform proper sanitization through the
1We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerabilities we have found in OpenMRS (version 2.4,
released 7/15/2016, and the preceding versions) to the OpenMRS developing community. We discuss
one particular case here.
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invocation of the validator implemented by VisitTypeValidator. A VisitType ob-
ject is then stored in the MySQL database, and could be retrieved later based on
user request. For instance, VisitTypeList.jsp queries the database for all defined
VisitType objects, and sends VisitType names and descriptions to the client side.
Therefore, the attacker can easily inject scripts as part of VisitType name and/or
description, and the constructed object would be stored in the database and possibly
in a later stage retrieved and executed in the victim’s client environment.
Integrity taint tracking is a well-recognized solution against these sorts of attacks.
In our example, the tainted VisitType object would be prevented from retrieval and
execution. The addition of sanitization methods would also be an obvious step, and
commensurate with an integrity taint analysis approach– sanitized objects would be
endorsed for the purposes of prospective security. However, many attack scenarios
demonstrate degradation of taint tracking effectiveness due to unsound or incomplete
input sanitization [19, 20].
To support integrity taint analysis in the presence of incomplete sanitization for
legacy code, we propose a program rewriting approach, which is applicable to systems
such as OpenMRS. Our program rewriting algorithm takes as input a heterogeneous
(prospective and retrospective) taint analysis policy specification and input code, and
instruments the code to support the policy. The policy allows user specification of
taint sources, secure sinks, and sanitizers. A distinct feature of our system is that
results of sanitization are considered “maybe tainted” data, which is allowed to flow
into security sensitive operations but in such cases is entered in a log to support
auditing and accountability.
Our rewriting algorithm is intended to be a pure model of the Phosphor taint anal-
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ysis system [22, 23] to track direct information flow, augmented with endorsement
and retrospective security measures. We are inspired by this system due to its proven
efficiency and general security model allowing any primitive value to be assigned an
integrity level (rather than just e.g., strings as in other systems [25, 26]). Operational
correctness of the algorithm is proven in an idealized model of Phosphor-style taint
analysis defined for a “Featherweight” Java (FJ) core language [27]. We choose this
model to focus on basic issues related to “pure” object orientation control and data
flow, e.g., method dispatch and propagation through value (de)construction. Opera-
tion correctness is established in terms of the compliance of the instrumentation to
the policy specification.
1.3.2 Semantics of Dynamic Integrity Taint Anal-
ysis
Taint analysis has many applications [19, 28, 29], but its security semantics is not well
understood. Taint analysis is typically defined as a direct, aka explicit, information
flow variant, where indirect flow of information is ignored. The semantics of informa-
tion flow [30] has been well studied and is typically characterized via noninterference
properties [31], but surprisingly little work has been done to develop similar proper-
ties for taint analysis. Formal definitions of taint analysis implementations do exist,
but they are usually operational in nature [32, 33].
An exception to this rule is work on explicit secrecy [24], which explores the
semantics of dynamic confidentiality taint analysis. However, this previous work
only considers taint analysis for low level languages with a greater focus on data
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confidentiality. Influenced by this model, we propose the semantics for dynamic
integrity taint analysis, which is defense against injection attacks in high level code
such as web applications [19, 34]. The issue here is ensuring that low integrity data
sources do not directly affect high integrity sinks such as security sensitive operations.
As introduced in Section 1.3.1, we have considered formal specifications of taint
analysis for hardening Java programs against injection attacks, with a particular
interest in hardening a web-based medical records software system. The formulation
studied here provides a meaningful semantics for the dynamic taint analysis that we
have defined, which is a “core” formulation of Phosphor taint analysis. However,
in addition to Phosphor, our approach provides a semantic foundation for reasoning
about other existing integrity dynamic taint analysis in high level languages (HLLs)
[35], as well as low level languages.
The main technical contribution in this realm is a definition of the security prop-
erty enforced by dynamic integrity taint analysis. This property, called explicit in-
tegrity, is general in that it applies to both high and low level languages. Our model
is based on previous work on explicit secrecy [24] for low level languages. We demon-
strate how that model can be applied for data integrity purposes in HLLs. Information
integrity can often be expressed as the dual of confidentiality [36]. However, the dual
of explicit secrecy does not support either the integrity flows in HLLs with structured
data, or the functional paradigm. Explicit integrity comports with applications of
dynamic taint analysis to harden programs against injection attacks– where low in-
tegrity user data may maliciously taint arguments to security sensitive operations,
e.g., database interactions in the case of SQL injection.
In addition to the basic definition, we also extend our notion of explicit integrity
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to support endorsement, which allows dynamic “untainting” of data usually as a
result of sanitization [20, 37]. Endorsement is usually considered the integrity dual
of confidentiality declassification, and we are able to adapt techniques for the latter
formulated for explicit secrecy.
Aside from providing general semantic insights and formal foundations for dy-
namic integrity taint analyses, we also show how explicit integrity provides guiding
principles for efficiency strategies in taint analysis instrumentation. In particular, sys-
tem designers often treat library methods as black boxes with respect to taint prop-
agation, i.e. taint properties are directly ascribed to library method results [25, 26].
For example, some systems will not ascribe taint to the result of character projection
from tainted strings [26], and other systems will ascribe taint to the results if argu-
ments are tainted [25], regardless of direct flow internal to the methods. The former
is an example of “undertainting”, while the latter is an example of “overtainting”.
Our formal account provides a precise characterization of these informal notions (see
Definitions 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), and a basis for designers to understand the effects of
implementation decisions with respect to a higher level security property.
1.3.3 The Security and Threat Model
The security problem we consider is about the integrity of data being passed to
security sensitive operations (SSOs). An important example is a string entered by
an untrusted users that is passed to a database method for parsing and execution as
a SQL command. The security mechanism should guarantee that low-integrity data
cannot be passed to SSOs without previous sanitization.
In contrast to standard information flow which is concerned with both direct
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(aka explicit) and indirect (aka implicit) flows, taint analysis is only concerned with
direct flow. Direct flows transfer data directly between variables, e.g., n1 and n2
directly affect the result of n1 + n2. Indirect flows are realized when data can af-
fect the result of code dispatch– the standard example is a conditional expression
if v then e1 else e2 where the data v indirectly affects the valuation of the expression
by guarding dispatch. While there are no primitive conditional expressions in our
Java model, indirect flows are realized via dynamic method dispatch which faithfully
models Java dispatch.
More precisely, we posit that programs p(θ) in this security setting contain a
low integrity data source θ, and an arbitrary number of secure sinks (SSOs) and
sanitizers which are specified externally to the program by a security administrator.
For simplicity we assume that SSOs are unary operations over primitive objects, so
there is no question about which argument may be tainted. Since we define a Java
based model, each sso or sanitizer is identified as a specific method m in a class C.
That is, there exists a set of Sanitizers containing class, method pairs C.m which are
assumed to return high-integrity data, though they may be passed low-integrity data.
Likewise, there exists a set of SSOs of the same form, and for brevity we will write
sso(e) for a method invocation new v.m(e) on some object v where C.m ∈ SSO. Note
that SSOs and Sanitizers are assumed to be closed under class inheritance, where the
method is not overridden. As a sanity condition we require SSOs ∩ Sanitizers = ∅.
For simplicity of our formal presentation we assume that only one tainted source will
exist. Explicit integrity, as a high-level property, is instantiated for this model.
We assume that our program rewriting algorithm is trusted. Input code is trusted
to be not malicious, though it may contain errors. We note that this assumption is
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important for application of taint analysis that disregards indirect flows, since there
is confidence that the latter will not be exploited (even accidentally) as a side-channel
attack vector by non-malicious code. We assume that untrusted data sources provide
low integrity data, though in this work we only consider tainted “static” values, e.g.,
strings, not tainted code that may be run as part of the main program execution.
However, the latter does not preclude hardening against XSS or injection attacks in
practice, if we consider an evaluation method to be an sso.
1.4 Related Work
Previous work by DeYoung et al. has studied audit policy specification for medical
(HIPAA) and business (GLBA) processes [38, 39]. This work illustrates the effec-
tiveness and generality of a temporal logic foundation for audit policy specification,
which is well-founded in a general theory of privacy [18]. Their auditing system has
also been implemented in a tool similar to an interactive theorem prover [40]. Their
specification language inspired our approach to logging specification semantics. How-
ever, this previous work assumes that audit logs are given, and does not consider the
correctness of logs. Some work does consider trustworthiness of logs [41], but only in
terms of tampering (malleability). In contrast, our work provides formal foundations
for the correctness of audit logs, and considers algorithms to automatically instrument
programs to generate correct logs.
Other work applies formal methods (including predicate logics [42, 43], process
calculi and game theory [44]) to model, specify, and enforce auditing and accountabil-
ity requirements in distributed systems. In that work, audit logs serve as evidence of
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resource access rights, an idea also explored in Aura [17] and the APPLE system [45].
In Aura, audit logs record machine-checkable proofs of compliance in the Aura policy
language. APPLE proposes a framework based on trust management and audit logic
with log generation functionality for a limited set of operations, in order to check user
compliance.
In contrast, we provide a formal foundation to support a broad class of logging
specifications and relevant correctness conditions. In this respect our proposed system
is closely related to PQL [46], which supports program rewriting with instrumenta-
tion to answer queries about program execution. From a technical perspective, our
approach is also related to trace matching in AspectJ [47], especially in the use of
logic to specify trace patterns. However, the concern in that work is aspect pointcut
specification, not logging correctness, and their method call patterns are restricted to
be regular expressions with no conditions on arguments, whereas the latter is needed
for the specifications in temporal properties of function calls.
Logging specifications are related to safety properties [1] and are enforceable by
security automata, as we have shown. Hence IRM rewriting techniques could be used
to implement them [14]. However, the theory of safety properties does not address
correctness of audit logs as we do, and our approach can be viewed as a logging-
specific IRM strategy. Guts et al. [48] develop a static technique to guarantee that
programs are properly instrumented to generate audit logs with sufficient evidence for
auditing purposes. As in our research, this is accomplished by first defining a formal
semantics of auditing. However, they are interested in evidence-based auditing for
specific distributed protocols.
Other recent work [9] has proposed log filters as a required improvement to the
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current logging practices in the industry due to costly resource consumption and the
loss of necessary log information among the collected redundant data. This work is
purely empirical, not foundational, but provides practical evidence of the relevance
of our efforts since logging filters could be defined as logging specifications.
Audit logs can be considered a form of provenance: the history of computation and
data. Several recent works have considered formal semantics of provenance [49, 50].
Cheney [51] presents a framework for provenance, built on a notion of system traces.
Recently, W3C has proposed a data model for provenance, called PROV [52], which
enjoys a formal description of its specified constraints and inferences in first-order
logic, [53], however the given semantics does not cover the relationship between the
provenance record and the actual system behavior. The confidentiality and integrity
of provenance information is also a significant concern [54].
Taint analysis is an established solution to enforce confidentiality and integrity
policies through direct data flow control. Various systems have been proposed for
both low and high level level languages. Our policy language and semantics are
based on a well-developed formal foundation, where we interpret Horn clause logic as
an instance of information algebra [55] in order to specify and interpret retrospective
policies.
Schwartz et al. [32] define a general model for runtime enforcement of policies
using taint tracking for an intermediate language. In Livshits [33], taint analysis
is expressed as part of operational semantics, similar to Schwartz et al. [32], and a
taxonomy of taint tracking is defined. Livshits et al. [19] propose a solution for a range
of vulnerabilities regarding Java-based web applications, including SQL injections,
XSS attacks and parameter tampering, and formalize taint propagation including
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sanitization. The work uses PQL [56] to specify vulnerabilities. However, these works
are focused on operational definitions of taint analysis for imperative languages. In
contrast we have developed a logical specification of taint analysis for a functional
OO language model that is separate from code, and is used to establish correctness
of an implementation. Our work also comprises a unique retrospective component to
protect against incomplete input sanitization. According to earlier studies [19, 20],
incomplete input sanitization makes a variety of applications susceptible to injection
attacks.
Another related line of work is focused on the optimization of integrity taint
tracking deployment in web-based applications. Sekar [34] proposes a taint tracking
mechanism to mitigate injection attacks in web applications. The work focuses on
input/output behavior of the application, and proposes a lower-overhead, language-
independent and non-intrusive technique that can be deployed to track taint informa-
tion for web applications by blackbox taint analysis with syntax-aware policies. In our
work, however, we propose a deep instrumentation technique to enforce taint prop-
agation in a layered in-depth fashion. Wei et al. [57] attempt to lower the memory
overhead of TaintDroid taint tracker [28] for Android applications. The granularity
of taint tracking places a significant role in the memory overhead. To this end, Taint-
Droid trades taint precision for better overhead, e.g., by having a single taint label
for an array of elements. Our work reflects a more straightforward object-level taint
approach in keeping with existing Java approaches.
Saxena et al. [58] employ static techniques to optimize dynamic taint tracking
done by binary instrumentation, through the analysis of registers and stack frames.
They observe that it is common for multiple local memory locations and registers
23
to have the same taint value. A single taint tag is used for all such locations. A
shadow stack is employed to retain the taint of objects in the stack. Cheng et al. [59]
also study the solutions for taint tracking overhead for binary instrumentation. They
propose a byte to byte mapping between the main and shadow memory that keeps
taint information. Bosman et al. [60] propose a new emulator architecture for the
x86 architecture from scratch with the sole purpose of minimizing the instructions
needed to propagate taint. Similar to Cheng et al. [59], they use shadow memory
to keep taint information, with a fixed offset from user memory space. Zhu et al.
[29] track taint for confidentiality and privacy purposes. In case a sensitive input
is leaked, the event is either logged, prohibited or replaced by some random value.
We have modeled a similar technique for an OO language, through high level logical
specification of shadow objects, so that each step of computation is simulated for the
corresponding shadow expressions.
Particularly for Java, Chin et al. [26] propose taint tracking of Java web applica-
tions in order to prohibit injection attacks. To this end, they focus on strings as user
inputs, and analyze the taint in character level. For each string, a separate taint tag
is associated with each character of the string, indicating whether that character was
derived from untrusted input. The instrumentation is only done on the string-related
library classes to record taint information, and methods are modified in order to prop-
agate taint information. Haldar et al. [25] propose an object-level tainting mechanism
for Java strings. They study the same classes as the ones in Chin et al. [26], and in-
strument all methods in these classes that have some string parameters and return a
string. Then, the returned value of instrumented method is tainted if at least one of
the argument strings is tainted. However, in contrast to our work, only strings are
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endowed with integrity information, whereas all values are assigned integrity labels
in our approach. These previous works also lack retrospective features.
Phosphor [22, 23] is an attempt to apply taint tracking more generally in Java,
to any primitive type and object class. Phosphor instruments the application and
libraries at bytecode level based on a given list of taint source and sink methods.
Input sanitizers with endorsement are not directly supported, however. As Phosphor
avoids any modifications to the JVM, the instrumented code is still portable. Our
work is an attempt to formalize Phosphor in FJ extended with input sanitization and
in-depth enforcement. Our larger goal is to develop an implementation of in-depth
dynamic integrity analysis for Java by leveraging the existing Phosphor system.
Secure information flow [61] and its interpretation as the well-known hyperprop-
erty [62] of noninterference [31] is challenging to implement in practical settings [30]
due to implicit flows. Taint analysis is thus an established solution to enforce confi-
dentiality and integrity policies since it tracks only direct data flow control. Various
systems have been proposed for both low and high level level languages. The major-
ity of previous work, however, has been focused on taint analysis policy specification
and enforcement (e.g., [32, 33, 57, 63]), rather than capturing the essence of direct
information flow which could provide an underlying framework to study numerous
taint analysis tools.
Knowledge-based semantics has been introduced by Askarov et al. [64] as a gen-
eral model for information flow of confidential data, concentrated on cryptographic
computations and key release (declassification [65]) and later employed in other data
secrecy analyses [37, 66, 67]. Recently, Schoepe et al. [24] have proposed the semantic
notion of correctness for taint tracking that enforces confidentiality policies of direct
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information flow, called explicit secrecy. To this end, they propose a knowledge-based
semantics, influenced by Volpano’s weak secrecy [68] and gradual release [64]. Explicit
secrecy is defined as a property of a program, where the program execution does not
change the explicit knowledge of public user. The authors show that noninterference
is not comparable to explicit secrecy. However, rather than restricting the discussion
to direct information flow in a low level language, we model a high level OO language
with a functional flavor to represent generality of our framework.
A counterpart for attacker knowledge in the realm of general flow of information
integrity, called attacker power [37], is introduced as the set of low integrity inputs
that generate the same observables. In this regard, Askarov et al. [37] use holes in
the syntax of program code for injection points, influenced by [69]. However, their
attack model is different as the low integrity and low confidentiality user is able to
inject program code in the main program, by which she could gain more knowledge.
We have tailored attacker power for explicit flows using state transformers, in order
to interpret integrity taint analysis.
Birgisson et al. [36] give a unified framework to capture different flavors of integrity,
in particular integrity via information flow and via different types of invariance. Sim-
ilar to other works in this line, they give a simple imperative language with labeled
operational semantics in order to enforce integrity policies through communication
with a monitor. In contrast, we use program rewriting techniques to enforce policies
regarding flow of data integrity, which are applicable to legacy systems.
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1.5 Overview and Main Technical Re-
sults of this Dissertation
This dissertation comprises solutions to tackle the problems regarding the enforce-
ment of in-depth policies. In particular, we propose the first semantic framework for
audit logging which enables us to discuss the soundness and completeness notions of
retrospective enforcement of security along with the prospective measures. We in-
stantiate this framework with a sufficiently expressive structure to support two major
application spaces: First, we propose a provably correct enforcement technique for a
general class of logging specifications that could be used to enhance prospective mea-
sures through accountability and surveillance. Second, we propose a unified language
to express and enforce in-depth policies that aim to ameliorate potentially erroneous
prospective controls. This dissertation also discusses a novel semantic framework for
dynamic integrity taint analysis, called explicit integrity, that is general enough to be
used in both imperative and functional paradigms. The major contributions of this
dissertation are as follows:
• The first semantic notion for retrospective enforcement that enables discussing
sound (Definition 2.5.2) and complete (Definition 2.5.3) audit logs.
• A rewriting algorithm to enforce retrospective measures (Definition 3.2.3), and
prove its soundness and completeness (Theorem 3.2.3).
• The first logical assertion of taint analysis that supports uniform specification
and enforcement of the in-depth dynamic integrity taint analysis policies (Def-
inition 4.2.3).
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• The first semantic framework for dynamic integrity taint analysis that is inclu-
sive enough to support functional languages along with imperative ones (Defi-
nition 5.1.3).
In Chapter 2 we define a semantics of auditing, and establish conditions for cor-
rectness of audit rewriting algorithms. That is, we define what it means for a program
instrumentation to correctly log information. In Section 2.1, we introduce information
algebra as the basis of our model for correct audit log generation. We characterize
logging specifications and correctness conditions for audit logs, in a high-level manner
using information algebra. In particular, we obtain formal notions of soundness and
completeness of program rewriting for auditing (Definitions 2.5.2 and 2.5.3). In Sec-
tion 2.6, we study the instantiations of the auditing semantics and transformation of
these instantiations to each other. In this section, we formulate information algebras
based on first-order logic (FOL) and relational algebra that are shown to satisfy nec-
essary conditions (Theorem 2.6.1 and Corollary 2.6.1) to enjoy information-algebraic
properties, including a partial information order. We then leverage FOL-based infor-
mation algebra to define a formal semantics of program auditing (Definition 2.6.5).
Chapter 3 discusses temporal properties of function calls as a general class of log-
ging specifications and break the glass policies. In Section 3.1, the language model
specification is given, which is Featherweight Java. In Section 3.2, we consider this
particular class of logging specifications and present a rewriting algorithm to support
this class In this section, we also prove that a rewriting algorithm is sound and com-
plete with respect to a specific class of logging specifications (Theorem 3.2.3). This
illustrates how our auditing semantics can be leveraged to prove program instrumen-
tation correctness for particular rewriting algorithms. In Section 3.3, we discuss a
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case study on health informatics, particularly OpenMRS system. In this section, we
discuss the deployment of correct audit logging mechanism for OpenMRS system,
and propose techniques to reduce memory overhead.
Chapter 4 discusses dynamic integrity taint analysis as another application for in-
depth enforcement of security. In Section 4.1, we define the source language model for
dynamic integrity taint analysis. In Section 4.2, we introduce a novel logical specifica-
tion of dynamic taint analysis with partial endorsement, that can be used to support a
uniform specification of an in-depth (prospective and retrospective) policy. The main
feature of this section is Definition 4.2.3 which specifies the in-depth policy. In Section
4.3, an implementation of dynamic integrity taint analysis is defined as a program
rewriting algorithm. This section also contains an extended example in Section 4.3.4
illustrating the main ideas of our formulations. In Section 4.4 the rewriting algorithm
is proven operationally correct on the basis of the prospective policy specification,
and sound/complete with respect to the retrospective policy specification. The main
results are that rewritten programs are simulations of the source with integrity flow
reflected in the operational semantics (Theorem 4.4.1) , and that prospective and
retrospective policies are correctly instrumented (Theorems 4.4.2 and 4.4.3).
Chapter 5 focuses on the underlying meaning of dynamic integrity taint analysis.
In Section 5.1, we define the semantic framework for dynamic integrity taint analysis.
We instantiate the semantic framework for the language model in Section 5.2. We
also introduce required properties for user-defined taint propagation policies that
could avoid incorrect implementations. Section 5.2.4 contains examples illustrating
the main ideas of our formulations, in particular incomparability of noninterference
with explicit integrity. Section 5.3 describes an implementation of dynamic integrity
29
taint analysis as a program rewriting algorithm. In Section 5.4, we show that our
enforcement mechanism satisfies the semantic property for dynamic integrity taint
analysis (Theorem 5.4.1).
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
A Semantics of Audit Logging
Our goal in this chapter is to formally characterize logging specifications and cor-
rectness conditions for audit logs [70]. To obtain a general model, we leverage ideas
from the theory of information algebra [13, 71], which is an abstract mathematical
framework for information systems. In short, we interpret program traces as in-
formation, and logging specifications as functions from traces to information. This
separates logging specifications from their implementation in code, and defines exactly
the information that should be in an audit log. This in turn establishes correctness
conditions for audit logging implementations.
2.1 Introduction to Information Alge-
bra
Information algebra is the algebraic study of the theory of information. In information
algebra, information is seen as a collection of separate elements. Each information
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element can be queried for further refinement and also aggregated with other infor-
mation elements. To this end, the algebra consists of two domains: an information
domain and a query domain. The information domain Φ is the set of information el-
ements that can be aggregated in order to build more inclusive information elements.
The query domain E is a lattice of querying sublanguages in which the partial order
relation among these sublanguages represents the granularity of the queries. In order
to aggregate and query the information elements, the following operations are defined.
Definition 2.1.1 Any information algebra (Φ, E) includes two basic operators:
• Combination ⊗ : Φ× Φ→ Φ: The operation X ⊗ Y combines (or, aggregates)
the information in elements X, Y ∈ Φ.
• Focusing ⇒: Φ × E → Φ: The operation X⇒S isolates the elements of X ∈ Φ
that are relevant to a sublanguage S ∈ E, i.e. the subpart of X specified by S.
The two-sorted algebra (Φ, E) is an information algebra if the combination and
focusing operations defined in Definition 2.1.1 meet specific properties.
Definition 2.1.2 Any two-sorted algebra (Φ, E) with operators ⊗ : Φ× Φ→ Φ and
⇒: Φ× E → Φ is an information algerba iff the following properties hold:
• Semigroup: Φ is a commutative semigroup under combination, i.e., associativity
and commutativity hold for ⊗ and there exists a neutral element I ∈ Φ,
• Transitivity of focusing: (X⇒L)⇒M = X⇒L∧M for all X ∈ Φ and L,M ∈ E1,
• Combination: (X⇒L ⊗ Y )⇒L = X⇒L ⊗ Y ⇒L for all X, Y ∈ Φ and L ∈ E,
1Note that L ∧M refers to the meet of L and M in the lattice E.
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• Support: For all X ∈ Φ, there exists some L ∈ E such that X⇒L = X, and
• Idempotence: X ⊗X⇒L = X for all X ∈ Φ and L ∈ E.
Using the combination operator we can define a partial order relation on Φ to
compare the information contained in the elements of Φ. A partial ordering is induced
on Φ by the so-called information ordering relation ≤, where intuitively for X, Y ∈ Φ
we have X ≤ Y iff Y contains at least as much information as X, though its precise
meaning depends on the particular algebra.
Definition 2.1.3 X is contained in Y , denoted as X ≤ Y , for all X, Y ∈ Φ iff
X ⊗ Y = Y .
Definition 2.1.4 We say that X and Y are information equivalent, and write X =
Y , iff X ≤ Y and Y ≤ X.
For a more detailed account of information algebra, the reader is referred to a
definitive survey paper [71]. In what follows, we give an intuitive example of informa-
tion algebra, before instantiating other structures that we will employ for retrospective
security semantics.
2.1.1 Illustrative Example: Relational Alge-
bras
Relational algebra is a well-recognized instance of information algebra [71]. In the
following, we briefly introduce relational algebra and discuss this instantiation.
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(R ./ R′) ./ R′′ = R ./ (R′ ./ R′′) R ./ R′ = R′ ./ R ∅ ./ R = R ./ ∅ = R
piA1 (piA3 (R)) = piA1∩A3 (R) piA1 (piA1 (R) ./ R
′) = piA1 (R) ./ piA1 (R
′)
if dom(R) = A1 then piA1 (R) = R R ./ piA1 (R) = R
Figure 2.1: Properties of Natural Join and Projection
Relational Algebra
Let A denote the set of attributes, Ai ⊆ A for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, A2 ⊆ A1, and assume
that A1 = {a1, ..., an}. Each tuple ((a1 : x1), · · · , (an : xn)) can be formulated as a
function f : A1 → {x1, ..., xn}, where f(ai) = xi.
Function f [A2] : A2 → {x1, ..., xn} is the restriction of f to A2, defined as
f [A2](a) = f(a), for all a ∈ A2.
A relation R over A1 is a set of functions f defined on a specific set of attributes
A1.
Then, the projection of R on A2 is defined as piA2(R) = {f [A2] | f ∈ R}.
The natural join of relation R over A1 and R′ over A3 is defined as R ./ R′ =
{f | dom(f) = A1 ∪ A3, f [A1] ∈ R, f [A3] ∈ R′}.
Instantiation
Let R be the universe of all relations R. Then, (R,P(A)) is an information algebra
with following definitions for combination and focusing:
R⊗R′ , R ./ R′ R⇒A1 , piA1(R)
since the projection and natural join satisfy the properties specified in Figure 2.1.
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2.2 General Model for Logging Speci-
fications
Following [1], an execution trace τ = κ0κ1κ2 . . . is a possibly infinite sequence of con-
figurations κ that describe the state of an executing program. We deliberately leave
configurations abstract, but examples abound and we explore a specific instantiation
for FJ-based calculus in Section 3.2. Note that an execution trace τ may represent
the partial execution of a program, i.e. the trace τ may be extended with additional
configurations as the program continues execution. We use metavariables τ and σ to
range over traces.
We assume given a function b·c that is an injective mapping from traces to Φ.
This mapping interprets a given trace as information, where the injective requirement
ensures that information is not lost in the interpretation. For example, if σ is a proper
prefix of τ and thus contains strictly less information, then formally bσc ≤ bτc. We
intentionally leave both Φ and b·c underspecified for generality, though application of
our formalism to a particular logging implementation requires instantiation of them.
We discuss an example in Section 2.6.
We let LS range over logging specifications, which are functions from traces to
Φ. As for Φ and b·c, we intentionally leave the language of specifications abstract,
but consider a particular instantiation in Section 2.6. Intuitively, LS(τ) denotes
the information that should be recorded in an audit log during the execution of τ
given specification LS , regardless of whether τ actually records any log information,
correctly or incorrectly. We call this the semantics of the logging specification LS .
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We assume that auditing is implementable, requiring at least that all conditions
for logging any piece of information must be met in a finite amount of time. As
we will show, this restriction implies that correct logging instrumentation is a safety
property [1].
Definition 2.2.1 We require of any logging specification LS that for all traces τ and
information X ≤ LS(τ), there exists a finite prefix σ of τ such that X ≤ LS(σ).
It is crucial to observe that some logging specifications may add information not
contained in traces to the auditing process. Security information not relevant to
program execution (such as ACLs), interpretation of event data (statistical or other-
wise), etc., may be added by the logging specification. For example, in the OpenMRS
system [72], logging of sensitive operations includes a human-understandable “type”
designation which is not used by any other code. Thus, given a trace τ and logging
specification LS , it is not necessarily the case that LS(τ) ≤ bτc. Audit logging is not
just a filtering of program events.
2.3 Correctness Conditions for Audit
Logs
A logging specification defines what information should be contained in an audit log.
In this section we develop formal notions of soundness and completeness as audit
log correctness conditions. We use metavariable L to range over audit logs. Again,
we intentionally leave the language of audit logs unspecified, but assume that the
function b·c is extended to audit logs, i.e. b·c is an injective mapping from audit logs
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Full program execution trace τLogging specification LS
LS(τ) The information that should be logged in τ
bLc The information contained in audit log L
Soundness
Completeness
LS(τ) subsumes bLc bLc subsumes LS(τ)
Figure 2.2: Concept Diagram: Logging Specification and Correctness of Audit Logs.
to Φ. Intuitively, bLc denotes the information in L, interpreted as an element of Φ.
An audit log L is sound with respect to a logging specification LS and trace
τ if the log information is contained in LS(τ). Similarly, an audit log is complete
with respect to a logging specification if it contains all of the information in the
logging specification’s semantics. Crucially, both definitions are independent of the
implementation details that generate L.
Definition 2.3.1 Audit log L is sound with respect to logging specification LS and
execution trace τ iff bLc ≤ LS(τ).
Definition 2.3.2 Audit log L is complete with respect to logging specification LS
and execution trace τ iff LS(τ) ≤ bLc.
Figure 2.2 illustrates graphically the relations of soundness and completeness of
audit logs with respect to the semantics of logging.
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Relation to Log Queries
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, we make a distinction between logging specifications
such as LSH which define how to record logs, and log queries such as LQH which
ask questions of logs, and our notions of soundness and completeness apply strictly
to logging specifications. However, any logging query must assume a logging spec-
ification semantics, hence a log that is demonstrably sound and complete provides
the same answers on a given query that an “ideal” log would. This is an important
property that is discussed in previous work, e.g. as “sufficiency” in [73].
2.4 Correct Logging Instrumentation is
a Safety Property
In case program executions generate audit logs, we write τ ; L to mean that trace τ
generates L, i.e. τ = κ0 . . . κn and logof (κn) = L where logof (κ) denotes the audit log
in configuration κ, i.e. the residual log after execution of the full trace. Ideally, infor-
mation that should be added to an audit log, is added to an audit log, immediately
as it becomes available. This ideal is formalized as follows.
Definition 2.4.1 For all logging specifications LS , the trace τ is ideally instrumented
for LS iff for all finite prefixes σ of τ we have σ ; L where L is sound and complete
with respect to LS and σ.
We observe that the restriction imposed on logging specifications by Definition
2.2.1, implies that ideal instrumentation of any logging specification is a safety prop-
erty in the sense defined by Schneider [1].
38
Theorem 2.4.1 For all logging specifications LS , the set of ideally instrumented
traces is a safety property.
Proof. If τ is ideally instrumented for LS , then it is prefix-closed by definition. Fur-
thermore, if τ is not ideally instrumented for LS , then it will definitely be rejected in
a finite amount of time, since any information in LS(τ) is encountered after execution
of a finite prefix σ of τ by Definition 2.2.1. These two facts obtain the result. uunionsq
This result implies that e.g. edit automata can be used to enforce instrumenta-
tion of logging specifications (see Section 3.2.2). However, theory related to safety
properties and their enforcement by execution monitors [1, 74] do not provide an
adequate semantic foundation for audit log generation, nor an account of soundness
and completeness of audit logs.
2.5 Implementing Logging Specifications
with Program Rewriting
The above-defined correctness conditions for audit logs provide a foundation on which
to establish correctness of logging implementations. Here we consider program rewrit-
ing approaches. Since rewriting concerns specific languages, we introduce an abstract
notion of programs p with an operational semantics that can produce a trace. We
write p ⇓ σ iff program p can produce execution trace τ , either deterministically or
non-deterministically, and σ is a finite prefix of τ .
A rewriting algorithm R is a (partial) function that takes a program p in a source
language and a logging specification LS and produces a new program, R(p,LS), in a
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target language.2 The intent is that the target program is the result of instrumenting
p to produce an audit log appropriate for the logging specification LS . A rewriting
algorithm may be partial, in particular because it may only be intended to work for
a specific set of logging specifications.
Ideally, a rewriting algorithm should preserve the semantics of the program it
instruments. That is, R is semantics-preserving if the rewritten program simulates
the semantics of the source code, modulo logging steps. We assume given a corre-
spondence relation :≈ on execution traces. A coherent definition of correspondence
should be similar to a bisimulation, but it is not necessarily symmetric nor a bisimu-
lation, since the instrumented target program may be in a different language than the
source program. We deliberately leave the correspondence relation underspecified, as
its definition will depend on the instantiation of the model. Possible definitions are
that traces produce the same final value, or that traces when restricted to a set of
memory locations are equivalent up to stuttering. We provide an explicit definition
of correspondence for FJ-calculus source and target languages in Section 3.2.
Definition 2.5.1 Rewriting algorithm R is semantics preserving iff for all programs
p and logging specifications LS such that R(p,LS) is defined, all of the following hold:
1. For all traces τ such that p ⇓ τ there exists τ ′ with τ :≈ τ ′ and R(p,LS) ⇓ τ ′.
2. For all traces τ such that R(p,LS) ⇓ τ there exists a trace τ ′ such that τ ′ :≈ τ
and p ⇓ τ ′.
In addition to preserving program semantics, a correctly rewritten program con-
structs a log in accordance with the given logging specification. More precisely, if
2We use metavariable p to range over programs in either the source or target language; it will be
clear from context which language is used.
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LS is a given logging specification and a trace τ describes execution of a source
program, rewriting should produce a program with a trace τ ′ that corresponds to
τ (i.e., τ :≈ τ ′), where the log L generated by τ ′ contains the same information as
LS(τ), or at least a sound approximation. Some definitions of :≈ may allow sev-
eral target-language traces to correspond to source-language traces (as for example
in Section 3.2, Definition 4.4.8). In any case, we expect that at least one simulation
exists. Hence we write simlogs(p, τ) to denote a nonempty set of logs L such that,
given source language trace τ and target program p, there exists some trace τ ′ where
p ⇓ τ ′ and τ :≈ τ ′ and τ ′ ; L. The name simlogs evokes the relation to logs resulting
from simulating executions in the target language.
The following definitions then establish correctness conditions for rewriting algo-
rithms. Note that satisfaction of either of these conditions only implies condition (i)
of Definition 2.5.1, not condition (ii), so semantics preservation is an independent
condition.
Definition 2.5.2 Rewriting algorithm R is sound iff for all programs p, logging spec-
ifications LS , and finite traces τ where p ⇓ τ , for all L ∈ simlogs(R(p,LS), τ) it is
the case that L is sound with respect to LS and τ .
Definition 2.5.3 Rewriting algorithm R is complete iff for all programs p, logging
specifications LS , and finite traces τ where p ⇓ τ , for all L ∈ simlogs(R(p,LS), τ) it
is the case that L is complete with respect to LS and τ .
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2.6 Languages for Logging Specifications
In this section, we go into more detail about information algebra and why it is a good
foundation for logging specifications and semantics. We use the formalism of infor-
mation algebras to characterize and compare the information contained in an audit
log with the information contained in an actual execution. In particular, Definition
2.6.5 formally defines logging specification using the operators of information algebra.
Example 2.6.1 gives an instance of such logging specification. We follow the proposed
formalism in this section to implement audit logging in health informatics.
Various approaches are taken to audit log generation and representation, includ-
ing logical [18], database [47], and probabilistic approaches [75]. Information alge-
bra is sufficiently general to contain relevant systems as instances, so our notions of
soundness and completeness can apply broadly. Here we discuss logical and database
approaches.
2.6.1 First Order Logic (FOL)
Logics have been used in several well-developed auditing systems [40, 43], for the
encoding of both audit logs and queries. FOL in particular is attractive due to
readily available implementation support, e.g. Datalog and Prolog.
Let Greek letters φ and ψ range over FOL formulas and let capital letters X, Y, Z
range over sets of formulas. We posit a sound and complete proof theory supporting
judgements of the form X ` φ. In this text we assume without loss of generality a
natural deduction proof theory.
The properties given in the following Lemma are stated without proof since they
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are self-evident properties of FOL deduction.
Lemma 2.6.1 Each of the following properties hold:
1. X ` φ for each φ ∈ X
2. If X ` φ for each φ in Y and Y ` ψ, then X ` ψ
Elements of our algebra are sets of formulas closed under logical entailment. In-
tuitively, given a set of formulas X, the closure of X is the set of formulas that are
logically entailed by X, and thus represents all the information contained in X. In
spirit, we follow the treatment of sentential logic as an information algebra explored
in related foundational work [13], however our definition of closure is syntactic, not
semantic.
Definition 2.6.1 We define a closure operation C, and a set ΦFOL of closed sets of
formulas:
C(X) = {φ | X ` φ} ΦFOL = {X | C(X) = X}
Note in particular that C(∅) is the set of logical tautologies.
Due to the definition of preconditions, we will be particularly interested in proving
properties of sets CL(X):
Definition 2.6.2 For each sublanguage L ∈ S, we define closure operator CL(X):
CL(X) = C(X) ∩ L.
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An important point about such sets is that their closures contain tautological as-
sertions, which may involve predicates P which are not included in L. However, in
tautological assertions any predicate does as well as any other, which is an important
fact to get hold of for our proofs. Thus we will identify a “dummy” predicate that,
in essence, allows us to treat a canonical form of tautologies.
Definition 2.6.3 We reserve a unary dummy predicate D with a countably infinite
domain of constants c, and posit an injective function from distinct concrete asser-
tions P (c¯) to distinct D(c). We further define normL(φ) to be the formula φ′ which is
the same as φ, but where each P (c¯) 6∈ L is replaced with its corresponding image D(c)
in the injection. The pointwise extension of normL to sets X is denoted normL(X).
Now, we demonstrate canonical forms:
Lemma 2.6.2 X ∩ L ∪ Y ` φ iff X ∩ L ∪ normL(Y ) ` normL(φ).
Proof. First we prove the left-to-right implication by induction on the derivation of
C(X) ∩ L ∪ Y ` φ and case analysis on the last step in the derivation.
Case Axiom. In this case φ ∈ X ∩ L ∪ Y , so either φ ∈ Y , or φ ∈ X ∩ L. In the
former subcase, normL(φ) ∈ normL(Y ) by definition and normL(φ) = φ in the latter
subcase. In either subcase, the result holds axiomatically.
Case → elimination. In this case we have:
X ∩ L ∪ Y ` ψ → φ X ∩ L ∪ Y ` ψ
X ∩ L ∪ Y ` φ
By the induction hypothesis we have:
X ∩ L ∪ normL(Y ) ` normL(ψ → φ) X ∩ L ∪ normL(Y ) ` normL(ψ)
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But normL(ψ → φ) = normL(ψ) → normL(ψ) by definition, so the result follows in
this case by modus ponens. uunionsq
Let Preds be the set of all predicate symbols, and let S ⊆ Preds be a set of
predicate symbols. We define sublanguage LS to be the set of well-formed formulas
over predicate symbols in S (and including boolean atoms T and F , and closed
under the usual first-order connectives and binders). We will use sublanguages to
define refinement operations in our information algebra. Subset containment induces
a lattice structure, denoted S, on the set of all sublanguages, with F = LPreds as the
top element.
Lemma 2.6.2 shows that wlog we can modify S so that every L ∈ S contains D.
Hence we have immediately:
Lemma 2.6.3 For all L,M ∈ S and φ ∈ F , normL(φ) ∈ L, and if φ ∈ M then
normL(φ) ∈M .
This allows us to prove the following important auxiliary results about closures.
Lemma 2.6.4 If C(X) ∩ L ` φ and φ ∈M , then C(X) ∩ L ∩M ` φ.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6.3 we have normL(φ) ∈ L, and by Lemma 2.6.2 we have C(X)∩
L ` normL(φ), hence normL(φ) ∈ C(X)∩L. But also normL(φ) ∈M by assumption
and Lemma 2.6.3, so also normL(φ) ∈ C(X)∩L∩M . Hence C(X)∩L∩M ` normL(φ)
as an axiom, therefore the result follows by Lemma 2.6.2. uunionsq
Lemma 2.6.5 If CL(CM(X)) ∪ Y ` φ then CM∩L(X) ∪ Y ` φ.
Proof. The result follows by induction on CL(CM(X)) ∪ Y ` φ and case analysis on
the last step in the derivation. Most cases follow in a straightforward manner; the
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presence of Y in the formulation is to allow for additional hypotheses, as for example
in the case of → introduction, as follows.
Case → introduction. In this case φ = φ1 → φ2, and we have:
CL(CM(X)) ∪ Y ∪ {φ1} ` φ2
CL(CM(X)) ∪ Y ` φ1 → φ2
but then by the induction hypothesis the judgement CM∩L(X) ∪ Y ∪ {φ1} ` φ is
derivable, so the result follows by → introduction.
The interesting case is the axiomatic one, i.e. where φ ∈ CL(CM(X)) ∪ Y , and
specifically the subcase where φ ∈ CL(CM(X)), which follows by Lemma 2.6.4. uunionsq
The following Lemma completes the necessary preconditions to prove that the
construction ΦFOL is a “domain-free” information algebra [13].
Lemma 2.6.6 Each of the following properties hold:
1. If X ⊆ Y then C(X) ⊆ C(Y ).
2. C(X ∪ Y ) = C(X ∪ C(Y ))
3. C(CL(CM(X))) = C(CM∩L(X))
for X ⊆ F and L,M ∈ S
4. CL(CL(X) ∪ Y ) = CL(CL(X) ∪ CL(Y ))
Proof. Properties (1) and (2) are a consequence of Lemma 2.6.1 as demostrated in
[13].
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Proof of (3). By definition:
C(CL(CM(X))) = C(C(C(X) ∩M) ∩ L) C(CM∩L(X)) = C(C(X) ∩M ∩ L)
Since C(X)∩M ⊆ C(C(X)∩M) by Lemma 2.6.1 property (1), therefore by property
(1) in the current Lemma:
C(C(X) ∩M ∩ L) ⊆ C(C(C(X) ∩M) ∩ L).
It thus remains to show that:
C(C(C(X) ∩M) ∩ L) ⊆ C(C(X) ∩M ∩ L)
which follows by definition of closure and an application of Lemma 2.6.5, taking
Y = ∅ in that Lemma.
Proof of (4). By (2), we have:
C(CL(X) ∪ Y ) = C(CL(X) ∪ C(Y ))
and thus also:
C(CL(X) ∪ (C(Y ) ∩ L)) ⊆ C(CL(X) ∪ C(Y ))
which establishes:
CL(CL(X) ∪ CL(Y )) ⊆ CL(CL(X) ∪ Y ).
47
For brevity in the remaining, define:
A = CL(CL(X) ∪ C(Y )) B = CL(CL(X) ∪ CL(Y )).
To prove the result it now suffices to establish that A ⊆ B, so we assume on the
contrary that there exists some φ ∈ L where A ` φ but B 6` φ. Now, clearly
φ 6∈ C(X) and φ 6∈ C(Y ), since in these cases it must be that B ` φ holds. Therefore
there exist some minimal nonempty subsets C ⊆ C(Y ) and D ⊆ CL(X) such that
C ∪D ` φ. Let ψD be the conjunction of terms in D. Clearly ψD ∈ L. Furthermore,
by properties of logic, C ` ψD → φ holds, so that ψD → φ ∈ C(Y ), and since
ψD ∈ L and φ ∈ L by construction and assumption, therefore ψD → φ ∈ L, hence
ψD → φ ∈ CL(Y ). But ψD ∈ CL(X) necesarily, so CL(X) ∪ CL(Y ) ` φ by modus
ponens and (1). Thus B ` φ also by (1), which is a contradiction, etc. uunionsq
Now we can define the focus and combination operators, which are the fundamen-
tal operators of an information algebra. Focusing isolates the component of a closed
set of formulas that is in a given sublanguage. Combination closes the union of closed
sets of formulas. Intuitively, the focus of a closed set of formulas X to sublanguage
L is the refinement of the information in X to the formulas in L. The combination
of closed sets of formulas X and Y combines the information of each set.
Definition 2.6.4 Define:
1. Focusing: X⇒S = C(X ∩ LS) where X ∈ ΦFOL, S ⊆ Preds
2. Combination: X ⊗ Y = C(X ∪ Y ) where X, Y ∈ ΦFOL
These definitions of focusing and combination enjoy a number of properties within
the algebra, as stated in the following Theorem, establishing that the construction is
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an information algebra. FOL has been treated as an information algebra before, but
our definitions of combination and focusing and hence the result are novel.
Theorem 2.6.1 Structure (ΦFOL,S) with focus operation X⇒S and combination op-
eration X ⊗ Y forms a domain-free information algebra.
Proof. The following properties hold immediately according to Lemma 2.6.6 and
Lemma 2.6.1, and thus (ΦFOL,S) is an information algebra [13]:
• Semigroup: Φ is associative and commutative under combination, and C(∅) is
a neutral element with X ⊗ C(∅) = X for all X ∈ Φ.
• Transitivity: (X⇒L)⇒M = X⇒L∩M for all X ∈ Φ and L,M ∈ S.
• Combination: (X⇒L ⊗ Y )⇒L = X⇒L ⊗ Y ⇒L for all X, Y ∈ Φ and L ∈ S.
• Support: X⇒F = X for all X ∈ Φ.
• Idempotence: X ⊗X⇒L = X for all X ∈ Φ and L ∈ S.
uunionsq
In addition, to interpret traces and logs as elements of this algebra, i.e. to define
the function b·c, we assume existence of a function toFOL(·) that injectively maps
traces and logs to sets of FOL formulas, and then take b·c = C(toFOL(·)). To define
the range of toFOL(·), that is, to specify how trace information will be represented in
FOL, we assume the existence of configuration description predicates P which are each
at least unary. Each configuration description predicate fully describes some element
of a configuration κ, and the first argument is always a natural number t, indicating
the time at which the configuration occurred. A set of configuration description pred-
icates with the same timestamp describes a configuration, and traces are described
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by the union of sets describing each configuration in the trace. In particular, the con-
figuration description predicates include predicate Call(t, f, x), which indicates that
function f is called at time t with argument x. We will fully define toFOL(·) when
we discuss particular source and target languages for program rewriting.
Example 2.6.1 We return to the example described in Section 1.2.1 to show how
FOL can express break the glass logging specifications. Adapting a logic programming
style, the trace of a program can be viewed as a fact base, and the logging specification
LSH performs resolution of a LoggedCall predicate, defined via the following Horn
clause we call ψH :
∀t, d, s, u.(Call(t, read, u, d) ∧ Call(s,breakGlass, u) ∧ s < t ∧ PatientInfo(d))
=⇒ LoggedCall(t, read, u, d)
Here we imagine that breakGlass is a break the glass function where u identifies
the current user and PatientInfo is a predicate specifying which files contain patient
information. The log contains only valid instances of LoggedCall given a particu-
lar trace, which specify the user and sensitive information accessed following glass
breaking, which otherwise would be disallowed by a separate access control policy.
Formally, we define logging specifications in a logic programming style by using
combination and focusing. Any logging specification is parameterized by a sublan-
guage S that identifies the predicate(s) to be resolved and Horn clauses X that define
it/them, hence we define a functional spec from pairs (X,S) to specifications LS ,
where we use λ as a binder for function definitions in the usual manner:
Definition 2.6.5 The function spec is given a pair (X,S) and returns a FOL logging
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specification, i.e. a function from traces to elements of ΦFOL:
spec(X,S) = λτ.(bτc ⊗ C(X))⇒S.
In any logging specification spec(X,S), we call X the guidelines.
The above example LSH would then be formally defined as spec(ψH , {LoggedCall}).
2.6.2 Relational Database
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, relational algebra is a canonical example of an informa-
tion algebra, which provides information algebraic analysis of relational databases.
However, that formulation is of little use in case we seek a formal relation between
recorded logs in the relational database and the semantics of logging specification
according to Definition 2.6.5. Thus, in this section, we formulate a novel instantia-
tion of relational databases which could be leveraged for correct audit purposes. We
define databases D as sets of relations, where a relation X is a set of tuples f . We
write ((a1 : x1), ..., (an : x1)) to denote an n-ary tuple with attributes (aka label)
ai associated with values xi. Databases are elements of the information algebra, and
sublanguages S are collections of sets of attributes. Each set of attributes corresponds
to a specific relation. Focusing is the restriction to particular relations in a database,
and combination is the union of databases. Hence, letting ≤RA denote the relational
algebra information ordering, D1 ≤RA D2 iff D1 ⊗ D2 = D2. We refer to this alge-
bra as ΦRA. In this context, a trace can be interpreted as a collection of relations,
and logging specifications can be defined using selects. Relational databases are also
heavily used for storing and querying audit logs.
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Let A be a denumerable set of attribute names. Moreover, let R be the universe
for relations, i.e., R = {R ⊆ Aa1 × · · ·Aam | ai ∈ A}. Note that Aai is the domain of
values for attribute ai. We denote the arity of a relation R with arity(R).
Definition 2.6.6 Let Name : R→ P(A) be defined as Name(R) = {a1, · · · , aarity(R)},
if R ⊆ Aa1 × · · ·Aaarity(R).
Definition 2.6.7 Let database D be a finite subset of R containing finite relations,
i.e., a database D is a finite collection of relations R ∈ R, where each R is a finite
set of tuples defining the relation. ΦRA is defined as the set of all databases.
We also define the querying sublanguages as the sets of relation names, i.e., S ∈
P(P(A)). Next, we define the information algebra operations:
Definition 2.6.8 Define:
• Focusing: D⇒S = {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S}, where D ∈ ΦRA, and S ∈ P(P(A))
and finite,
• Combination: D1⊗D2 = {R1∪R2 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2},Name(R1) = Name(R2)}.
Note that in case some relation is not defined in a database, we assume it is defined
as an empty relation. We also define a mapping which represents non-trivial relation
names in a database:
Definition 2.6.9 Let Names : ΦRA → P(P(A)) be defined as
Names(D) = {Name(R) | R ∈ D,R 6= ∅}.
In what follows we show that (ΦRA,P(P(A))) is an information algebra.
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Lemma 2.6.7 ΦRA is a commutative semigroup.
Proof. We need to show that
• ΦRA is associative on combination:
Holds straightforwardly based on the associativity of union on sets:
D1 ⊗ (D2 ⊗D3) = D1 ⊗ {R2 ∪R3 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {2, 3},
Name(R2) = Name(R3)}
= {R1 ∪ (R2 ∪R3) | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
Name(R1) = Name(R2) = Name(R3)}
= {(R1 ∪R2) ∪R3 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
Name(R1) = Name(R2) = Name(R3)}
= {R1 ∪R2 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2},
Name(R1) = Name(R2)} ⊗D3
= (D1 ⊗D2)⊗D3.
• ΦRA is commutative on combination:
Holds straightforwardly based on the commutativity of union on sets:
D1 ⊗D2 = {R1 ∪R2 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2},Name(R1) = Name(R2)}
= {R2 ∪R1 | Ri ∈ Di, i ∈ {1, 2},Name(R1) = Name(R2)}
= D2 ⊗D1.
• There exists a neutral element I such that for all D, D ⊗ I = D:
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Let I = {∅}. Obviously, D ⊗ I = D as ∅ is the neutral element for union.
uunionsq
Lemma 2.6.8 Transitivity: (D⇒S1)⇒S2 = D⇒S1∩S2.
Proof.
(D⇒S1)⇒S2 = {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S1}⇒S2
= {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S1,Name(R) ∈ S2}
= {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S1 ∩ S2}
= D⇒S1∩S2 .
uunionsq
Lemma 2.6.9 Combination: (D1⇒S ⊗D2)⇒S = D1⇒S ⊗D2⇒S.
Proof.
(D1⇒S ⊗D2)⇒S = ({R1 ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S} ⊗D2)⇒S
= {R1 ∪R2 | R1 ∈ D1,Name(R1) ∈ S,R2 ∈ D2,
Name(R1) = Name(R2)}⇒S
= {R1 ∪R2 | R1 ∈ D1,Name(R1) ∈ S,R2 ∈ D2,
Name(R1) = Name(R2),Name(R1 ∪R2) ∈ S}.
Obviously, if Name(R1) = Name(R2), then Name(R1 ∪ R2) = Name(R1). We thus
54
have
(D1⇒S ⊗D2)⇒S = {R1 ∪R2 | R1 ∈ D1,Name(R1) ∈ S,R2 ∈ D2,
Name(R1) = Name(R2)}
Moreover,
D1
⇒S ⊗D2⇒S = {R1 ∈ D | Name(R1) ∈ S} ⊗ {R2 ∈ D | Name(R2) ∈ S}
= {R1 ∪R2 | R1 ∈ D1,Name(R1) ∈ S,R2 ∈ D2,Name(R2) ∈ S,
Name(R1) = Name(R2)}
= {R1 ∪R2 | R1 ∈ D1,Name(R1) ∈ S,R2 ∈ D2,
Name(R1) = Name(R2)}.
Thus, (D1⇒S ⊗D2)⇒S = D1⇒S ⊗D2⇒S. uunionsq
Lemma 2.6.10 Support: ∀D, ∃S,D⇒S = D.
Proof. Let S = Names(D). Then, D⇒Names(D) = D. uunionsq
Lemma 2.6.11 Idempotence: D ⊗D⇒S = D.
Proof.
D ⊗D⇒S = {R | R ∈ D} ⊗ {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S}
= {R ∈ D | Name(R) /∈ S} ∪ {R ∈ D | Name(R) ∈ S}
= D.
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uunionsq
Corollary 2.6.1 (ΦRA,P(P(A))) is an information algebra.
2.6.3 Transforming and Combining Audit Logs
Multiple audit logs from different sources are often combined in practice. Also, logging
information is often transformed for storage and communication. For example, log
data may be generated in common event format (CEF), which is parsed and stored in
relational database tables, and subsequently exported and communicated via JSON.
In all cases, it is necessary to characterize the effect of transformation (if any) on log
information, and relate queries on various representations to the logging specification
semantics. Otherwise, it is unclear what is the relation of log queries to log-generating
programs.
To address this, information algebra provides a useful concept called monotone
mapping. Given two information algebras Ψ1 and Ψ2 with ordering relations ≤1 and
≤2 respectively, a mapping µ from elements X, Y of Ψ1 to elements µ(X), µ(Y ) of
Ψ2 is monotone iff X ≤1 Y implies µ(X) ≤2 µ(Y ). For example, assuming that
Ψ1 is our FOL information algebra while Ψ2 is relational algebra, we can define a
monotone mapping using a least Herbrand interpretation [76], denoted H, and by
positing a function attrs from n-ary predicate symbols to functions mapping numbers
1, ..., n to labels. That is, attrs(P)(n) is the label associated with the nth argument
of predicate P. We require that if P 6= Q then attrs(P)(j) 6= attrs(Q)(k) for all j, k.
To map predicates to tuples we have:
tuple(P(x1, . . . , xn)) = ((attrs(P)(1) : x1), . . . , (attrs(P)(n) : xn))
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Then to obtain a relation from all valid instances of a particular predicate P given
formulas X we define:
RP(X) = {tuple(P(x1, . . . , xn)) | P(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H(X)}
Now we define the function rel which is collection of all relations obtained from
X, where P1, ...,Pn are the predicate symbols occurring in X:
rel(X) = {RP1(X), · · · , RPn(X)}
Theorem 2.6.2 rel is a monotone mapping.
Proof. We need to show that X ≤FOL Y implies rel(X) ≤RA rel(Y ).
From X ≤FOL Y we have H(X) ⊆ H(Y ). Let R ∈ rel(X) and R′ ∈ rel(Y ), such that
Name(R) = Name(R′). Then, R = RP(X) and R′ = RP(Y ), for some n-ary predicate
symbol P such that Name(R) = {attrs(P)(1), · · · , attrs(P)(n)}. Since H(X) ⊆ H(Y ),
R = {tuple(P(x1, . . . , xn)) | P(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H(X)}
⊆ {tuple(P(x1, . . . , xn)) | P(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ H(Y )} = R′.
Therefore, R ∪R′ = R′. Then,
rel(X)⊗ rel(Y ) = {R ∪R′ | R ∈ rel(X), R′ ∈ rel(Y ),Name(R) = Name(R′)}
= {R′ | R ∈ rel(X), R′ ∈ rel(Y ),Name(R) = Name(R′)}
= rel(Y ).
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This implies rel(X) ≤RA rel(Y ) by information containment definition. uunionsq
Thus, if we wish to generate an audit log L as a set of FOL formulas, but ultimately
store the data in a relational database, we are still able to maintain a formal relation
between stored logs and the semantics of a given trace τ and specification LS . E.g.,
if a log L is sound with respect to τ and LS , then rel(bLc) ≤RA rel(LS(τ)). While
the data in rel(bLc) may very well be broken up into multiple relations in practice,
e.g. to compress data and/or for query optimization, the formalism also establishes
correctness conditions for the transformation that relate resulting information to the
logging semantics LS(τ) by way of the mapping. We reify this idea in our OpenMRS
implementation as discussed in Section 3.3.2.
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Chapter 3
Temporal properties of function
calls: Break the glass policies
In this chapter, we specify our language model, a core OO calculus in Section 3.1.
Next, we specify a class of logging specifications whose concern is the temporal prop-
erties of function calls [77]. This class, called Calls is introduced in Section 3.2.1.
Section 3.2.2 proposes an edit automata to enforce ideal instrumentation. We develop
a provably correct enforcement mechanism by program instrumentation for Calls in
Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.4. We also discuss our case study in health informatics
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we explore the techniques to avoid memory leakage in
the deployment of Calls.
3.1 Source Language
In this section, we define the source language which is the basis for our language
model in this dissertation. It includes the definitions of configurations and execution
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traces.function toFOL(·) that shows how we concretely model execution traces in
FOL. This language model which is used with potential minor modifications in the
following sections for studying temporal properties of function calls and dynamic
integrity taint analysis.
We begin the technical presentation with definition of our language model based
on Featherweight Java (FJ) [27]. FJ is a core calculus that includes class hierarchy
definitions, subtyping, dynamic dispatch, and other basic features of Java. Language
FJ is a simple call-by-value OO core calculus with functional flavor. An FJ program is
a pair (e, CT ) where e is an expression, and CT is a class table which maintains class
definitions. An FJ configuration is a pair (e, n) of an expression e and a timestamp
n. We assume the implicit existence of class tables as a component of configurations,
since class tables do not change during program execution.
3.1.1 Syntax
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the syntax for FJ. We let A, B, C, D range over class names,
x range over variables, f range over field names, and m range over method names.
Values, denoted v or u, are objects, i.e. expressions of the form new C(v1, . . . , vn).
We assume given an Object value that has no fields or methods. In addition to
the standard expressions of FJ, we introduce a new form C.m(e). This form is used
to identify the method C.m associated with a current evaluation context (aka the
“activation frame”). This does not really change the semantics, but is a useful feature
for our specification of sanitizer endorsement since return values from sanitizers need
to be endorsed– see the Invoke and Return rules in the operational semantics for its
usage.
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L ::= class C extends C {C¯ f¯; K M¯} K ::= C(C¯ f¯){super(f¯); this.f¯ = f¯; } M ::= C m(C¯ x¯){return e; }
e ::= x | e.f | e.m(e¯) | new C(e¯) | C.m(e) E ::= [ ] | E.f | E.m(e¯) | v.m(v¯, E, e¯′) | new C(v¯, E, e¯′) | C.m(E)
κ ::= (e, n) p ::= (e, CT )
Figure 3.1: FJ Syntax
For brevity in this syntax, we use vector notations. Specifically we write f¯ to
denote the sequence f1, . . . , fn, similarly for C¯, m¯, x¯, e¯, etc., and we write M¯ as short-
hand for M1 · · · Mn. We write the empty sequence as ∅, we use a comma as a sequence
concatenation operator. If and only if m is one of the names in m¯, we write m ∈ m¯. Vec-
tor notation is also used to abbreviate sequences of declarations; we let C¯ f¯ and C¯ f¯;
denote C1 f1, . . . , Cn fn and C1 f1; . . . ; Cn fn; respectively. The notation this.f¯ = f¯;
abbreviates this.f1 = f1; . . . ; this.fn = fn;. Sequences of names and declarations
are assumed to contain no duplicate names.
3.1.2 Semantics
The semantic definition has several components, in addition to evaluation rules.
The class table, field and method body lookup, and inheritance
The class table CT maintains class definitions. The manner in which we look up field
and method definitions implements inheritance and override, which allows fields and
methods to be redefined in subclasses. These definitions are given Figure 3.2 and
Figure 3.3. We assume a given class table CT during evaluation, which will be clear
from context.
Using CT we also define a predicate to denote the inherited methods in a class
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fieldsCT (Object) = ∅
CT (C) = class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} fieldsCT (D) = D¯ g¯
fieldsCT (C) = D¯ g¯, C¯ f¯
Figure 3.2: Class Fields in FJ
CT (C) = class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} B m(B¯ x¯){return e; } ∈ M¯
mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
CT (C) = class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} m 6∈ M¯
mbodyCT (m, C) = mbodyCT (m, D)
Figure 3.3: Method Bodies in FJ
(Figure 3.4). The class table is implicit in this definition.
Method type lookup
Just as we’ve defined a function for looking up method bodies in the class table,
we also define a function that will look up method types in a class table. Method
type lookup is defined in Figure 3.5. Although we omit FJ type analysis from this
presentation, method type lookup will be useful for taint analysis instrumentation
(Definition 4.3.1).
Operational semantics
Now, we can define the operational semantics of FJ. We define these as a small step
relation in the usual manner, depicted in Figure 3.6.
We use →∗ to denote the reflexive, transitive closure of →. We will also use
the notion of an execution trace τ to represent a series of configurations κ, where
τ = κ1 . . . κn means that κi → κi+1 for 0 < i < n. Note that an execution trace τ may
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CT (C) = class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} B m(B¯ x¯){return e; } ∈ M¯
Inherit(m, C, C)
CT (C) = class C extends E {C¯ f¯; K M¯} m 6∈ M¯ Inherit(m, E, D)
Inherit(m, C, D)
Figure 3.4: Method Inheritance in FJ
class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} B m(B¯ x¯){return e; } ∈ M¯
mtypeCT (m, C) = B¯→ B
class C extends D {C¯ f¯; K M¯} m 6∈ M¯
mtypeCT (m, C) = mtypeCT (m, D)
Figure 3.5: Method Types in FJ
represent the partial execution of a program, i.e. the trace τ may be extended with
additional configurations as the program continues execution. We use metavariables
τ and σ to range over traces.
To denote execution of top-level programs p(θ) where θ is an object, we assume
that all class tables CT include an entry point TopLevel.main, where TopLevel ob-
jects have no fields. We define p(θ) = new TopLevel().main(θ), and we write p(θ) ⇓ τ
iff trace τ begins with the configuration (p(θ), 0).
We define a mapping toFOL(·) that shows how we concretely model execution
traces in FOL. We develop toFOL(·) that interprets FJ traces as sets of logical facts
(a fact base), and define b·c = C(toFOL(·)). Intuitively, in the interpretation each
configuration is represented by a Context predicate representing the evaluation con-
text, and predicates (e.g. Call) representing redexes. Each of these predicates have
an initial natural number argument denoting a “timestamp”, reflecting the ordering
of configurations in a trace.
63
Context
(e, n)→ (e′, n′)
(E[e], n)→ (E[e′], n′)
Field
fieldsCT (C) = C¯ f¯ fi ∈ f¯
(new C(v¯).fi, n)→ (vi, n+ 1)
Invoke
mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
(new C(v¯).m(u¯), n)→ (C.m(e[new C(v¯)/this][u¯/x¯]), n+ 1)
Return
(C.m(v), n)→ (v, n+ 1)
Figure 3.6: FJ Operational Semantics
toFOL((v, n)) = {Value(n, v)},
toFOL((E[new C(v¯).f], n)) = {GetField(n, new C(v¯), f),Context(n, E)},
toFOL((E[new C(v¯).m(u¯)], n)) = {Call(n, C, v¯, m, u¯),Context(n, E)},
toFOL((E[C.m(v)], n)) = {ReturnValue(n, C, m, v),Context(n, E)}.
Figure 3.7: Definition of toFOL(·) for Configurations.
Definition 3.1.1 We define toFOL(·) as a mapping on traces and configurations:
toFOL(τ) =
⋃
σ∈prefix(τ)
toFOL(σ)
such that toFOL(σ) = ⋃i toFOL(κi) for σ = κ1 · · ·κk. We define toFOL(κ) as in
Figure 3.7.
3.2 Rewriting Programs with Logging
Specifications
Since correct logging instrumentation is a safety property (Section 2.4), there are
several possible implementation strategies. For example, one could define an edit
automata that enforces the property (see Section 3.2.2), that could be implemented
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either as a separate program monitor or using IRM techniques [14]. But since we
are interested in program rewriting for a particular class of logging specifications, the
approach we discuss here is more simply stated and proven correct than a general
IRM methodology.
We specify a class of logging specifications of interest, along with a program rewrit-
ing algorithm that is sound and complete for it. We consider FJ to serve as the formal
setting to establish correctness of a program rewriting approach to correct instrumen-
tation of logging specification. We use this same approach to implement an auditing
tool for OpenMRS, described in the next section. The supported class of logging spec-
ifications is predicated on temporal properties of method calls and characteristics of
their arguments. This class has practical potential since security-sensitive operations
are often packaged as functions or methods (e.g. in medical records software [78]),
and the supported class allows complex policies such as break the glass to be ex-
pressed. The language of logging specifications is FOL, and we use ΦFOL to define
the semantics of logging and prove correctness of the algorithm.
3.2.1 Specifications Based on Function Call Prop-
erties
We define a class Calls of logging specifications that capture temporal properties
of function calls, such as those reflected in break the glass policies. We restrict
specification definitions to safe Horn clauses to ensure applicability of well-known
results and total algorithms such as Datalog [76]. Specifications in Calls support
logging of calls to a specific methods C0.m0 that happen after functions C1.m1, . . . , Cn.mn
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∀t, C, v¯, m, u¯, D .Call(t, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∧ Inherit(m, C, D) =⇒ Call(t, D, v¯, m, u¯)
∀t0, . . . , tn, v¯0, . . . , v¯n, u¯0, . . . , u¯n .Call(t0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0)
n∧
i=1
(Call(ti, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∧ ti < t0) ∧
φ((t0, v¯0, u¯0), . . . , (tn, v¯n, u¯n)) =⇒ LoggedCall(t0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0).
Figure 3.8: Horn Clauses in Calls
are called. Conditions on all object arguments, method arguments, and times of
method invocation, can be defined via a predicate φ. Hence more precise requirements
can be imposed, e.g. a linear ordering on invocations, particular values of method
arguments, etc.
Definition 3.2.1 Calls is the set of all logging specifications spec(X, {LoggedCall})
where X contains safe Horn clauses of the form given in Figure 3.8.
While set X may contain other safe Horn clauses, in particular definitions of
predicates occurring in φ, no other Horn clause in X uses the predicate symbols
LoggedCall, Value, Context, Call, ReturnValue, or GetField. For convenience in the
following, we define Logevent(LS) = C0.m0 and Triggers(LS) = {C1.m1, ..., Cn.mn}.
We note that specifications in Calls clearly satisfy Definition 2.2.1, since precon-
ditions for logging a particular call to C0.m0 must be satisfied at the time of that
call.
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3.2.2 Edit Automata Enforcement of Calls Spec-
ifications
Considering Theorem 2.4.1, we observe that given a logging specification in Calls,
we can easily define an edit automata that enforces this property. The following
definition is in the “guarded command” style used by Schneider [1]. The array A is
used to store potentially multiple values of potentially multiple calls to each function
gi.
Theorem 3.2.1 Given spec(X,S) ∈ Calls, the ideal instrumentation property is
enforced by the edit automata in Figure 3.9. It is defined using the following predicates
on input configurations κ:
Call(t, C, x¯,m, y¯) : means Call(t, C, x¯,m, y¯) ∈ toFOL(κ)
φ logged : means φ ∈ toFOL(logof (κ))
and also T and V denote the universes of timestamps and program values respectively.
Proof.
Straightforward by induction on traces and definitions of edit automata [74]. uunionsq
However, as indicated in Section 2.4, this technique does not provide an adequate se-
mantic foundation for log generation, and consequently correctness studies. Studying
the correctness of audit logging requires the ability to analyze whether the entries
are “appropriately” added to the log in each step of computation. That is, we need
to be able to judge whether a log entry has been recorded according to the logging
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state vars A[n+ 1] : array of sets of T × V¯ × V¯ initial ∅
transitions not (Call(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0) ∨ Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)) −→ skip
Call(t1, C1, x¯1, m1, y¯1) −→ A[1] := A[1] ∪ {(t1, x¯1, y¯1)}
...
Call(tn, Cn, x¯n, mn, y¯n) −→ A[n] := A[n] ∪ {(tn, x¯n, y¯n)}
Call(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0)∧
(not(∃` ∈ A[1] ∗ · · · ∗A[n].φ((t0, x¯0, y¯0), `))∨
LoggedCall(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0) logged)
−→ skip
editing rules Call(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0)∧
∃` ∈ A[1] ∗ · · · ∗A[n].φ((t0, x¯0, y¯0), `)∧
LoggedCall(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0) not logged
−→ add LoggedCall(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0) to log
Figure 3.9: Edit Automata to Enforce Ideal Instrumentation
specification (necessity), and also what the logging specification advertises is added to
the log (sufficiency). However, note that given a logging specification LS , an ideally
instrumented trace is defined as a trace whose every prefix generates correct log wrt
that prefix and LS (Definition 2.4.1). This definition does not convey the required
formal components to study the necessity and sufficiency conditions of logging cor-
rectness in each step of computation. In the following we propose an instrumentation
approach to enforce audit logging in a provably correct manner.
3.2.3 Target Language
In order to specify a rewriting algorithm for provably correct enforcement of audit
logging, we need to establish the target language as the codomain of the rewriting
algorithm, i.e., the algorithm rewrites programs into the ones in the target language.
The syntax of our target language FJlog extends FJ syntax with a command to track
logging preconditions (callEvent(m, u¯)), i.e. calls to logging triggers, and a command
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e ::= . . . | this.callEvent(m, u¯); e | this.emit(m, u¯); e κ ::= (e, n,X,L)
Precondition
(new C(v¯).callEvent(m, u¯); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, C, v¯, m, u¯)},L)
Log
X ∪XGuidelines ` LoggedCall(n− 1, C, v¯, m, u¯)
(new C(v¯).emit(m, u¯); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X,L ∪ {LoggedCall(n− 1, C, v¯, m, u¯)})
NoLog
X ∪XGuidelines 6` LoggedCall(n− 1, C, v¯, m, u¯)
(new C(v¯).emit(m, u¯); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X,L)
Figure 3.10: FJlog Syntax and Sematics Extensions.
to emit log entries (emit(m, u¯)). Configurations are extended to include a set X of
logging preconditions, and an audit log L. These extensions are depicted in Figure
3.10.
The semantics of FJlog extends the semantics of FJ with new rules for methods
callEvent(m, u¯) and emit(m, u¯), which update the set of logging preconditions and
audit log respectively. An instrumented program uses the set of logging preconditions
to determine when it should emit events to the audit log. The semantics is parameter-
ized by a guideline XGuidelines, typically taken from a logging specification. Given the
definition of Calls, these semantics would be easy to implement using e.g. a Datalog
proof engine. The extensions to FJlog semantics is also given in Figure 3.10.
Note that to ensure that these instrumentation commands do not change execu-
tion behavior, the configuration’s time is not incremented when callEvent(m, u¯) and
emit(m, u¯) are evaluated. That is, the configuration time counts the number of source
language computation steps.
The rules Log and NoLog rely on checking whether XGuidelines and logging precon-
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ditions X entail LoggedCall(n− 1, C, v¯, m, u¯).
To establish correctness of program rewriting, we need to define a correspondence
relation :≈. Source language execution traces and target language execution traces
correspond if they represent the same expression evaluated to the same point. We
make special cases for when the source execution is about to perform a function
application that the target execution will track or log via an callEvent(m, u¯) or
emit(m, u¯) command. In these cases, the target execution may be ahead by one or
two steps, allowing time for addition of information to the log.
Definition 3.2.2 Given source language execution trace τ = κ0 . . . κm and target
language execution trace τ ′ = κ′0 . . . κ′n, where κi = (ei, ti) and κ′i = (e′i, t′i, Xi,Li),
τ :≈ τ ′ iff e0 = e′0 and either
1. em = e′n (taking = to mean syntactic equivalence); or
2. em = e′n−1 and e′n = v.callEvent(m, u¯); e′ for some v, m, u¯, and e′; or
3. em = e′n−2 and e′n = v.emit(m, u¯); e′ for some v, m, u¯, and e′.
Finally, we need to define toFOL(L) for audit logs L produced by an instrumented
program. Since our audit logs are just sets of formulas of the form LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯),
we define toFOL(L) = L.
3.2.4 Program Rewriting Algorithm
Our program rewriting algorithm RFJ takes an FJ program p = (e, CT ), a logging
specification LS = spec(XGuidelines, {LoggedCall}) ∈ Calls, and produces an FJlog
program p′ = (e′, CT ′) such that e and e′ are identical, and CT ′ is identical to CT
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C.m = Logevent(LS) mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x¯, this.callEvent(m, x¯); this.emit(m, x¯); e
C.m ∈ Triggers(LS) mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x¯, this.callEvent(m, x¯); e
C.m /∈ Triggers(LS) ∪ {Logevent(LS)}
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = mbodyCT (m, C)
Figure 3.11: Axioms for Rewriting Algorithm RFJ
except for the addition of callEvent(m, u¯) and emit(m, u¯) method invocations. The
algorithm is straightforward: we modify the class table to add callEvent(m, u¯) to the
definition of any method C.m ∈ Triggers(LS)∪{Logevent(LS)} and add emit(m, u¯) to
the definition of method C.m = Logevent(LS).
Definition 3.2.3 For FJ program p = (e, CT ) and logging specifications LS ∈ Calls,
define:
RFJ((e, CT ),LS) = (e,R(CT ))
where R(CT ) is the smallest class table satisfying the axioms given in Figure 3.11.
Program rewriting algorithm RFJ is semantics preserving, sound, and complete
for Calls. We have completely formalized these results (modulo well-known Horn
clause logic definitions and properties) in Coq [79]. In this section we summarize our
results.
Theorem 3.2.2 Program rewriting algorithm RFJ is semantics preserving (Defini-
tion 2.5.1).
Proof. Intuitively, the addition of this.callEvent(m, v¯) and this.emit(m, v¯) methods
does not interfere with FJ evaluation. The proof follows easily by induction on the
number of small-step reductions of programs. uunionsq
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Our proof strategy for soundness and completeness ofRFJ is to show that an audit
log produced by an instrumented program is the refinement of the least Herbrand
model of the logging specification semantics unioned with the logging specification’s
guidelines. By showing that audit logs combined with the guidelines are the least
Herbrand models of the logging specification semantics, we show that they contain
the same information. This implies soundness and completeness of program rewriting.
The following Lemma relates the syntactic property of closure with the properties
of a least Herbrand model [76, 80], and shows that the least Herbrand model of X
contains the same information as X. It holds by the soundness and completeness of
the logic.
Lemma 3.2.1 C(H(X)) = C(X) and H(X) = H(C(X)).
The following Lemmas states a similar but subtly different property relevant to sub-
language focusing that we will use in Theorem 3.2.3.
Lemma 3.2.2 C(C(H(X)) ∩ L) = C(H(X) ∩ L).
The key idea underlying the soundness of the program rewriting algorithm is that
any facts that are added to the set of logging preconditions or the audit log during
execution of the instrumented program are true facts: they are in the model of the
corresponding source language execution trace.
Lemma 3.2.3 Let p be a FJ program and LS ∈ Calls be a logging specification. For
all target language execution traces τ such that RFJ(p,LS) ⇓ τ , where τ = κ0 . . . κn
and κn = (e, t, X,L), there exists a source language execution trace τ ′ such that
τ ′ :≈ τ and p ⇓ τ ′ and X ⊆ toFOL(τ ′).
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To show that RFJ is complete, we must show that for a logging specification
LS = spec(XGuidelines, {LoggedCall}) ∈ Calls and a source language execution τ , and
a corresponding target language execution τ ′ that produces audit log L, for any ground
instance LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ LS(τ) we have LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ L. In
order to show that, we need to show that (X ∪XGuidelines) ` LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯),
where X is the set of logging preconditions tracked during the target language exe-
cution τ ′ (see Rules Precondition and Log).
A key insight is that the only facts in toFOL(τ) relevant to deriving grounded
goals of the form LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) are facts Call(n′, C′, v¯′, m′, u′) for C′.m′ ∈
{Logevent(LS)} ∪ Triggers(LS), and these are exactly the facts that appear in the
instrumented program’s set of logging preconditions tracked during execution. For-
mally, the support of a grounded goal ψ given assumptions X, denoted support(X,ψ),
is the set of conjuncts in φ where φ⇒ ψ is a grounding of a Horn clause of the form
∀x1, . . . , xm. φ′ ⇒ ψ′ ∈ X and X ` φ. In Datalog terms, these are the grounded
subgoals of ψ in its derivation given knowledge base X. Hence:
Lemma 3.2.4 Let p be a FJ program and LS ∈ Calls be a logging specification where
LS = spec(Y, S). For all τ such that p ⇓ τ there exists a target language execution
trace τ ′ such that τ :≈ τ ′, R(p,LS) ⇓ τ ′ and τ ′ = κ0 . . . κn where κn = (e,m,X,L)
such that for all φ ∈ LS(τ) and Call(t, C, v¯, m, u) ∈ support(Y ∪ toFOL(τ), φ) we have
Call(t, C, v¯, m, u) ∈ X.
From Lemma 3.2.3 and Lemma 3.2.4, we can establish that the log generated by
the rewritten program is the least Herbrand model of the given logging specification
semantics.
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Lemma 3.2.5 Let p be a FJ program and LS = spec(X, {LoggedCall}) ∈ Calls be a
logging specification. For all τ such that p ⇓ τ we have simlogs(RFJ(p,LS), τ) = {L}
such that:
L = H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{LoggedCall}
Proof. (Sketch.) First, note that we can construct a target language execution trace
τ ′ such that RFJ(p,LS) ⇓ τ ′ and τ :≈ τ ′ (i.e., τ ′ executes the source program to the
same point that τ does). Let the last configuration of τ ′ be (e, n, Y,L). We observe
that this construction uniquely defines the log L due to determinism in the language
and Definition 4.4.8.
Let Z = H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{LoggedCall}. If LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ L, then
X ∪ Y ` LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) by semantic definition of FJlog. But by Lemma
3.2.3 we have X ⊆ toFOL(τ), hence X ∪ toFOL(τ) ` LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) so
LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ Z.
Conversely, if LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ Z, by Lemma 3.2.4 (and the determinism
of our languages), any Call fact in support(X ∪ toFOL(τ),LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯)) is
also inX, hence every such LoggedCall will also be in L. Thus LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈
Z iff LoggedCall(n, C, v¯, m, u¯) ∈ L. The result follows by definition of H. uunionsq
These Lemmas suffice to prove our main Theorem, demonstrating soundness and
completeness of program rewriting algorithm RFJ. This result establishes that the log
generated by the instrumented program and the semantics of the logging specification
contain exactly the same information with respect to the sublanguage L{LoggedCall}.
Theorem 3.2.3 (Soundness and Completeness) Program rewriting algorithmRFJ
is sound and complete (Definitions 2.5.2 and 2.5.3).
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Proof. Let p be a FJ program and LS = spec(X, {LoggedCall}) ∈ Calls be a logging
specification. We aim to show that for all source language execution traces τ such
that p ⇓ τ we have simlogs(RFJ(p,LS), τ) = {L} such that C(L) = LS(τ).
By Lemma 3.2.5, we have that simlogs(RFJ(p,LS), τ) = {L} such that L = H(X∪
toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{LoggedCall}. By Lemma 3.2.1 and Lemma 3.2.2 LS(τ) = C(C(H(X ∪
toFOL(τ)))∩L{LoggedCall}) = C(H(X∪toFOL(τ))∩L{LoggedCall}). Hence, both LS(τ) ≤
C(L) and C(L) ≤ LS(τ). uunionsq
3.3 Case Study on a Medical Records
System
As a case study, we have developed a tool [81] that enables automatic instrumentation
of logging specifications for the OpenMRS system. The implementation is based on
the formal model developed in Section 3.2 which enjoys a correctness guarantee. The
logging information is stored in a SQL database consisting of multiple tables, and
the correctness of this scheme is established via the monotone mapping defined in
Section 2.6.3. We have also considered how to reduce memory overhead as a central
optimization challenge.
OpenMRS [15] is a Java-based open-source web application for medical records,
built on the Spring Framework [82]. Previous efforts in auditing for OpenMRS in-
clude recording any modification to the database records as part of the OpenMRS
core implementation, and logging every function call to a set of predefined records
[72]. The latter illustrates the relevance of function invocations as a key factor in
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logging. Furthermore, function calls define the fundamental unit of “secure opera-
tions” in OpenMRS access control [78]. This highlights the relevance of our Calls
logging specification class, particularly as it pertains to specification of break the glass
policies, which are sensitive to authorization.
In contrast to the earlier auditing solutions for OpenMRS, ours facilitates a smart
log generation mechanism in which only the necessary information are recorded, based
on accurate log specifications. Moreover, logging specifications are defined indepen-
dently from code, rather than being embedded in it in an ad-hoc manner. This
way, system administrators need to only assert logging specifications in the style of
Calls (Definition 3.2.1), and the tool builds the corresponding module that could
be installed on the OpenMRS server. This is more convenient, declarative, and less
error prone than direct ad-hoc instrumentation of code. In Figure 3.12 the details of
building the module is given.
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System Architecture Summary
To clarify the following discussion, we briefly summarize the architecture of our sys-
tem. Logging specifications are made in the style of Calls, which can be parsed into
JSON objects with a standard form recognized by our system. Instrumentation of
legacy code is then accomplished using aspect oriented programming. Parsed specifi-
cations are used to identify join points, where the system weaves aspects supporting
audit logging into OpenMRS bytecode. These aspects communicate with a proof
engine at the joint points to reason about audit log generation, implementing the
semantics developed for FJlog in Section 3.2.3. In our deployment logs are recorded
in a SQL database, but our architecture supports other approaches via the use of
listeners. Figure 3.13 illustrates the major components we have deployed to facilitate
auditing at runtime.
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3.3.1 Break the Glass Policies for OpenMRS
Break the glass policies for auditing are intended to retrospectively manage the same
security that is proactively managed by access control (before the glass is broken).
Thus it is important that we focus on the same resources in auditing as those focused
on by access control. The data model of OpenMRS consists of several domains e.g.,
“Patient” and “User” domains contain information about the patients and system
users respectively, and “Encounter” domain includes the information regarding the
interventions of healthcare providers with patients. In order to access and modify the
information in different domains, corresponding service-layer functionalities are de-
fined that are accessible through web interface. These functionalities provide security
sensitive operations through which data assets are handled. Thus, OpenMRS autho-
rization mechanism checks user eligibility to perform these operations [78]. Likewise,
we focus on these functionalities to be addressed in the logging specifications, i.e.,
the triggers and logging events are constrained to the service-layer methods as they
provide access to data domains, e.g., the patient and user data.
We adapt the logical language of logging specifications developed above (Definition
3.2.1), with the minor extension that we allow logging of methods with more than
one argument. We note that logging specifications can include other information
specified as safe Horn clauses, e.g. ACLs, and generally define predicates specified in
φ((x0, t0), . . . , (xn, tn)) of Definition 3.2.1. We consider break the glass policies as a
key example application in our deployment. For instance a simple break the glass
policy states that if the glass is broken by some low-level user, and subsequently the
patient information is accessed by that user, the access should be logged. This policy
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loggedCall(T, getPatient, U, P) :-
call(T, getPatient, U, P), call(S, breakTheGlass, U), @<(S, T), hasSecurityLevel(U, low).
hasSecurityLevel(admin, high).
hassecuritylevel(alice, low).
Figure 3.14: A Simple Break the Glass Policy Specified in the Proof Engine Database.
is depicted in Figure 3.141. The variable U refers to the user, and the variable P refers
to the patient. This specification also defines security levels for two users, alice and
admin. The predicate @< defines the usual total ordering on integers.
To enable these policies in practice, we have added a “break the glass” button
to a user menu in the OpenMRS GUI that can be manually activated on demand.
Activation invokes the breakTheGlass method parameterized by the user id. We
note that breaking the glass does not turn off access control in our current implemen-
tation, which we consider a separate engineering concern that is out of scope for this
work.
It is worth mentioning that while our tool is designed for OpenMRS, our general
approach can be used for arbitrary Java code at source or bytecode level.
3.3.2 Code Instrumentation
To instrument code for log generation, we leverage the Spring Framework that sup-
ports aspect-oriented programming (AOP). AOP is used to rewrite code where neces-
sary with “advice”, which in our case is before certain method invocations (so-called
“before advice”). Our advice checks the invoked method names and implements the
semantics given in Section 3.2.3, establishing correctness of audit logging. Join points
1We use the monospace font to present policies, data, and code excerpts that are relevant to the
implementation.
79
<advice>
<point>org.openmrs.api.PatientService</point>
<class>
org.openmrs.module.retrosecurity.advice.RetroSecurityAdvice
</class>
</advice>
Figure 3.15: Specifying Joint Points for Advices.
are automatically extracted from logging specifications, and defined with service-level
granularity in a configuration file. Weaving into bytecode is also performed automat-
ically by our system.
Since the generated code pieces are before advices, they are interposed before
every interface method of the declared services. An aspect is configured by declar-
ing where the join point and corresponding advice is. For example, Figure 3.15
shows an excerpt of a configuration file, where every interface method of the service
PatientService is a join point so before invoking each of those methods the advice
in RetroSecurityAdvice will be woven into the control flow.
The Advice
RetroSecurityAdvice is the before advice automatically generated by our system
based on the logging specification. It essentially determines whether a method call is
a trigger or a logging event and interacts with the proof engine appropriately in each
case.
The first time the advice is executed, the proof engine is initialized in a separate
thread. Moreover, a LoggedCall derivation listener is added to the list of the engine
listeners. Then, if memory overhead mitigation (Section 3.4) is not activated, the
invoked method names are checked and the rule Protection (Section 3.2.3) is imple-
mented for the triggers and the logging event, i.e., the proof engine is asked to add
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the the information regarding the invocation of the method. In the case memory
overhead mitigation is activated, the set of Protection rules of Figure 3.17 are imple-
mented for the triggers and the logging event. The implementation of the rules Log
and NoLog (Section 3.2.3) is handled by the LoggedCall derivation listener.
The advice also checks for the invocation of the interface method queryLog().
This method communicates with the engine to facilitate instant querying based on
the invocations of the logging preconditions that exist in the memory.
3.3.3 Proof Engine
According to the the semantics of FJlog, it is necessary to perform logical deduction,
in particular resolution of LoggedCall predicates. As we will show in Section 3.4,
the required deductions could be generalized to any arbitrary formula. To this end,
we have employed XSB Prolog [83] as our proof engine, due to its reliability and
robustness. We have restricted our specifications to safe Horn clauses though, despite
the fact that XSB Prolog provides a more expressive tool. In order to have a bidi-
rectional communication between the Java application and the engine, InterProlog
Java/Prolog SDK [84] is used. A lightweight Datalog engine that communicates with
Java application is more preferable, but we were not able to identify such third-party
tool and thus it remains as future work.
The proof engine is initialized in a separate thread with an interface to the main
execution trace. The interface includes methods to define predicates, to add rules
and facts, and to revoke them asynchronously2. The asynchrony avoids blocking the
“normal” execution trace for audit logging purposes. The interface also provides an
2Revoking facts is required for memory overhead mitigation.
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instant querying mechanism. The execution trace of instrumented program commu-
nicates with the XSB Prolog engine as these interface methods are invoked in the
advices.
3.3.4 Writing and Storing the Log
Asynchronous communication with the proof engine through multi-threading enables
us to modularize the deduction of the information that we need to log, separate from
the storage and retainment details. This supports a variety of possible approaches to
storing log information– e.g., using a strict transactional discipline to ensure writing
to critical log, and/or blocking execution until log write occurs. Advice generated by
the system for audit log generation just needs to include event listeners to implement
the technology of choice for log storage and retainment.
In our application, the logging information is stored in a SQL database consisting
of multiple tables. The generated advices include event listeners to implement our
technology of choice for log storage and retainment. In case a new logging information
is derived by the proof engine, the corresponding listeners in the main execution
trace are notified and the listeners partition and store the logging information in
potentially multiple tables. Correctness of this storage technique is established using
the monotone mapping rel defined in Section 2.6.3, i.e., the join of these tables are
information equivalent (Definition 2.1.4) to the semantics of logging specification for
a given break the glass policy. This ensures that the correctness guarantees extend
to database storage.
Consider the case where a loggedCall is derived by the proof engine given the
logging specification in Section 3.3.1. Here, the instantiation of U and P are user
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select time, “getPatien”, uname, patient_name
from GetPatL, User, Patient
where GetPatL.uid = User.uid and GetPatL.pid = Patient.pid
Figure 3.16: Querying the Log with SQL.
and patient names, respectively, used in the OpenMRS implementation. However,
logged calls are stored in a table called GetPatL with attributes time, uid, and pid,
where uid is the primary key for a User table with a uname attribute, and pid is
the primary key for a Patient table with a patient_name attribute. Thus, for any
given logging specification of the appropriate form, the monotonic mapping rel of the
select statement in Figure 3.16 gives us the exact information content of the logging
specification following execution of an OpenMRS session:
3.4 Reducing Memory Overhead
A source of overhead in our system is memory needed to store logging preconditions.
We observe that a naive implementation of the intended semantics will add all trigger
functions to the logging preconditions, regardless of whether they are redundant in
some way. To optimize memory usage, we therefore aim to refrain from adding
information about trigger invocations if it is unnecessary for future derivations of
audit log information. As a simple example, in the following logging specification it
suffices to add only the first invocation of C1.m1 to the set of logging preconditions to
infer the relevant logging information.
∀t0, t1, x¯0, x¯1, y¯0, y¯1 .Call(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0) ∧ Call(t1, C1, (t1, C1, x¯1, m1, y¯1)) ∧ t1 < t0
=⇒ LoggedCall(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0).
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Intuitively, our general approach is to rewrite the body of a given logging specifi-
cation in a form consisting of different conjuncts, such that the truth valuation of each
conjunct is independent of the others. This way, the required information to derive
each conjunct is independent of the information required for other conjuncts. Then,
if the inference of a LoggedCall predicate needs a conjunct to be derived only once
during the program execution, we can limit the amount of information required to
derive that conjunct to the point where it is derivable, without affecting the derivabil-
ity of other conjuncts. In other words, following derivation of that conjunct, triggers
in the conjunct are “turned off”, i.e. no longer added to logging preconditions when
encountered during execution.
Formally, the logging specification is rewritten in the form
∀t0, . . . , tn, x¯0, . . . , x¯n, y¯0, . . . , y¯n .
n∧
i=1
(ti < t0)
L∧
k=1
Qk =⇒ LoggedCall(t0, C0, x¯0, m0, y¯0),
where each Qk is a conjunct of literals with independent truth valuation resting on
disjointness of predicated variables. In what follows, a formal description of the
technique is given.
Since we have a linear computational model, the predicates corresponding to the
timestamp comparisons (ti < t0) do not play a significant role in the inference of
LoggedCall predicates. There reason is, at any point in time, the set of logging
preconditions only contain function invocations that have been occurred in the past,
i.e., if the logging event is invoked at timestamp t0, then ti < t0 holds for all trigger
invocation timetamps ti that are retained in the set of logging preconditions. In what
follows, a formal description of the technique is given.
Consider the Definition 3.2.1, where C1.m1 = Logevent(LS). Let predicates of the
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form ϕi′((x¯0, y¯0, t0), . . . , (x¯n, y¯n, tn)) be positive literals and
φ((x¯0, y¯0, t0), . . . , (x¯n, y¯0, tn)) ,
n′∧
i′=1
ϕi′((x¯0, y¯0, t0), . . . , (x¯n, y¯n, tn)).
Then, we define the set Ψ as
Ψ ,{ϕi′((x¯0, y¯0, t0), . . . , (x¯n, y¯n, tn)) | i′ ∈ 1 · · ·n′}∪
{(Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)) | i ∈ 0 · · ·n}.
Moreover, let’s denote the set of free variables of a formula φ as FV (φ), and abuse this
notation to represent the set of free variables that exist in a set of formulas. Then,
FV (Ψ) = {x¯0, · · · , x¯n, y¯0, · · · , y¯n, t0, · · · , tn}. Next, we define the relation, ~FV over
free variables of positive literals in Ψ, which represents whether they are free variables
of the same literal.
Definition 3.4.1 Let ~FV ⊆ FV (Ψ)×FV (Ψ) be a relation where α~FV β iff there
exists some literal P ∈ Ψ such that α, β ∈ FV (P ). Then, the transitive closure of
~FV is denoted by ~TFV .
Lemma 3.4.1 ~FV is reflexive and symmetric.
Corollary 3.4.1 ~TFV is an equivalence relation and so, partitions FV (Ψ)
Let [α]~TFV denote the equivalence class induced by ~TFV over FV (Ψ), where
[α]~TFV , {β | α ~TFV β}. Intuitively, each equivalence class [α]~TFV represents a
set of free variables in Ψ that are free in a subset of literals of Ψ, transitively. To
be explicit about these subsets of literals, we have the following definition (Definition
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3.4.2). Note that rather than representing an equivalence class using a representative
α (i.e., the notation [α]~TFV ), we may employ an enumeration of these classes and
denote each class as Ck, where k ∈ 1 · · ·L. L represents the number of equivalence
classes that have partitioned FV (Ψ). In order to map these two notations, we consider
a mapping ω : FV (Ψ)→ {1, · · · , L} where ω(α) = k if [α]~TFV = Ck.
Definition 3.4.2 Let C be an equivalence class induced by ~TFV . The predicate class
PC is a subset of literals of Ψ defined as PC , {P ∈ Ψ | FV (P ) ⊆ C}. We define
the independent conjuncts as QC ,
∧
P∈PC P . We also denote Q[α] as Qk if ω(α) = k.
Obviously, FV (Qk) = Ck.
Lemma 3.4.2 Let C1, · · · , CL be all the equivalence classes induced by ~TFV over
FV (Ψ). Then, PC1 , · · · ,PCL give a partition on Ψ.
Proof. We need to show that
• for all distinct k, k′ ∈ 1 · · ·L, PCk ∩ PCk′ = ∅:
By contradiction: Let k, k′ ∈ 1 · · ·L be specific distinct indexes where PCk ∩
PCk′ 6= ∅, i.e., there exists some P ∈ Ψ, such that P ∈ PCk and P ∈ PCk′ .
Then, according to the definition, we have FV (P ) ⊆ Ck and FV (P ) ⊆ Ck′ .
Since FV (P ) is non-empty, we would have Ck∩Ck′ 6= ∅, which contradicts with
Ck and Ck′ being classes over FV (Ψ).
• ⋃Lk=1PCk = Ψ:
Obviously, ⋃Lk=1PCk ⊆ Ψby the definition of predicate classes. It only suffices
to show that ⋃Lk=1PCk ⊇ Ψ. Let P ∈ Ψ. Since FV (P ) 6= ∅, there exists
some α ∈ FV (P ). Considering the equivalence class [α]~TFV , we will then have
FV (P ) ⊆ [α]~TFV . This entails that P ∈ P[α]~TFV and so, P ∈
⋃L
k=1PCk .
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uunionsq
In order to specify and prove the correctness of the proposed technique, a new
calculus FJ′log is formalized with memory overhead mitigation capabilities. In what
follows the details of this calculus and the correctness result are given. Moreover,
a developed example of how these techniques could be applied to a sample logging
specification in Calls is discussed, later in this section.
The given techniques are implemented in the OpenMRS retrospective security
module as a case study.
3.4.1 Language with Memory Overhead Mitiga-
tion
The language FJlog is defined in Section 3.2 whose syntax includes a command to
track logging preconditions (callEvent(m, u¯)) and a command to emit log entries
(emit(m, u¯)). Configurations are quadruples of the form κ ::= (e, n,X,L) which
include a set X of logging precondtions (sometimes referred to as “database”), and
an audit log L. The semantics of FJlog includes the rule Precondition to update the
set of logging preconditions.
The language FJ′log has the same syntax as FJlog. The configurations, however,
have an additional component W which is a set of function names. It is used to
keep track of functions that we do not require to add their invocation information to
the database any more. By adding some trigger name Ci.mi to W , we indicate that
further additions of information regarding Ci.mi invocations to X will not cause new
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LoggedCall predicates to be derived.
κ ::= (e, n,X,L,W ) configurations
All stepwise reduction rules in this language are the same as the ones in FJlog,
except for Precondition. Instead of that rule, we impose the set of rules in Figure
3.17. Note that XG denotes the guidelines database. For the sake of brevity, we will
omit ~TFV from the class notations onward.
The rule Precondition-1 states that if a trigger is invoked, but is already added
to the set W , according to the semantics of W , we do not add the invocation to the
database. The remaining rules consider the other case, i.e., the trigger is not already
added to W . The rule Precondition-2 expresses the case where the trigger Ci.mi is not
in W , and there are no literals except for Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i) with x¯i, y¯i or ti as free
variables. In this case, the invocation is added to database and the trigger name is
added to the set W , in order to avoid further addition of invocations to this trigger.
If there are literals other than Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i) with free variables x¯i, y¯i or ti, but
the free variables of all those literals are restricted to x¯i, y¯i and ti, we study the
derivability of the ground form of Q[ti] considering the new invocation. Notice that
FV (Q[ti]) = {x¯i, y¯i, ti}. If the ground form of Q[ti] is derivable, then the invocation
is added to the database. The trigger name is also added to W (Precondition-4).
Otherwise, the invocation is not added to the database (Precondition-3). The reason
is, keeping the invocation information in the database will not help deriving a ground
form of Q[ti] in the future steps.
If there are literals other than Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i) with free variables x¯i, y¯i or ti,
and the free variables of those literals are not restricted to x¯i, y¯i and ti, but exclude x¯0,
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y¯0 and t0, then the derivability of Q[ti] is studied. In this case, the set of free variables
of Q[ti] is [ti], for sure. If a ground form of Q[ti] is derivable, then the invocation is
added to the database and the trigger names whose timestamp and argument variable
are in [ti] are added toW (Precondition-6). Otherwise, the invocation is still added to
the database (Precondition-5) but the trigger name is not added toW . The reason is,
keeping the invocation information in the database might help derive a ground form
of Q[ti] in the future steps, since there exist free variables other than x¯i, y¯i and ti in
Q[ti] that could be substituted with proper values so that Q[ti] could be derived. Note
that α¯i represents a sequence of free variables [ti] − {x¯i, y¯i, ti} and a¯i is a sequence
of timestamps and values, except for the timestamp and argument value of trigger i.
Moreover,
[
a¯i/α¯i
]
denotes the substitution of values to their corresponding variables.
The rule Precondition-7 discusses the remaining case for triggers, that is when
there are literals other than Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i) with free variables x¯i, y¯i or ti, the
free variables of those literals are not restricted to x¯i, y¯i and ti, and include x¯0, y¯0 or
t0. Then, the invocation is added to the database but the trigger name is not added
to W , independent of whether a ground form of Q[ti] is derivable or not. If a ground
form of Q[ti] is not derivable at the moment, keeping the invocation information in the
database might help derive a ground form of Q[ti] in the future steps, since there exist
free variables other than x¯i, y¯i and ti in Q[ti] that could be substituted with proper
values so that a ground form of Q[ti] could be derived. Otherwise, if a ground form
of Q[ti] is derivable, we might still need to add future invocations of Ci.mi and other
triggers whose timestamp and argument variables are in [ti]. That is why, we avoid
adding trigger names to W . This is due to the fact that Q[ti] includes invocation
to the logging event and possibly other predicates defined over its timestamp and
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argument variable (x¯i, y¯i and ti). Thus, future derivations of Q[ti] could be affected.
This represents a major difference between the case when Q[ti] includes {x¯0, y¯0, t0}
and the case Q[ti] excludes these variables. In the latter case, it is only required to
derive a ground form of Q[ti] once during program execution, in order to study whether
LoggedCall predicates could be inferred. Therefore, whenever a ground form of Q[ti]
is derivable at the time of Ci.mi invocation, W is beefed up with the corresponding
trigger names. In the prior case, however, it is required to derive all possible ground
forms of Q[ti], so that we would be able to infer all possible LoggedCall predicates.
The last rule (Precondition-8) discusses the case where the logging event is in-
voked. Since we need to infer all possible LoggedCall predicates, we add all those
invocations to the database.
3.4.2 Correctness of Memory Overhead Mitiga-
tion
In order to study the executional behaviour of programs in FJ′log compared to the case
where they are executing in FJlog, we need to understand the relationship between
the set of logging preconditions in these languages. To this end, we develop an
algorithm that generates the reduced database and the set W of trigger names, out
of a full-blown database of logging preconditions. The algorithm Refine is defined in
Algorithm 2. We denote the reduced set of logging preconditions X as R(X), and
the generated set of trigger names as W(X), defined as follows:
R(X) , fst(Refine X [ ] ∅) W(X) , snd(Refine X [ ] ∅)
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We do not express any explicit mapping between sets and sorted lists in our
formulation for the sake of brevity. The employment of sets and their corresponding
sorted lists are clear from the context. Let’s denote the restriction of a set X to
timestamps less than or equal to n, as X|n.
In what follows, Lemmas 3.4.3 to 3.4.7 discuss properties of R(X) and W(X).
Lemma 3.4.7, in particular, shows that R(X) is enough to derive all LoggedCall
predicates that are derivable from X. Lemma 3.4.8 states that in a single reduc-
tion step, the reduced set of logging preconditions is preserved and the generated
audit log is maintained, which then can be generalized straightforwardly to multi-
step reduction, in Theorem 3.4.1. Then, Corollary 3.4.2 gives us our intended result,
which states that a program could be evaluated in FJ′log with reduced set of logging
preconditions and the same audit log.
Lemma 3.4.3 Let X be a set of logging preconditions. For all i ∈ 1 · · ·n, if ti ∈ [t0]
then Ci.mi /∈ W(X).
Proof. Since ti ∈ [t0], [ti] = [t0] and so [ti]∩{x¯0, y¯0, t0} 6= ∅. Thus, for each invocation
information of Ci.mi in X, only line 25 of Algorithm 2 is executed. Obviously, Ci.mi is
not added to W in this line. uunionsq
Lemma 3.4.4 For all i ∈ 0 · · ·n, if ti ∈ [t0] and Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ X, then
Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X).
Proof. First let’s consider the case where i = 0. Then, according to line 31 of Algo-
rithm 2, Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X). Now, let i ∈ 1 · · ·n. According to Lemma 3.4.3,
Ci.mi /∈ W(X) and so Ci.mi /∈ W(X|n−1). This implies that only line 25 of Algorithm
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Algorithm 2: Refine algorithm
Input: Sorted list of invocation facts, Sorted list of invocation facts, Set of
trigger names
Output: Sorted list of invocation facts, Set of trigger names
1 Refine [ ] Y W = (Y,W )
2
3 Refine ((Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)) :: X) Y W =
4 if i ∈ 1 · · ·n then
5 if Ci.mi ∈ W then
6 Refine X Y W
7 else
8 if P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} = ∅ then
9 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) (W ∪ {Ci.mi})
10 else
11 if [ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} = ∅ then
12 if
Y ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)} ∪XG 0 Q[ti]
[
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
then
13 Refine X Y W
14 else
15 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) (W ∪ {Ci.mi})
16 end
17 else
18 if [ti] ∩ {x¯0, y¯0, t0} = ∅ then
19 if @a¯i . Y ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)} ∪XG `
Q[ti]
[
a¯i/α¯i
][
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
then
20 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) W
21 else
22 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) (W ∪ti′∈[ti] {Ci′ .mi′})
23 end
24 else
25 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) W
26 end
27 end
28 end
29 end
30 else
31 Refine X (Y + [Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)]) W
32 end
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2 can be executed for Ci.mi, in which the invocation to Ci.mi is added to Y , which then
is reflected in R(X). uunionsq
Let ¯¯t(k), ¯¯x(k) and ¯¯y(k) denote the sequences of timestamp, object field variables
and function argument variables respectively, that are in class Ck. Similarly, ¯¯s(k) and
¯¯v(k) and ¯¯u(k) are used to denote sequences of timestamps, field values and function
argument values that substitute ¯¯t(k), ¯¯x(k) and ¯¯y(k) respectively.
Lemma 3.4.5 Let i ∈ 1 · · ·n. Suppose that
X ∪XG ` Qω(i)
[
¯¯s(ω(i))/¯¯t(ω(i))
][
¯¯v(ω(i))/¯¯x(ω(i))
][
¯¯u(ω(i))/¯¯y(ω(i))
]
,
for some sequences of timestamps, field values and argument values ¯¯s(ω(i)), ¯¯v(ω(i))
and ¯¯u(ω(i)). If Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ X and Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) /∈ R(X) for some
i′ such that ti′ ∈ [ti], then Ci′ .mi′ ∈ W(X|si′−1).
Proof. Let’s assume Ci′ .mi′ /∈ W(X|si′−1). Since Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ X and
Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) /∈ R(X), we need to follow Refine algorithm to extract the
places where the invocation information is not added to Y . The only place with such
a property is line 13 (other than line 6 which is refuted by the assumption). Then,
• P[ti′ ] − {Call(ti′ , Ci′ , x¯i′ , mi′ , y¯i′)} = ∅, [ti′ ]− {x¯i′ , y¯i′ , ti′} = ∅, and
• X|si′−1 ∪ {Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′)} ∪XG 0 Q[ti′ ]
[
si′ − 1/ti′
][
v¯i′/x¯i′
][
u¯i′/y¯i′
]
.
The latter result is in contradiction with the general form
X ∪XG ` Qω(i)
[
¯¯s(ω(i))/¯¯t(ω(i))
][
¯¯v(ω(i))/¯¯x(ω(i))
][
¯¯u(ω(i))/¯¯y(ω(i))
]
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considering the fact that ω(i) = ω(i′) due to ti′ ∈ [ti], and also Q[ti] = Qω(i′). uunionsq
Lemma 3.4.6 Let X be a set of logging preconditions. For all i ∈ 1 · · ·n, if Ci.mi ∈
W(X), then there exist some n, v¯i, u¯i and a¯i such that Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X)
and
R(X) ∪XG ` Q[ti]
[
a¯i/α¯i
][
n/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
.
Proof. The only places where a trigger is added toW in Algorithm 2 are the lines 9, 15,
and 22. In line 9, invocation to Ci.mi is added to Y , which then is reflected in R(X).
Moreover, this line is executed whenever P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} = ∅. Thus, for
this case Q[ti] = Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i). Then, since Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X), we
have R(X)∪XG ` Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i). In line 15, similar to line 9, invocation to gi is
added to Y , so Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X). Moreover, this line is executed provided
the condition in lines 12 does not hold. This ensures the derivation of the ground form
of Q[ti]. The line 22 is executed if the condition in lines 19 does not hold. Therefore,
a ground form of Q[ti] should be derivable. This entails that for all ti′ ∈ [ti], there
exist some n′, v¯i′ and u¯i′ such that Call(n′, Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ Y ∪ {Call(n,gi, v)}. As
Y ∪ {Call(n, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)} is reflected in R(X), the proof is complete. uunionsq
Lemma 3.4.7 If X ∪XG ` LoggedCall(s0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0)} then
R(X) ∪XG ` LoggedCall(s0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0).
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Proof. If
X ∪XG ` LoggedCall(s0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0)
then there exist s1, · · · , sn, v¯1, · · · , v¯n, u¯1, · · · , u¯n such that
X ∪XG `
n∧
i=1
(si < s0)
L∧
k=1
Qk
[
¯¯s(k)/¯¯t(k)
][
¯¯v(k)/¯¯x(k)
][
¯¯u(k)/¯¯y(k)
]
.
It implies that for all i ∈ 0 · · ·n, Call(si, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ X. For each i ∈ 0 · · ·n, we
consider the following two cases:
• [ti] = [t0]: Then, ti ∈ [t0]. Since Call(si, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ X, Lemma 3.4.4 implies
that Call(si, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i) ∈ R(X). Then,
R(X) ∪XG `
(si < s0) ∧Qω(i)
[
¯¯s(ω(i))/¯¯t(ω(i))
][
¯¯v(ω(i))/¯¯x(ω(i))
][
¯¯u(ω(i))/¯¯y(ω(i))
]
.
• [ti] 6= [t0]: Then, [ti]∩{x0, t0} = ∅. Now, we consider the following two subcases:
– For all ti′ ∈ [ti], if Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ X then
Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ R(X).
Then obviously the following are provable under the assumption R(X) ∪
XG.:
∗ (si < s0), and
∗ Qω(i)
[
¯¯s(ω(i))/¯¯t(ω(i))
][
¯¯v(ω(i))/¯¯x(ω(i))
][
¯¯u(ω(i))/¯¯y(ω(i))
]
.
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– There exists some ti′ ∈ [ti] such that
∗ Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ X and
∗ Call(si′ , Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) /∈ R(X).
Then, by Lemma 3.4.5, Ci′ .mi′ ∈ W(X|si′−1), which implies that Ci′ .mi′ ∈
W(X). Using Lemma 3.4.6, we conclude that there exist some n ≤ si′− 1,
v¯i′ , u¯i′ and a¯i′ such that Call(n, Ci′ , v¯i′ , mi′ , u¯i′) ∈ R(X) and R(X) ∪XG `
Q[ti′ ]
[
a¯i′/α¯i′
][
n/ti′
][
v¯i′/x¯i′
][
u¯i′/y¯i′
]
. This entails that R(X) ∪ XG ` (n <
s0) ∧Qω(i)
[
a¯i′/α¯i′
][
n/ti′
][
v¯i′/x¯i′
][
u¯i′/y¯i′
]
considering the fact that Qω(i) =
Q[ti′ ], as ti′ ∈ [ti].
Thus, R(X) ∪XG suffices to derive ground forms of all Qω(i) and therefore R(X) ∪
XG ` LoggedCall(s0, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0). uunionsq
Lemma 3.4.8 If (e, n,X,L)→ (e′, n′, X ′,L′) in FJlog, then
(e, n,R(X),L,W(X))→ (e′, n′,R(X ′),L′,W(X ′))
in FJ′log.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (e, n,X,L)→ (e′, n′, X ′,L′). The interesting
cases are the reductions of new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i) and new Ci(v¯i).emit(mi, u¯i).
Let
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},L).
There are eight cases in FJ′log, then. The first case is where i ∈ 1 · · ·n and Ci.mi ∈
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W(X). Then,
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e,R(X), n,L, C,W(X))→ (e, n,R(X),L,W(X)).
Then we need to show that R(X) = R(X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)}) and W(X) =
W(X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)}) for this case, which hold based on line 6 of Refine
in Algorithm 2. The other seven cases are similarly provable based on the definition
of Refine.
Let
(new Ci(v¯i).emit(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X,L ∪ {LoggedCall(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)}).
This holds when X ∪ XG ` LoggedCall(n − 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i). Using Lemma 3.4.7, we
then have R(X) ∪XG ` LoggedCall(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i), which implies that
(new Ci(v¯i).emit(mi, u¯i); e, n,R(X),L,W(X))→
(e, n,R(X),L ∪ {LoggedCall(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},W(X)).
Let
(new Ci(v¯i).emit(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L)→ (e, n,X,L).
Then X ∪ XG 0 LoggedCall(n − 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i). Since R(X) ⊆ X and the proof
system is monotone, we conclude that R(X) ∪XG 0 LoggedCall(n − 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i).
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It then implies that
(new Ci(v¯i).emit(mi, u¯i); e, n,R(X),L,W(X))→ (e, n,R(X),L,W(X)).
uunionsq
Theorem 3.4.1 Let (e, n,X,L)→∗ (e′, n′, X ′,L′) in FJlog. This implies that
(e, n,R(X),L,W(X))→∗ (e′, n′,R(X ′),L′,W(X ′))
in FJ′log.
Proof. It is straightforward by induction on the derivation of multi-step evaluation
(e, n,X,L)→∗ (e′, n′, X ′,L′) using the result of Lemma 3.4.8. uunionsq
The following corollary states the correctness in the sense that a program could
be evaluated in FJ′log with reduced set of logging preconditions and the same audit
log as it is evaluated in FJlog.
Corollary 3.4.2 If (e, 0, ∅, ∅)→∗ (v, n,X,L) in FJlog, then
(e, 0, ∅, ∅, ∅)→∗ (v, n,R(X),L,W(X))
in FJ′log.
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3.4.3 An Illustrative Example for Memory Over-
head Mitigation
In the following example, we demonstrate details of our formulation for mitigating
memory overhead, considering a sample logging specification.
Example 3.4.1 In this example, for the sake of brevity we assume that FJ includes
primitive values e.g., integers as objects. Consider the logging specification in Figure
3.18. Then,
Ψ = {Call(ti, Ci, xi, mi, yi) | i ∈ 0 · · · 4} ∪ {t1 < t2, y1%2 = 0, y3 = y4,
HasSecLevel(y4, secret), Includes(y0, y4)}
and obviously FV (Ψ) = {ti, xi, yi | i ∈ 0 · · · 4}. Note that each literal could be defined
intensionally or extensionally beside the guideline.
Then, the relation ~FV includes several pairs including (t1, t2), (y3, y4), (y4, y0)
and (ti, yi) for all i ∈ {0, · · · , 4} among other pairs.
We then have the following equivalence classes:
C1 = {t1, x1, y1, t2, x2, y2} C2 = {t0, x0, y0, t3, x3, y3, t4, x4, y4}
Note that ω(1) = ω(2) = 1 and ω(0) = ω(3) = ω(4) = 2. As an example, ¯¯t(2) =
t0, t3, t4 is a possible sequence of timestamp variables of class C2.
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This implies the following predicate classes in Ψ:
PC1 = {Call(t1, C1, x1, m1, y1),Call(t2, C2, x2, m2, y2), t1 < t2, y1%2 = 0} PC2 =
{y3 = y4,HasSecLevel(y4, secret), Includes(y0, y4)} ∪ i=0,3,4{Call(ti, Ci, xi, mi, yi)}
Then, Q1 and Q2 could be defined accordingly.
Q1 = Call(t1, C1, x1, m1, y1) ∧ Call(t2, C2, x2, m2, y2) ∧ t1 < t2 ∧ y1%2 = 0,
Q2 =Call(t0, C1, x0, m0, y0) ∧ Call(t3, C3, x3, m3, y3) ∧ Call(t4, C4, x4, m4, y4) ∧ y3 = y4∧
HasSecLevel(y4, secret) ∧ Includes(y0, y4).
Let X = {Call(2, C1, 0, m1, 4)} and W = ∅. We know that Q[t2] = Q1 and Q[t4] =
Q2. We then have
X ∪ {Call(6, C2, 0, m2, 5)} ∪XG ` Q[t2]
[
2/t1
][
4/y1
][
6/t2
][
5/y2
][
0/x1
][
0/x1
]
.
Therefore, according to Precondition-6 we would have
(callEvent(m2, 5); e, 7,{Call(2, C1, 0, m1, 4)},L, ∅)→
(e, 7, {Call(2, C1, 0, m1, 4),Call(6, C2, 0, m2, 5)},L, {C1.m1, C2.m2}).
Since a ground form of Q[t2] is derived, we add both C1.m1 and C2.m2 to W to ensure
that we will not add any invocation information of these triggers to X, any more.
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Now suppose X has grown to be
X = {Call(2, C1, 0, m1, 4),Call(6, C2, 0, m2, 5),
Call(11, C3, 0, m3, 7),Call(16, C0, 0, m0, [5, 7, 9])}.
Note that the argument to C0.m0 is a list. At time 16, LoggedCall is not derivable as
one of triggers (C4.m4) has not been called yet. We then have
X∪{Call(25, C4, 0, m4, 7)} ∪XG `
Q[t4]
[
11/t3
][
7/y3
][
16/t0
][
[5, 7, 9]/y0
][
25/t4
][
7/y4
][
0/x0, x3, x4
]
,
assuming that XG ` HasSecLevel(7, secret). Then, according to Precondition-7 we
will have
(callEvent(m4, 7); e, 26,X,L, {C1.m1, C2.m2})→
(e, 26, X ∪ {Call(25, C4, 0, m4, 7)},L, {{C1.m1, C2.m2}).
Despite the fact that a ground form of Q[t4] is derived, W is not extended with trigger
names, e.g., C4.m4. This helps us adding invocations of these triggers to X in the
future, which might help derive LoggedCall predicates that otherwise we were not able
to derive. For instance, in this example, if Call(27, C3, 0, m3, 2), Call(31, C4, 0, m4, 2),
and Call(34, C0, 0, m0, [1, 4, 2]) are added later to the set of logging preconditions, the
predicate LoggedCall(34, C0, 0, m0, [1, 4, 2]) is derivable3.
3Assuming that XG ` HasSecLevel(2, secret).
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Precondition-1
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi ∈W
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X,L,W )
Precondition-2
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} = ∅
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)}, n,L,W ∪ {Ci.mi})
Precondition-3
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} 6= ∅
[ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} = ∅ X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)} ∪XG 0 Q[ti]
[
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X,L,W )
Precondition-4
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} 6= ∅
[ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} = ∅ X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)} ∪XG ` Q[ti]
[
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},L,W ∪ {Ci.mi})
Precondition-5
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} 6= ∅ [ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} 6= ∅
[ti] ∩ {x¯0, y¯0, t0} = ∅ @a¯i . X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i))} ∪XG ` Q[ti]
[
a¯i/α¯i
][
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},L,W )
Precondition-6
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} 6= ∅ [ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} 6= ∅
[ti] ∩ {x¯0, y¯0, t0} = ∅ ∃a¯i . X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i))} ∪XG ` Q[ti]
[
a¯i/α¯i
][
n− 1/ti
][
v¯i/x¯i
][
u¯i/y¯i
]
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},L,W ∪ti′∈[ti] {Ci′ .mi′})
Precondition-7
i ∈ 1 · · ·n Ci.mi /∈W P[ti] − {Call(ti, Ci, x¯i, mi, y¯i)} 6= ∅ [ti]− {x¯i, y¯i, ti} 6= ∅ [ti] ∩ {x¯0, y¯0, t0} 6= ∅
(new Ci(v¯i).callEvent(mi, u¯i); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, Ci, v¯i, mi, u¯i)},L,W )
Precondition-8
(new C0(v¯0).callEvent(m0, u¯0); e, n,X,L,W )→ (e, n,X ∪ {Call(n− 1, C0, v¯0, m0, u¯0)},L,W )
Figure 3.17: Precondition rules for FJ′log.
∀t0, . . . , t4, x0, . . . , x4, y0, . . . , y4 .Call(t0, C0, x0, m0, y0)
4∧
i=1
(Call(ti, Ci, xi, mi, yi) ∧ ti < t0) ∧
t1 < t2 ∧ y1%2 = 0 ∧ y3 = y4 ∧HasSecLevel(y4, secret) ∧ Includes(y0, y4) =⇒ LoggedCall(t0, C0, x0, m0, y0).
Figure 3.18: Logging Specification for Example 3.4.1
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Chapter 4
Direct Information Flow: Dynamic
Integrity Taint Analysis
In this chapter, we focus on another realm of application for combining prospec-
tive and retrospective measures. As introduced in Chapter 1, retrospective measures
could be leveraged as a testing suite to study the potentially vulnerable design and
implementation of prospective controls. For example, granted accesses to users can
be audited at runtime to discover potential vulnerabilities in the access control policy
specification and enforcement. Another example in this application space, is em-
ploying in-depth policy specification and enforcement to mitigate imperfect input
sanitization in taint analysis regarding direct flow of data integrity. Input sanitiza-
tion refers to the analysis and potential modification of user provided data in order to
enhance data integrity. However, erroneous implementation of input sanitizers leave
systems susceptible to command injection vulnerabilities that could be exploited by
different attacks, e.g., XSS, SQL injection, etc. As discussed in Section 1.3, many
real-world systems suffer from programming bugs that provide erroneous data saniti-
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zation. By in-depth enforcement of taint analysis such vulnerabilities are discovered
at runtime, which helps mitigating injection attacks in a later stage.
In this chapter, we discuss how we can provably enforce prospective and retro-
spective measures in order to ameliorate legacy code against injection attacks [85]. In
this regard, we use the language model specified in Section 3.1 with some extensions.
In particular, we add the support for primitive types that may convey user supplied
data. The details of these extensions are discussed in Section 4.1. We use FOL-based
specifications to define taint and its propagation in each step of computation. Us-
ing these specifications, we define in-depth policies that analyze direct data integrity
flow both prospectively and retrospectively at runtime. These definitions are given in
Section 4.2. The rewriting algorithm that enforces these in-depth policies are given
in Section 4.3. The operational correctness of prospective enforcement and sound-
ness/completeness of retrospective enforcement are studied in Section 4.4. Later in
Chapter 5, we will propose a semantic framework to model direct flow of data in-
tegrity, called explicit integrity. Explicit integrity provides an underlying model for
dynamic integrity taint analysis, and identifies the security property that integrity
taint analysis tools support. This framework could be applied in functional settings
as well as other programming paradigms. Using explicit integrity, different taint anal-
ysis tools can be studied for correctness purposes. In particular, we prove that our
rewriting algorithm satisfies explicit integrity.
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4.1 An OO Model for Integrity Taint
Analysis
In order to study dynamic integrity taint analysis in FJ, we extend the semantics
for library methods that allow specification of operations on base values (such as
strings and integers). Consideration of these features is important for a thorough
modeling of Phosphor-style taint analysis, and important related issues such as string-
vs. character-based taint [26] which have not been considered in previous formal work
on taint analysis [32]. Since static analysis is not a topic of this dissertation, for brevity
we omit the standard FJ type analysis which is described in [27].
The abstract calculus described in Section 3.1 is not particularly interesting with
respect to direct information flow and integrity propagation, especially since method
dispatch is considered an indirect flow. More interesting is the manner in which
taint propagates through primitive values and library operations on them, especially
strings and string operations. This is because direct flows should propagate through
some of these methods. Also, for run-time efficiency and ease of coding some Java
taint analysis tools treat even complex library methods as “black boxes” that are
instrumented at the top level for efficiency [25], rather than relying on instrumentation
of lower-level operations.
Note that treating library methods as “black boxes” introduces a potential for
over- and under-tainting– for example in some systems all string library methods
that return strings are instrumented to return tainted results if any of the arguments
are tainted, regardless of any direct flow from the argument to result [25]. Clearly
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this strategy introduces a potential for over-taint. Other systems do not propagate
taint from strings to their component characters when decomposed [26], which is an
example of under-taint. Part of our goal here is to develop an adequate language
model to consider these approaches.
We therefore extend our basic definitions to accommodate primitive values and
their manipulation. These extensions are given in Figure 4.1. Let a primitive field
be a field containing a primitive value. We call a primitive object/class any objec-
t/class with primitive fields only, and a library method is any method that operates
on primitive objects, defined in a primitive class. We expect primitive objects to
be object wrappers for primitive values (e.g., Int(5) wrapping primitive value 5),
and library methods to be object-oriented wrappers over primitive operations (e.g.,
Int plus(Int) wrapping primitive operation +), allowing the latter’s embedding in
FJ. As a sanity condition we only allow library methods to select primitive fields
or perform primitive operations. Let LibMeths be the set of library method names
paired with their corresponding primitive class names. If C.m ∈ LibMeths, class C may
inherit the library method m from another class D.
The set of security sensitive operations (SSOs) and the set of sanitizer methods
(Sanitizers), introduced in Section 1.3, are similarly closed under inheritance, if the
methods are not overriden. We assume that in the body of each sanitizer, endorse
method is invoked. This method, simply returns this object that has been sanitized.
We posit a special set of field names PrimField that access primitive values ranged
over by ν that may occur in objects, and a set of operations ranged over by Op that
operate on primitive values. We require that special field name selections only occur
as arguments to Op, which can easily be enforced in practice by a static analysis. Sim-
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D.m ∈ LibMeths Inherit(m, C, D)
C.m ∈ LibMeths
D.m ∈ SSOs Inherit(m, C, D)
C.m ∈ SSOs
D.m ∈ Sanitizers Inherit(m, C, D)
C.m ∈ Sanitizers
C.m ∈ Sanitizers mtypeCT (m, C) = C¯→ D fieldsCT (D) = f¯
mbodyR(CT )(endorse, D) = ∅, new D(this.f)
C.m ∈ Sanitizers
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x¯, e.endorse()
f∗ ∈ PrimField e ::= ν | e.f∗ e ::= · · · | Op(e¯) v ::= new C(v¯) | ν E ::= · · · | Op(ν¯, E, e¯)
Figure 4.1: Extending FJ for Dynamic Integrity Taint Analysis.
ilarly, primitive values ν may only occur in special object fields and be manipulated
there by any Op.
For library methods we require that the body of any library method be of the
form where C is a primitive class:
return new C(e¯1, . . . , e¯n)
We define the meaning of operations Op via an “immediate” big-step semantic relation
≈ where the rhs of the relation is required to be a primitive value, and we identify
expressions up to ≈. For example, to define a library method for integer addition,
where Int objects contain a primitive numeric val, field we would define a + operation
as follows:
+(n1, n2) ≈ n1 + n2
Then we can add to the definition of Int in CT a method Plus to support arithmetic
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in programs:
Int plus(Int x) { return(new(Int)(+(this.val, x.val))); }
Similarly, to define string concatenation, we define a concatenation operation @ on
primitive strings:
@(s1, s2) ≈ s1s2
and we extend the definition of String in CT with the following method, where we
assume all String objects maintain their primitive representation in a val field:
String concat(String x)
{ return(new(String)(@(this.val, x.val))); }
In our security model, tainted input source is a specified argument to a top-level
program, i.e., in p(θ), we assume that θ is supplied by a low integrity source.
4.2 In-Depth Integrity Analysis Speci-
fied Logically
In this section, we demonstrate how in-depth integrity direct taint analysis for FJ can
be expressed as a single uniform policy separate from code. To accomplish this we
interpret program traces as information represented by a logical fact base in the style
of Datalog. We then define a predicate called Shadow that inductively constructs a
“shadow” expression that reflects the proper taint for all data in a configuration at
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any point in a trace.
An important feature of Java based taint analyses is that they tend to be object
based, i.e. each object has an assigned taint level. In our model, a shadow expression
has a syntactic structure that matches up with the configuration expression, and
associates integrity levels (including “high” ◦ and “low” •) with particular objects via
shape conformance.
Example 4.2.1 Suppose a method m of an untainted C object with no fields is invoked
on a pair of tainted s1 and untainted s2 strings:
new C().m(new String(s1), new String(s2))
. The proper shadow is:
shadow C(◦).m(shadow String(•), shadow String(◦)).
On the basis of shadow expressions that correctly track integrity, we can logically
specify prospective taint analysis as a property of shadowed trace information, and
retrospective taint analysis as a function of shadowed trace information. An extended
example of a shadowed trace is presented in a later section (4.3.4).
4.2.1 Taint Tracking as a Logical Trace Prop-
erty
In order to specify taint tracking, we extend the mapping toFOL(·) that interprets
FJ traces as sets of logical facts.
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Definition 4.2.1 We redefine toFOL(·) as a mapping on traces and configurations,
according to Definition 3.1.1, with the following extension:
toFOL((E[Op(ν¯)], n)) = {PrimCall(n,Op, ν¯),Context(n, E)}.
Integrity Identifiers
We introduce an integrity identifier t that denotes the integrity level associate with
objects. To support a notion of “partial endorsement” for partially trusted sanitiz-
ers, we define three taint labels, to denote high integrity (◦), low integrity (•), and
questionable integrity ().
t ::= ◦ |  | •
We specify an ordering ≤ on these labels denoting their integrity relation:
• ≤  ≤ ◦
For simplicity in this presentation we will assume that all Sanitizers are partially
trusted and cannot raise the integrity of a tainted or maybe tainted object beyond
maybe tainted. It would be possible to include both trusted and untrusted sanitizers
without changing the formalism.
We posit the usual meet ∧ and join ∨ operations on taint lattice elements, and
introduce logical predicates meet and join such that meet(t1 ∧ t2, t1, t2) and join(t1 ∨
t2, t1, t2) hold.
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sv ::= shadow C(t, s¯v) | δ se ::= sv | se.f | se.m(s¯e) | shadow C(t, s¯e) | C.m(se) | Op(s¯e)
SE ::= [ ] | SE.f | SE.m(s¯e) | sv.m(s¯v,SE, s¯e′) | shadow C(t, s¯v,SE, s¯e′) | C.m(SE) | Op(s¯v,SE, s¯e)
Figure 4.2: Shadow Values, Expressions, and Evaluation Contexts.
4.2.2 Shadow Traces, Taint Propagation, and San-
itization
Shadow traces reflect taint information of objects as they are passed around programs.
Shadow traces manipulate shadow terms and context, which are terms T in the logic
with the following syntax. Note the structural conformance with closed e and E,
but with primitive values replaced with a single dummy value δ that is omitted for
brevity in examples, but is necessary to maintain proper arity for field selection.
Shadow expressions most importantly assign integrity identifiers t to objects. The
sytax for shadow values, expressions, and evaluation contexts is given in Figure 4.2.
The shadowing specification requires that shadow expressions evolve in a shape-
conformant way with the original configuration. To this end, we define a metatheo-
retic function for shadow method bodies, smbody, that imposes untainted tags on all
method bodies, defined a priori, and removes primitive values.
Definition 4.2.2 Shadow method bodies are defined by the function smbody.
smbodyCT (m, C) = x¯.srewrite(e),
where mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯.e and the shadow rewriting function, srewrite, is defined as
in Figure 4.3, where srewrite(e¯) denotes a mapping of srewrite over the vector e¯.
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srewrite(x) = x
srewrite(new C(e¯)) = shadow C(◦, srewrite(e))
srewrite(e.f) = srewrite(e).f
srewrite(e.m(e¯′)) = srewrite(e).m(srewrite(e¯′))
srewrite(C.m(e)) = C.m(srewrite(e))
srewrite(Op(e¯)) = Op(srewrite(e¯))
srewrite(ν) = δ
Figure 4.3: Definition of Mapping srewrite.
We use match as a predicate which matches a shadow expression se, to a shadow
context SE and a shadow expression se′ where se′ is the part of the shadow in the
hole. The definition of match is given in Figure 4.4.
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match(sv, [ ], sv).
match(shadow C(t, sv).fi, [ ], shadow C(t, sv).fi).
match(shadow C(t, sv).m(su), [ ], shadow C(t, sv).m(su)).
match(C.m(sv), [ ], C.m(sv)).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒ match(se.f,SE.f, se′).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒ match(se.m(se),SE.m(se), se′).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒
match(sv.m(sv, se, se), sv.m(sv,SE, se), se′).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒
match(shadow C(t, sv, se, se), shadow C(t, sv,SE, se), se′).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒ match(C.m(se), C.m(SE), se′).
match(se,SE, se′) =⇒ match(Op(s¯v, se, s¯e),Op(s¯v,SE, s¯e), se′).
Figure 4.4: match Predicate Definition.
Next, in Figure 4.5, we define a predicate Shadow(n, se) where se is the relevant
shadow expression at execution step n, establishing an ordering for the shadow trace.
Shadow has as its precondition a “current” shadow expression, and as its postcondi-
tion the shadow expression for the next step of evaluation (with the exception of the
rule for shadowing Ops on primitive values which reflects the “immediate” valuation
due to the definition of ≈– note the timestamp is not incremented in the postcondi-
tion in that case). We set the shadow of the initial configuration at timestamp 1, and
then Shadow inductively shadows the full trace. Shadow is defined by case analysis
on the structure of shadow expression in the hole. The shadow expression in the hole
and the shadow evaluation context are derived from match predicate definition.1
Note especially how integrity is treated by sanitization and endorsement in this
specification. For elements of Sanitizers, if input is tainted then the result is consid-
ered to be only partially endorsed. For library methods, taint is propagated given a
1Some notational liberties are taken in Figure 4.5 regarding expression and context substitutions,
which are defined using predicates elided for brevity.
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Shadow(1, shadow TopLevel(◦).main(shadow C(•, δ¯))).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE, sv.m(sv′)) ∧ C.m /∈ LibMeths ∧ smbodyCT (m, C) = x¯.se′ =⇒
Shadow(n+ 1,SE[C.m(se′[sv′/x¯][sv/this])]).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE, shadow C(t0, sv).m(shadow C(t, sv))) ∧ C.m ∈ LibMeths∧
smbodyCT (m, C) = x¯.shadow D(◦, se) ∧ Prop(t, C.m(t0, t¯)) =⇒
Shadow(n+ 1,SE[C.m(shadow D(t, se)[shadow C(t0, sv)/this][shadow C(t, sv))/x¯])]).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE, shadow C(t, sv).fi) =⇒ Shadow(n+ 1,SE[svi]).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE,Op(δ¯)) =⇒ Shadow(n,SE[δ]).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE, C.m(shadow D(t, sv))) ∧ C.m ∈ Sanitizers =⇒
Shadow(n+ 1,SE[shadow D(t ∨, sv)]).
Shadow(n, se) ∧match(se,SE, C.m(sv)) ∧ C.m /∈ Sanitizers =⇒ Shadow(n+ 1,SE[sv]).
Figure 4.5: Shadow Predicate Definition.
user-defined predicate Prop(t, T ) where T is a compound term of the form C.m(t¯) with
t¯ the given integrity of this followed by the integrity of the arguments to method
C.m, and t is the integrity of the result. For example, one could define:
meet(t, t1, t2)⇒ Prop(t, String.concat(t1, t2)) (4.1)
4.2.3 In-Depth Integrity Taint Analysis Policies
We define our in-depth policy for integrity taint analysis. The prospective component
blocks the execution of the program whenever a tainted value is passed to a secure
method. To this end, in Figure 4.6 we define the predicate BAD which identifies
traces that should be rejected as unsafe. The retrospective component specifies that
data of questionable integrity that is passed to a secure method should be logged.
The relevant logging specification is specified in terms of a predicate MaybeBad also
defined in Figure 4.6.
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match(se,SE, shadow C(t, sv).m(shadow D(t′, sv′)) ∧ Shadow(n, se)∧
Call(n, C, v¯, m, u) ∧ C.m ∈ SSOs =⇒ SsoTaint(n, t′, u).
SsoTaint(n, •, u) =⇒ BAD(n). SsoTaint(n, t, u) ∧ t ≤  =⇒ MaybeBAD(u).
Figure 4.6: Predicates for Specifying Prospective and Retrospective Properties
Definition 4.2.3 Let X be the set of rules in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 and the set of
user defined rules for Prop. The prospective integrity taint analysis policy is defined
as the set of traces that do not end in BAD states.
SPtaint = {τ | (bτc ⊗ C(X))⇒{BAD} = C(∅)}.
The retrospective integrity taint analysis policy is the following logging specification:
LS taint = λτ.(bτc ⊗ C(X))⇒{MaybeBAD}
We define a program as being safe iff it does not produce a bad trace.
Definition 4.2.4 We call a program p(θ) safe iff for all τ it is the case that p(θ) ⇓ τ
implies τ ∈ SPtaint. We call the program unsafe iff there exists some trace τ such that
p(θ) ⇓ τ and τ /∈ SPtaint.
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4.3 Taint Analysis Instrumentation via
Program Rewriting
Now we define an object based dynamic integrity taint analysis in a more familiar
operational style. Taint analysis instrumentation is added automatically by a program
rewriting algorithm R that models the Phosphor rewriting algorithm. It adds taint
label fields to all objects, and operations for appropriately propagating taint along
direct flow paths. In addition to blocking behavior to enforce prospective checks, we
incorporate logging instrumentation to support retrospective measures in the presence
of partially trusted sanitization.
4.3.1 In-Depth Taint Analysis Instrumentation
The target language of the rewriting algorithm R, called FJtaint, is the same as FJ,
except we add taint labels t as a form of primitive value ν, the type of which we posit
as Taint. For the semantics of taint values operations we define:
∨(t1, t2) ≈ t1 ∨ t2 ∧ (t1, t2) ≈ t1 ∧ t2
In addition we introduce a “check” operation ? such that ?t ≈ t iff t > •. We also add
an explicit sequencing operation of the form e; e to target language expressions, and
evaluation contexts of the form E; e. along with the appropriate operational semantics
rule that we define below in Section 4.3.3.
Now we define the program rewriting algorithm R as follows. Since in our security
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model the only tainted input source is a specified argument to a top-level program,
the rewriting algorithm adds an untainted label to all objects. The class table is then
manipulated to specify a taint field for all objects, a check object method that blocks
if the argument is tainted, and an endorse method for any object class returned by
a sanitizer.
As discussed in Chapter 1, sanitization is typically taken to be “ideal” for integrity
flow analyses, however in practice sanitization is imperfect, which creates an attack
vector. To support retrospective measures specified in Definition 4.2.3, we define
endorse so it takes object taint t to the join of t and . The algorithm also adds a log
method call to the beginning of SSOs, which will log objects that are maybe tainted
or worse. The semantics of log are defined directly in the operational semantics of
FJtaint below.
Definition 4.3.1 For any expression e, the expression µ(e) is syntactically equiva-
lent to e except with every subexpression new C(e¯) replaced with new C(◦, e¯). Given
SSOs and Sanitizers, define R(e, CT ) = (µ(e),R(CT )), where R(CT ) is the smallest
class table satisfying the axioms given in Figure 4.7.
4.3.2 Taint Propagation of Library Methods
Another important element of taint analysis is instrumentation of library methods
that propagate taint– the propagation must be made explicit to reflect the interference
of arguments with results. The approach to this in taint analysis systems is often
motivated by efficiency as much as correctness [25]. We assume that library methods
are instrumented to propagate taint as intended (i.e. in accordance with the user
defined predicate Prop).
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fieldsR(CT )(Object) = Taint taint mbodyR(CT )(check, Object) = x, new Object(?x.taint)
C.m ∈ Sanitizers mtypeCT (m, C) = C¯→ D fieldsCT (D) = f¯
mbodyR(CT )(endorse, D) = ∅, new D(∨(, this.taint), this.f)
C.m ∈ SSOs mbodyCT (m, C) = x, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x, this.log(x); this.check(x);µ(e)
C.m 6∈ Sanitizers ∪ SSOs mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x¯, µ(e)
Figure 4.7: Axioms for Rewriting Algorithm
Here is how addition and string concatenation, for example, can be modified to
propagate taint. Note the taint of arguments will be propagated to results by taking
the meet of argument taint, thus reflecting the degree of integrity corruption:
Int plus(Int x)
{ return(new(Int)
(∧(this.taint, x.taint),+(this.val, x.val))); }
String concat(Int x)
{ return(new(String)
∧(this.taint, x.taint),@(this.val, x.val))); }
4.3.3 Operational Semantics of FJtaint
To support the semantics of log, we add an audit log L as a new configuration
component in FJtaint that stores objects of questionable integrity. The log method
is the only one that interacts with the log in any way. We “inherit” the reduction
semantics of FJ, and add a rule also for evaluation of sequencing. These extensions
are given in Figure 4.8.
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Reduce
(e, n)→ (e′, n′)
(e, n,L)→ (e′, n′L)
Sequence
(v; e, n)→ (e, n)
Log
t ≤ 
(u.log(new C(t, v¯)), n,L)→ (new C(t, v¯), n,L ∪ {new C(t, v¯)})
NoLog
t > 
(u.log(new C(t, v¯)), n,L)→ (new C(t, v¯), n,L)
Figure 4.8: Operational Semantics of FJtaint.
As for FJ we use →∗ to denote the reflexive, transitive closure on → over FJtaint
configurations of the form (e, n,L). We define FJtaint configurations and traces as
for FJ. Abusing notation, we write R(p(θ)) ⇓ τ iff τ begins with the configuration
(R(p(θ)), 1,∅), and also κ ⇓ τ iff τ is a valid trace in the FJtaint semantics beginning
with κ.
4.3.4 An Illustrative Example: Dynamic Integrity
Taint Analysis
To illustrate the major points of our construction for source program traces and their
shadows, as well as the corresponding traces of rewritten programs, we consider an
example of program that contains an sso call on a string that has been constructed
from a sanitized low integrity input.
Example 4.3.1 Let
mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) =
x, new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(x.concat(
new String(′′world′′))).
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p(new String(′′hello ′′))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(
new String(′′hello ′′).concat(new String(′′world′′))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(
String.concat(new String(@(new String(′′hello ′′).val, new String(′′world′′).val))))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(
String.concat(new String(@(′′hello ′′, new String(′′world′′).val))))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(String.concat(new String(′′hello world′′)))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new Sec().sanitize(new String(′′hello world′′))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(new String(′′hello world′′).endorse())))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(String.endorse(new String(′′hello world′′)))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(new String(′′hello world′′))))
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec().secureMeth(new String(′′hello world′′)))
→ TopLevel.main(Sec.secureMeth(new String(′′hello world′′)))
→ TopLevel.main(new String(′′hello world′′))
→ new String(′′hello world′′).
Figure 4.9: Example 4.3.1: Source Trace.
Assume the string ′′hello ′′ is tainted with low integrity. Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10,
and Figure 4.11 give the source trace, the shadow expressions and the target trace,
respectively. Note that shadow expressions in Figure 4.10 are derived based on the
rules given in Figure 4.5. For the sake of brevity and clarity in illustrating the main
ideas, we have assumed that methods Sec.sanitize and Sec.secureMeth are identity
functions. Some reduction steps are elided in the example as n-length multi-step
reductions →n.
4.4 Properties of Program Rewriting
The logical definition of in-depth integrity taint analysis presented in Section 4.2
establishes the proper specification of prospective and retrospective analysis. In this
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Shadow(1, shadow TopLevel(◦).main(shadow String(•, δ)))
Shadow(2, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(
shadow String(•, δ).concat(shadow String(◦, δ)))))
Shadow(3, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(shadow String(•,@(shadow String(•, δ).val, shadow String(◦, δ).val)))))))
Shadow(4, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(shadow String(•,@(δ, shadow String(◦, δ).val)))))))
Shadow(5, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(shadow String(•,@(δ, δ)))))))
Shadow(5, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(shadow String(•, δ))))))
Shadow(6, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow Sec(◦).sanitize(shadow String(•, δ)))))
Shadow(7, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(shadow String(•, δ).endorse()))))
Shadow(8, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(String.endorse(shadow String(•, δ))))))
Shadow(9, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(shadow String(•, δ)))))
Shadow(10, TopLevel.main(shadow Sec(◦).secureMeth(shadow String(, δ))))
Shadow(11, TopLevel.main(Sec.secureMeth(shadow String(, δ))))
Shadow(12, TopLevel.main(shadow String(, δ)))
Shadow(13, shadow String(, δ))
Figure 4.10: Example 4.3.1: Shadow Expressions.
section, we show how these definitions are used to establish operational correctness of
prospective enforcement and soundness/completeness of retrospective enforcement for
R, and how these conditions are proven. The main properties defined in this section
establish operational correctness for prospective measure and soundness/completeness
of retrospective measure in Definitions 4.4.3 and 4.4.5 respectively, and the main
results demonstrate that these properties are enjoyed by R in Theorems 4.4.2 and
4.4.3.
4.4.1 Semantics Preservation
A core condition for operational correctness of R is the proof of semantics preserva-
tion for safe programs in FJ, i.e. that rewritten programs simulate the semantics of
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R(p(new String(′′hello ′′))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new Sec(◦).sanitize(
new String(•, ′′hello ′′).concat(new String(◦, ′′world′′)))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(new String(•,@(new String(•, ′′hello ′′).val, new String(◦, ′′world′′).val)))))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(new String(•,@(′′hello ′′, new String(◦, ′′world′′).val)))))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new Sec(◦).sanitize(
String.concat(new String(•, ′′hello world′′))))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new Sec(◦).sanitize(new String(•, ′′hello world′′)))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(new String(•, ′′hello world′′).endorse()))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(String.endorse(new String(, ′′hello world′′))))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(Sec.sanitize(new String(, ′′hello world′′)))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(new Sec(◦).secureMeth(new String(, ′′hello world′′))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(Sec.secureMeth(new Sec(◦).log(new String(, ′′hello world′′));
new Sec(◦).check(new String(, ′′hello world′′)); new String(, ′′hello world′′))),∅
→ TopLevel.main(Sec.secureMeth(new Sec(◦).check(new String(, ′′hello world′′));
new String(, ′′hello world′′))), {new String(, ′′hello world′′)}
→ TopLevel.main(Sec.secureMeth(new String(, ′′hello world′′))), {new String(, ′′hello world′′)}
→ TopLevel.main(new String(, ′′hello world′′)), {new String(, ′′hello world′′)}
→ new String(, ′′hello world′′), {new String(, ′′hello world′′)}
Figure 4.11: Example 4.3.1: Target Trace.
source program modulo security instrumentations. The way this simulation is defined
will naturally imply a full and faithful implementation of taint shadowing semantics.
Adapting Definition 2.5.1, we say that rewriting algorithm R is semantics preserving
for SPtaint iff there exists a relation :≈ with the following property.
Definition 4.4.1 Rewriting algorithm R is semantics preserving iff for all safe pro-
grams p(θ) (Definition 4.2.4) all of the following hold:
1. For all traces τ such that p(θ) ⇓ τ there exists τ ′ with τ :≈ τ ′ and R(p(θ)) ⇓ τ ′.
2. For all traces τ such that R(p(θ)) ⇓ τ there exists a trace τ ′ such that τ ′ :≈ τ
and p(θ) ⇓ τ ′.
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Observe that :≈ may relate more than one trace in the target program to a trace in
the source program, since instrumentation in the target language may introduce new
reduction steps that can cause “stuttering” with respect to source language traces.
As evidenced in the statement of semantics preservation, we will generally relate
“executable” source programs p(θ) with rewritten programs R(p(θ)) for simplicity
in the statement of properties and ease of proofs. However, for practical purposes
it is important to observe that instrumentation can be performed on program entry
points p and class tables CT once, prior to invocation on possibly tainted θ, due to
the following property which follows immediately from the definition of R.
Lemma 4.4.1 R(p(θ)) = R(p)(R(θ))
4.4.2 Operational Correctness for Prospective
Analysis
Proof of semantics preservation establishes operational correctness for the prospective
component of R, since SPtaint expresses the correct prospective specification as a
safety property. To this end, we define the notion of security failure.
Definition 4.4.2 An FJtaint program e causes a security failure iff
e, 1,∅→∗ E[v.check(new C(•, v¯))], n,L
for some E, v, new C(•, v¯), n, and L.
The operational correctness of prospective component of rewriting algorithm is
then defined as follows:
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Definition 4.4.3 We call rewriting algorithm R operationally correct for prospective
enforcement provided that a program p(θ) is unsafe (Definition 4.2.4) iff R(p(θ))
causes a security failure (Definition 4.4.2).
4.4.3 Soundness/Completeness for Retrospective
Analysis
In addition to preserving program semantics, a correctly rewritten program constructs
a log in accordance with the given logging specification. More precisely, if LS is a given
logging specification and a trace τ describes execution of a source program, rewriting
should produce a program with a trace τ ′ that corresponds to τ (i.e., τ :≈ τ ′), where
the log L generated by τ ′, written τ ′ ; L, ideally contains the same information
as LS(τ). A minor technical issue is that instrumentation imposed by R requires
that information is added to the log after an sso invocation with an argument of at
most questionable integrity, and :≈ accounts for this stuttering. In our trace based
correctness condition we need to account for this, hence the following Definition:
Definition 4.4.4 For FJtaint programs we write τ ; L iff tail(σ) = e, n,L where σ
is the longest trace such that τ ′ :≈ τ and τ ′ :≈ σ for some FJ trace τ ′.
The following definitions then establish soundness/completeness conditions re-
garding retrospective enforcement for rewriting algorithms. Note that satisfaction of
either of these conditions only implies condition (1) of Definition 4.4.1, not condition
(2), so semantics preservation is an independent condition. We define toFOL(L) =
{MaybeBAD(v) | v ∈ L}, and thus bLc = C(toFOL(L)).
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Definition 4.4.5 Rewriting algorithm R is retrospectively sound/complete for ret-
rospective enforcement iff for all programs R(p(θ)), and finite traces τ and σ where:
R(p(θ)) ⇓ σ τ :≈ σ σ ; L
we have that L is sound/complete with respect to LS taint and τ .
4.4.4 Definition of :≈ and Correctness Results
To establish operational correctness of prospective enforcement and soundness/com-
pleteness of retrospective enforcement for the program rewriting algorithm, we need
to define a correspondence relation :≈. Source language execution traces and target
language execution traces correspond if they represent the same expression evaluated
to the same point. We make a special case: when a sink method is called in the
source execution, in which the target execution needs to first check the arguments
to the sink method in order to log and enforce prospective policy by check. In this
case, the target execution may be ahead by some number of steps, allowing time to
enforce heterogeneous policies.
In order to define the correspondence between execution traces of the source and
target language, we first define a mapping, overlay, that computes the target config-
uration by overlaying the source configuration with its shadow.
Definition 4.4.6 The mapping overlay : (e, se) 7→ e′ is defined in Figure 4.12.
We define a way to obtain the last shadow in a trace. Give a source trace τ of
length n, LastShadow(τ) denotes the shadow of the last configuration in the trace τ .
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overlay(x, x) = x overlay(ν, δ) = ν overlay(Op(e¯),Op(se)) = Op(overlay(e, se))
overlay(e.f, se.f) = overlay(e, se).f overlay(new C(e¯), shadow C(t, se)) = new C(t, overlay(e, se))
overlay(C.m(e), C.m(se)) = C.m(overlay(e, se)) overlay(e.m(e¯′), se.m(se′)) = overlay(e, se).m(overlay(e′, se′))
Figure 4.12: Definition of overlay.
Considering the rule
Shadow(n, se) =⇒ LShadow(se), (4.2)
we define LastShadow(τ) = se such that bτc ⊗X ` LShadow(se), where X contains
the rules given in Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 and (4.2). We need to show that LastShadow
is total function on non-trivial traces, i.e., LastShadow uniquely maps any non-empty
trace to a shadow expression.
Lemma 4.4.2 LastShadow is total function on non-trivial traces.
Proof. By induction on the length of traces and the fact that shadow expressions are
defined uniquely for every step of reduction in Figure 4.5. uunionsq
We also define a mapping, trim, from the expressions of the target language to
the expressions of the source language. Intuitively, trim removes the invocations to
check and log.
Definition 4.4.7 The mapping trim : e 7→ e′ is defined in Figure 4.13. We assume
 to be no-op, i.e., ; e = e.
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trim(x) = x trim(e.f) = trim(e).f trim(new C(e¯)) = new C(trim(e)) trim(C.m(e)) = C.m(trim(e))
trim(Op(e¯)) = Op(trim(e)) trim(e1; e2) = trim(e1); trim(e2)
trim(e.m(e¯′)) =
{
 if m ∈ {log, check}
trim(e).m(trim(e′)) if m /∈ {log, check}
Figure 4.13: Definition of trim.
Definition 4.4.8 Given source language execution trace τ = σκ and target language
execution trace τ ′ = σ′κ′, τ :≈ τ ′ iff overlay(κ, LastShadow(τ)) = trim(e′), where
κ′ = e′, n′,L.
In what follows, we prove the semantics preservation given by Definition 4.4.1.
To this end, in Lemma 4.4.3, we show that if trim of an expression is a value, that
expression eventually reduces to that value provided it is not a security failure. More-
over, Lemma 4.4.4 states that if trim of a non-security failure expression e is reduced
to e′ then e reduces (in potentially multiple steps) to some expression with the same
trim as e′.
Lemma 4.4.3 For all expressions e, if trim(e) = v, then either (1) for all L there
exists some trace σ such that e, n,L ⇓ σκ where κ = v, n′,L′ for some n′ and L′, or
(2) e causes a security failure.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. Most of the cases are trivial. Non-trivial
cases are as follows:
• Let e = new C(e1, · · · , en) where e does not cause a security failure. We
need to show that if trim(new C(e1, · · · , en)) = trim(v), then for all n and
L there exist some trace σ such that e, n,L ⇓ σκ where κ = v, n′,L′ for
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some n′ and L′. Let v = new C(v1, · · · , vn). Since trim(new C(e1, · · · , en)) =
new C(trim(e1), · · · , trim(en)), for each i ∈ {1, · · ·n} we have trim(ei) = vi.
Then by induction hypothesis, for all ni and Li there exists some trace σi such
that ei, ni,Li ⇓ σiκi where κi = vi, n′i,L′i for some n′i and L′i. This straightfor-
wardly gives the required result.
• Let e = e1; e2 where e does not cause a security failure. We need to show that
if trim(e1; e2) = trim(v), then for all n and L there exist some trace σ such
that e, n,L ⇓ σκ where κ = v, n′,L′ for some n′ and L′. Since trim(e1, e2) =
trim(e1); trim(e2), there are two cases: (1) trim(e1) =  and trim(e2) = v, or
(2) trim(e2) =  and trim(e1) = v. In either case the result is immediate by
induction hypothesis.
uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.4 For all expressions e, if trim(e), n,L→ e′, n′,L′ then either (1) there
exists σ such that e, n,L ⇓ σκ with κ = e′′, n′′,L′′ and trim(e′′) = trim(e′), or (2) e
causes a security failure.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e, and applying Lemma 4.4.3. uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.5 states that overlaying a method body with its shadow is equal to
the same method body in the rewritten class table.
Lemma 4.4.5 overlay(e, srewrite(e)) = µ(e).
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. Most of the cases are immediate or con-
cluded from the induction hypothesis. The core case is where e = new C(e¯). In this
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case, we have overlay(new C(e¯), srewrite(new C(e¯))) = overlay(new C(e¯), shadow C(◦, e¯)).
Using the induction hypothesis, overlay(e, srewrite(e)) = µ(e), we then have
overlay(new C(e¯), srewrite(new C(e¯))) = new C(◦, µ(e¯)) = µ(new C(e¯)).
uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.6 and Lemma 4.4.7 state that single step and multi step reductions in
FJ preserve :≈.
Lemma 4.4.6 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and e1 → e′1 then there exists σ such that κ2 ⇓ σ and
τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σ.
Proof. It is proven by induction on the derivation of e1 → e′1 and applying Lemmas
4.4.4 and 4.4.5. In the following the interesting cases are studied.
• Let new C(v¯).fi → vi, i.e., e1 = new C(v¯) and e′1 = vi. Then the shadow of
e1 is se1 = shadow C(t, s¯v).fi. Let κ2 = e2, n2,L2. Then, according to τ1e1 :≈
τ2κ2, we have trim(e2) = overlay(e1, se1) = new C(t, overlay(v, sv)).fi. Then,
trim(e2), n2,L2 → overlay(vi, svi), n2,L2. Using Lemma 4.4.4, there exists σ
such that κ2 ⇓ σκ with κ = e′2, n′2,L′2 and trim(e′2) = overlay(vi, svi), which
implies that τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σκ.
• Let C.m(v) → v, i.e., e1 = C.m(v) and e′1 = v. Then the shadow of e1 is
se1 = C.m(sv). Let κ2 = e2, n2,L2. Then, according to τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2, we have
trim(e2) = overlay(e1, se1) = C.m(overlay(v, sv)). Then, trim(e2), n2,L2 →
overlay(v, sv), n2,L2. Using Lemma 4.4.4, there exists σ such that κ2 ⇓ σκ
with κ = e′2, n′2,L′2 and trim(e′2) = overlay(v, sv), which implies that τ1e1e′1 :≈
τ2σκ.
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• Let v.m(u¯) → e[v/this][u¯/x¯], where mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e. That is, e1 =
v.m(u¯) and e′1 = e[v/this][u¯/x¯]. Then the shadow of e1 is se1 = sv.m(s¯u).
Let κ2 = e2, n2,L2. Then, according to τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2, we have trim(e2) =
overlay(e1, se1) = overlay(v, sv).m(overlay(u, su)). We consider the following
cases for C.m:
– If C.m ∈ SSOs then trim(e2), n2,L2 → eˆ, n2,L2, where
eˆ = this.log(x); this.check(x);µ(e)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x].
Using Lemma 4.4.4, there exists σ such that κ2 ⇓ σκ with κ = e′2, n′2,L′2
and trim(e′2) = trim(eˆ). We have
trim(eˆ) = trim(this.log(x); this.check(x);
µ(e)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x])
= trim(µ(e[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x]))
= µ(e)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x].
According to Lemma 4.4.5, overlay(e, se) = µ(e). Thus,
trim(e′2) = trim(eˆ) = overlay(e, se)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x]
= overlay(e[v/this][u/x], se[sv/this][su/x]),
which implies that τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σκ.
– If C.m /∈ SSOs ∪ LibMeths, then trim(e2), n2,L2 → eˆ, n2,L2, where eˆ =
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µ(e)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x¯]. Then simialr to the case where
C.m ∈ SSOs, we conclude that τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σκ.
– If C.m ∈ LibMeths then mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, new D(e¯). We have e′1 =
new D(e¯)[v/this][u¯/x¯] and trim(e2), n2,L2 → eˆ, n2,L2, where
eˆ = new D(t, e¯)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x¯]
such that Prop(t, C.m(t0 ∧ t)), t0 is the taint tag in sv and t is the sequence
of taint tag in su. Using Lemma 4.4.4, there exists σ such that κ2 ⇓ σκ
with κ = e′2, n′2,L′2 and trim(e′2) = trim(eˆ). We have
trim(e′2) = trim(eˆ)
= new D(t, trim(e))[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x¯]
= new D(t, e¯)[overlay(v, sv)/this][overlay(u, su)/x¯]
= overlay(new D(e¯)[u¯/x¯][v/this], shadow D(t, se)[su/x¯][sv/this]),
which implies that τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σκ.
uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.7 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and e1 ⇓ σ1, then there exists σ2 such that κ2 ⇓ σ2
and τ1σ1 :≈ τ2σ2.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e1 ⇓ σ1 (reflexive and transitive closure) and
applying Lemma 4.4.6. uunionsq
Similarly, Lemma 4.4.8 and Lemma 4.4.9 argue that single step and multi step
reductions in FJtaint preserve :≈.
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Lemma 4.4.8 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and κ2 → κ′2 then there exists σ where e1 ⇓ σ and
τ1σ :≈ τ1κ2κ′2.
Proof. It is proven by induction on the derivation of κ2 → κ′2 and applying Lemma
4.4.5. The interesting case is method invocation. Let κ2 = e2, n2,L2, where e2 =
v.m(u¯). Assume that mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e. Then, we have the following two cases:
• If C.m ∈ SSOs then e2 → log(u); check(u);µ(e)[u/x][v/this]. Since τ1e1 :≈
τ2κ2, we have trim(e2) = overlay(e1, se1), which implies that e1 = v′.m(u′) such
that overlay(v′, sv ′) = v and overlay(u′, su′) = u. By Lemma 4.4.5, we conclude
that
overlay(e[u′/x][v′/this], se[su′/x][sv ′/this]) =
trim(log(u); check(u);µ(e)[u/x][v/this]).
As e1 → e[u′/x][v′/this], the proof is complete for this case.
• If C.m /∈ SSOs then e2 → µ(e)[u¯/x¯][v/this]. Since τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2, we have
trim(e2) = overlay(e1, se1), which implies that e1 = v′.m(u¯′) such that overlay(v′, sv ′) =
v and overlay(u′, su′) = u¯. By Lemma 4.4.5, we conclude that
overlay(e[u¯′/x¯][v′/this], se[su′/x¯][sv ′/this]) = trim(µ(e)[u¯/x][v/this]).
As e1 → e[u¯′/x][v′/this], the proof is complete for this case similar the case
above.
uunionsq
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Lemma 4.4.9 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and κ2 ⇓ σ2, then there exists σ1 such that e1 ⇓ σ1
and τ1σ1 :≈ τ2σ2.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of κ2 ⇓ σ2 (reflexive and transitive closure) and
applying Lemma 4.4.8. uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.10 states that initial configuration in FJtaint corresponds to the initial
configuration in FJ. Finally, in Theorem 4.4.1, the semantics preservation property is
proven.
Lemma 4.4.10 Let θ = new C(ν¯) be a tainted input. Then,
new TopLevel().main(θ) :≈
new TopLevel(◦).main(new C(•, ν¯)),∅.
Proof. By the definition of shadow expressions and :≈. uunionsq
Theorem 4.4.1 establishes semantics preservation for rewriting algorithm R.
Theorem 4.4.1 The rewriting algorithmR is semantics preserving (Definition 4.4.1).
Proof. Lemma 4.4.10 states that initial configuration of a program p corresponds to
the initial configuration of R(p). Lemmas 4.4.7 and 4.4.9 extend the correspondence
relation for traces of arbitrary lengths. More specifically, Lemmas 4.4.10 and 4.4.7
entail the 1st condition of Definition 4.4.1, and Lemmas 4.4.10 and 4.4.9 result in the
2nd condition of Definition 4.4.1. uunionsq
In order to prove that prospective component of R is operationally correct, we
first need to show that SPtaint is a safety property.
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Lemma 4.4.11 SPtaint is a safety property.
Proof. Let τ /∈ SPtaint. Then, (bτc ⊗ C(X))⇒{BAD} 6= C(∅). This implies that there
exists some n such that BAD(n) ∈ (bτc ⊗ C(X))⇒{BAD}. Let τ [· · ·n] denote the
finite prefix of τ up to timestamp n. By Definition 4.2.3 BAD only refers to events
that precede step n, so it follows that bτc ⊗ C(X) ` BAD(n) iff bτ [· · ·n]c ⊗ C(X) `
BAD(n), i.e. τ /∈ SPtaint iff τ [· · ·n] /∈ SPtaint for finite n, hence SPtaint is a safety
property [1]. uunionsq
Theorem 4.4.2 The rewriting algorithm R is operationally correct for prospective
enforcement (Definition 4.4.3).
Proof. Suppose on the one hand that p(θ) is unsafe, which is the case iff p(θ) ⇓ τ and
τ /∈ SPtaint for some τ . Then according to Lemma 4.4.11, there exists some timestamp
n such that τ [· · ·n] characterizes SPtaint, i.e., BAD(n) is derivable from the rules in
Definition 4.2.3 and so (τ [· · ·n])σ /∈ SPtaint for any σ. Let n be the least timestamp
with such property and τ ′ = τ [· · ·n− 1], and τ [n] = E[v.m(new D(u¯))] where v.m is an
sso invocation and new D(u¯) has low integrity by the Definition 4.2.3. By Theorem
4.4.1 there exists some trace σ, such that R(p(θ)) ⇓ σ and τ ′ :≈ σ. Therefore, by
definition of :≈ and → we may assert that tail(σ) ⇓ κ1κ2κ3 such that
κ1 = E′[v.m(new D(•, u¯))], n,L
κ2 = E′[v.log(new D(•, u¯)); v.check(new D(•, u¯))], n,L
κ3 = E′[v.check(new D(•, u¯))], n,L ∪ {new D(•, u¯)}
Thus, R(p(θ)) ⇓ σκ1κ2κ3 and therefore R(p(θ)) causes a security failure.
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Supposing on the other hand that R(p(θ)) causes a security failure, it follows that
p(θ) is unsafe by similar reasoning (i.e. fundamental appeal to Theorem 4.4.1), since
security checks are only added to the beginning of SSOs and fail if the argument has
low integrity. uunionsq
In what follows, we give a proof for retrospective soundness/completeness of
rewriting algorithm R, given in Definition 4.4.5. As in Section 3.2, our strategy
is based on an appeal to least Herbrand models H of the logging specifications and
logs (least Herbrand models are known to exist for safe Horn clause logics with com-
pound terms [86]). In essence, we demonstrate that audit logs generated by FJtaint
programs are the least Herbrand model of the logging specification for the source
program, hence contain the same information.
We study the cases where a record is added to the audit log for single step (Lemma
4.4.12) and multi step (Lemma 4.4.13) reductions.
Lemma 4.4.12 Let e, n,L → e′, n′,L′. If v ∈ L′ − L then we have e = E[u.log(v)]
for some evaluation context E and value u, v = new C(t, v′) and t ≤ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e, n,L→ e′, n′,L′. uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.13 Let e, n,L ⇓ σκ, where κ = e′, n′,L′. If v ∈ L′ − L then there exists
some trace σ′κ1κ2 as the prefix of σκ such that κ1 = e1, n1,L1, κ2 = e2, n2,L2, where
e1 = E[u.log(v)] for some evaluation context E and value u, v = new C(t, v′) and
t ≤ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e, n,L ⇓ σκ and applying Lemma 4.4.12. uunionsq
Lemmas 4.4.14, 4.4.15 and 4.4.16 extend the results of Lemmas 4.4.4, 4.4.6 and
4.4.7 respectively, for FJtaint traces with maximal length.
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Lemma 4.4.14 For all expressions e, if trim(e), n,L → e′, n′,L′ then either (1)
there exists σ such that e, n,L ⇓ σκ with κ = e′′, n′′,L′′, trim(e′′) = trim(e′) and
κ→ eˆ, nˆ, Lˆ for some eˆ nˆ, and Lˆ implies trim(eˆ) 6= trim(e′) or (2) e causes a security
failure.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e, and applying Lemma 4.4.3. uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.15 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and e1 → e′1 then there exists σ such that κ2 ⇓ σ,
τ1e1e′1 :≈ τ2σ, and if tail(σ) = κ′2 and κ′2 → κ′′2 for some κ′′2 then τ1e1e′1 6:≈ τ2σκ′′2.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e1 → e′1 and applying Lemmas 4.4.14 and
4.4.5. uunionsq
Lemma 4.4.16 If τ1e1 :≈ τ2κ2 and e1 ⇓ σ1 non-trivially, then there exists σ2 such
that κ2 ⇓ σ2, τ1σ1 :≈ τ2σ2, and if tail(σ2) = κ′2 and κ′2 → κ′′2 for some κ′′2 then
τ1σ1 6:≈ τ2σ2κ′′2.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of e1 ⇓ σ1 and applying Lemma 4.4.15. uunionsq
In Lemma 4.4.17, we establish that the log generated by the rewritten program is
the least Herbrand model of the given logging specification semantics. This allows us
to easily prove retrospective soundness/completeness in Theorem 4.4.3.
Lemma 4.4.17 Given R(p(θ)) ⇓ σ and τ :≈ σ and σ ; L, we have:
toFOL(L) = H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD}.
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Proof. (Sketch) We first show that toFOL(L) is a subset of H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩
L{MaybeBAD}. Let MaybeBAD(v) ∈ toFOL(L). According to the definition of toFOL(L),
v ∈ L. Using Lemma 4.4.13, there exists some trace σ′κ1κ2 as the prefix of σ such
that κ1 = e1, n1,L1, κ2 = e2, n2,L2, where e1 = E[u.log(v)] for some evaluation con-
text E and value u, v = new C(t, v′) and t ≤ . Using Theorem 4.4.1, there exists a
trace τˆ such that p(θ) ⇓ τˆ and τˆ :≈ σ′κ1κ2. This ensures that
MaybeBAD(v) ∈ H(X ∪ toFOL(τˆ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD},
as u.log(v) could only appear in the body of some method C.m ∈ SSOs, according
to the rewriting algorithm R, and thus the preconditions of the last rule defined in
Figure 4.6 are satisfied by X ∪ toFOL(τˆ). Moreover, τˆ is a prefix of τ , and thus
toFOL(τˆ) ⊆ toFOL(τ). This entails that
MaybeBAD(v) ∈ H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD}.
Next, we show that H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD} is a subset of toFOL(L).
Let MaybeBAD(new D(t′, v¯′)) ∈ H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD} and v = new D(v¯′).
Then, there exist some n, C, u¯ and m where Call(n, C, u¯, m, v) ∈ toFOL(τ). More-
over, there exist SE, se, t, se and se′, where the predicates Shadow(n, se) and
match(se, SE, shadow C(t, se).m(shadow D(t′, se′))) are derivable from the rules in X,
C.m ∈ SSOs and t′ ≤ . Let τ [· · ·n] denote the prefix of τ ending in timestamp n.
Based on the definition of toFOL(·), we can infer that tail(τ [· · ·n]) = E[new C(u¯).m(v)].
Using Theorem 4.4.1, we know that there exists trace σ′ such that R(p(θ)) ⇓ σ′ and
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τ [· · ·n] :≈ σ′. Let tail(σ′) = eˆ, nˆ, Lˆ. Therefore,
trim(eˆ) = overlay(E[new C(u¯).m(new D(v¯′))],
SE[shadow C(t, se).m(shadow D(t′, se′))])
= Eˆ[new C(t, u¯).m(new D(t′, v¯′))].
Obviously, trim(eˆ), nˆ, Lˆ → Eˆ[new C(t, u¯).log(new D(t′, v¯′)); e], nˆ, Lˆ according to the
semantics of target language. Then, using Lemma 4.4.4, tail(σ′) ⇓ σ′′κ1κ2κ3, where
κ1 = Eˆ′[new C(t, u¯).m(new D(t′, v¯′))], nˆ′Lˆ′
κ2 = Eˆ′[new C(t, u¯).log(new D(t′, v¯′)); e], nˆ′, Lˆ′
κ3 = Eˆ′[e], nˆ′, Lˆ′ ∪ {new D(t′, v¯′)},
for some Eˆ′ such that
trim(Eˆ′[new C(t, u¯).log(new D(t′, v¯′)); e]) =
trim(Eˆ[new C(t, u¯).log(new D(t′, v¯′)); e]).
Since τ [· · ·n+1] :≈ σ′σ′′κ1κ2κ3, τ [· · ·n+1] is a prefix of τ and Lˆ′∪{new D(t′, v¯′)} ⊆ L
due to the monotonic growth of log, we conclude that new D(t′, v¯′) ∈ L. uunionsq
Theorem 4.4.3 The rewriting algorithm R is retrospectively sound and complete
(Definition 4.4.5).
Proof. Let p be a source program and LS be a logging specification defined as LS =
spec(X, {MaybeBAD}). We aim to show that for all R(p(θ)) and finite traces τ and
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σ, such that R(p(θ)) ⇓ σ, τ :≈ σ and σ ; L, C(toFOL(L)) = LS(τ). By Lemma
4.4.17, we have
toFOL(L) = H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD}.
By Lemma 3.2.1 and Lemma 3.2.2
LS(τ) = C(C(H(X ∪ toFOL(τ))) ∩ L{MaybeBAD})
= C(H(X ∪ toFOL(τ)) ∩ L{MaybeBAD}).
Hence, LS(τ) ≤ C(toFOL(L)) and C(toFOL(L)) ≤ LS(τ) both hold. uunionsq
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Chapter 5
The Meaning of Dynamic Integrity
Taint Analysis
The semantics of information flow has been well studied and is typically characterized
via noninterference properties, but surprisingly little work has been done to develop
similar properties for taint analysis. Recently, it has been shown that direct flow
of data confidentiality is not comparable with noninterference [24], i.e., there are
both noninterfering programs with direct leakage of secret data to public domain,
and programs without such direct leakges, but interfering. For instance consider
the following two statements in a core imperative language, in which s and p are
respectively secret and public variables:
if s = 0 then p := s else p := 0 if s = 0 then p := 1 else p := 2
The first statement is noninterfering, but direct flow of information from s to p exists,
whereas the second statement is interfering due to the indirect flow from s to p,
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but there are not any direct flows from s to p. In this chapter, we show similar
examples that distinguish noninterference from the security property that is enforced
by dynamic integrity taint analysis. Our examples are in a functional setting with
hierarchical data structures.
Formal definitions of taint analysis implementations do exist, but they are usu-
ally operational in nature. For example, in Section 4.4.4, we have established an
operational correctness for the prospective enforcement of direct integrity flow.
In this chapter, we propose a semantic framework to model direct flow of data in-
tegrity enforced by integrity taint analysis techniques. We intend to use the proposed
semantics to establish provable correctness conditions for rewriting algorithms that
instrument integrity taint analysis in the presence of input sanitization. This way an
underlying semantic framework is provided to study numerous other integrity taint
analyzers in the future.
5.1 Direct Integrity Flow Semantics: Ex-
plicit Integrity
In this section, we build “explicit integrity” a semantic property that builds on the
notions of explicit secrecy [24] and attacker power [37]. Similar to explicit secrecy,
explicit integrity is language-agnostic. In later sections, we discuss instantiation of
this model for FJ.
Explicit secrecy is defined as a property of a program, where the execution does not
change the knowledge of a low confidentiality user. Knowledge [64] is defined as the set
of initial states that a low confidentiality user is able to consider to generate a given
141
sequence of observables. Explicit knowledge [24] restricts attacker knowledge for direct
confidentiality flows only. In this section, we demonstrate how explicit knowledge can
be “dualized” for direct integrity flow analysis and applied as a semantic framework
for dynamic integrity taint analysis tools, particularly in functional languages with
hierarchical data structures (FJ).
Attacker power [37] is introduced as a counterpart to attacker knowledge in the
context of integrity, as the set of low integrity inputs that generate the same sequence
of high integrity events. Each high integrity event could be a simple assignment to
a predefined high integrity variable, a method that manipulates trusted data (secure
sinks), etc. according to the language model. The more refined the attacker power is,
the more powerful the low integrity attacker becomes, as she becomes more capable
to distinguish between the effects of different attacks on high integrity data.
We define explicit attacker power as the attacker power constrained on direct in-
tegrity flows. Then, explicit integrity is defined as the property of preserving explicit
attacker power during program execution. In order to limit flows to direct ones, we
have followed the techniques introduced in [24] to define state transformers. State
transformers extract direct flows semantically by specifying the ways in which pro-
gram state is modified in each step of execution, along with direct-flow events that
are generated.
5.1.1 Model Specification
In what follows, we formulate our explicit integrity semantics. We first define the
interface for our framework. Let K be the of program configurations for a given
object language. κ ranges over configurations. Configurations consist of control and
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state segments. Control refers to the code and state refers to data. Let C be the set
of controls with c ranging over the elements of C. Moreover, let S denote the set of
states and s represent a given state. We also define a set of high integrity events,
E. A high integrity event e may refer to different computations in different language
models and settings. For example, it could be as simple as assigning a low integrity
data to a high integrity variable, or invoking a method with a low integrity data as
its parameter to store that parameter in a database. We assume the existence of
the small step evaluation relation →⊆ K×E∗×K where (κ, e, κ′) ∈→ is denoted as
κ
e−→ κ′. We use κ→ κ′ if e is empty () or could be elided in the discussion. Notation
→∗ is used for reflexive and transitive closure of →.
Each configuration is considered to include two segments: control (code) and
state (data). These segments are not necessarily disjoint and could overlap in some
language models. In this regard, let mappings state : K → S and control : K → C
extract the state and control segments of configurations, and 〈·, ·〉 : C × S → K
construct a configuration from its control and state segments. These mappings need
to satisfy the following property, for any κ:
〈control(κ), state(κ)〉 = κ.
We assume the existence of an entry point [·] in the controls denoted by c[·] by
which the attacker can inject low integrity input. The attacker input is denoted by
a. Then c[a] represents a control in which the attacker has injected input a. Note
that an attack a is a data piece itself, i.e., a is a value.
We define state transformers as follows:
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Definition 5.1.1 Let κ→ κ′ and control(κ) = c for some c. f : S→ S× E∗ is the
function where f(s) = (state(κ′′), e) for all s and for the unique κ′′ and e such that
〈c, s〉 e−→ κ′′. We write κ→f κ′ to associate the state transformer f with the reduction
κ→ κ′.
This definition is then extended to multiple evaluation steps by composing state
transformers at each step. Let f(s) = (s′, e) and g(s′) = (s′′, e′). Then, (g ∗ f)(s) =
(s′′, e e′).
We now define the power an attacker obtains by observing high integrity events.
We capture this by defining a set of high integrity equivalent states that generate
the same sequence of high integrity events. We posit the binary relation =T on S
to denote high integrity equivalent (or trust equivalent) states. Intuitively, s =T s′
if s and s′ agree on high integrity data. The instantiation of the relation depends
on the language model in which the states are defined. For a state s and some state
transformer f , the state s′ is considered as an element of the explicit attacker power,
if s =T s′ and s′ agrees with s on the generated high integrity events.
Definition 5.1.2 We define explicit attacker power with respect to state s and state
transformer f as follows, where projection on the ith element of a tuple is denoted by
pii.
pe(s, f) = {s′ | s =T s′, pi2(f(s)) = pi2(f(s′))}.
A control then satisfies explicit integrity for some state iff no state can be excluded
from observing the high integrity events generated by the extracted state transformer.
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Definition 5.1.3 A control c satisfies explicit integrity for state s, iff 〈c, s〉→∗fκ′
implies that for any s′ and s′′, if s′ =T s′′ then we have s′′ ∈ pe(s′, f).
A control c satisfies explicit integrity iff for any s, c satisfies explicit integrity for
s.
We can now consider explicit integrity in the presence of endorsement in the style
of gradual release [64]. We assume that there exists a set of integrity events Een ⊆ E
that are generated when endorsements occur. Explicit attacker power is only allowed
to change for such events.
Definition 5.1.4 A control c satisfies explicit integrity modulo endorsement for
state s iff 〈c, s〉 →∗f κ′ e−→∗gκ′′ and e /∈ Een∗ imply that pe(s, f) = pe(s, g ∗ f).
We also define a variant of noninterference for the sake of comparison with explicit
integrity.
Definition 5.1.5 Program c is noninterfering iff for any two trust equivalent states
s and s′, if 〈c, s〉 and 〈c, s′〉 generate sequence of events e and e′ respectively, up to a
given number of steps of evaluation, then we have e = e′.
5.2 An OO Model
For practical purposes we are interested in applications of taint analysis for HLLs,
especially Java [85]. Therefore in our formulation we consider a core model of Java,
which is based on Featherweight Java (FJ), discussed in Section 4.1. We extend the
configurations with states, defined below.
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5.2.1 Operational Semantics
Rather than a substitution-based semantics (Section 3.1), we use a stack-based se-
mantics to keep track of program variables in effect and their integrity level. Stack-
based semantics provides a framework to distinguish between controls and states in
functional settings, where as in substitution-based semantics these components are
mingled within the structure of expressions. The separation of data from code is
leveraged in our framework to study explicit integrity.
We assume the existence of at least two integrity levels H and L which denote the
high integrity and the low integrity levels, respectively. A stack, denoted by Σ, is a
possibly empty sequence of substitutions γ, where each γ is a partial mapping from
variables to values.
Σ ::= ∅ | γ :: Σ
Then we can define a stack-based semantics in a standard fashion as follows. Config-
urations are expression, stack pairs (e,Σ). The reduction relation is ternary, of the
form κ α→ κ′ where α is a sequence of events– either integrity events iev or endorse-
ment events eev. The former occurs when an sso is invoked, the latter occurs when
a sanitizer returns, and both events are parameterized with the values flowing into
the sso or the value just sanitized, respectively. Figure 5.1 defines the stack-based
operational semantics for FJ.
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Context
(e,Σ) α→ (e′,Σ′)
(E[e],Σ) α→ (E[e′],Σ′)
Var
(x, γ :: Σ)→ (γ(x), γ :: Σ)
Field
fieldsCT (C) = C¯ f¯ fi ∈ f¯
(new C(v¯).fi,Σ)→ (vi,Σ)
Invoke
mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e C.m 6∈ SSOs
(new C(v¯).m(u¯),Σ)→ (C.m(e), [new C(v¯)/this][u¯/x¯] :: Σ)
SSO
mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e C.m ∈ SSOs
(new C(v¯).m(u¯),Σ) iev(u)→ (C.m(e), [new C(v¯)/this][u¯/x¯] :: Σ)
Return
C.m 6∈ Sanitizers
(C.m(v), γ :: Σ)→ (v,Σ)
Sanitized
C.m ∈ Sanitizers
(C.m(v), γ :: Σ) eev(v)→ (v,Σ)
Figure 5.1: Stack-based Operational Semantics for FJ.
e redex
control(E[e],Σ) = e
e redex
state(E[e],Σ) = (E,Σ)
〈e, (E,Σ)〉 = (E[e],Σ)
Figure 5.2: Definitions of control, state and 〈·, ·〉 in FJ.
5.2.2 Model instantiation for FJ
In this section, we instantiate explicit integrity for FJ. First, we define the required
interface specified in Section 5.1. Let C be the set of redexes. We define s to be a pair
of an evaluation context and a stack (E,Σ). We define κ as the pair of expressions
and stacks, i.e., (e,Σ). Mappings control, state and 〈·, ·〉 are defined in Figure 5.2.
These definitions satisfy 〈control(κ), state(κ)〉 = κ.
Lemma 5.2.1 For any FJ configuration κ, we have 〈control(κ), state(κ)〉 = κ.
Proof. Straightforward based on the definition of mappings in Figure 5.2. uunionsq
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E1 = E2 Σ1 =T Σ2
(E1,Σ1) =T (E2,Σ2)
∅ =T ∅
dom(γ1) = dom(γ2) ∀x ∈ dom(γ1).Γ(x) = H⇒ γ1(x) = γ2(x) Σ1 =T Σ2
(γ1 :: Σ1) =T (γ2 :: Σ2)
Figure 5.3: Definition trust equivalent states in FJ.
The set E is the set of events of the form iev(v) and eev(v). We modify the
operational semantics of FJ slightly in order to consider integrity events. When an
sso is invoked with argument v the integrity event iev(v) is generated. Moreover, the
event eev(v) is generated when a sanitizer is returned (with endorsed value).
Now, in order to define trust equivalent states in FJ, we posit a function Γ that
maps every program variable (method argument) to high or low integrity– without
loss of generality we assume that all method variables are uniquely named. Essen-
tially, Γ(x) = H for all and only sso arguments. To complete the instantiation of
the model we define trust equivalence relation =T on FJ states as given in Figure
5.3. Note that we abuse the notation to define trust equivalent stacks as part of
the definition. Two states in FJ are trust equivalent, if the evaluation contexts of
those states are syntactically equal and their stacks are trust equivalent. Two stacks
are trust equivalent if they map high integrity variables to the same values in each
activation record.
The initial state is s0 = ([ ], [a/attack] :: ∅), where Γ(attack) = L. s0 refers to
the initial attacker capabilities.
We have a single code injection (attack) entry point in FJ top-level programs p
which we have defined to be of the form new TopLevel().main([·]). Attacks are defined
as primitive values being fed to TopLevel.main, i.e., a ::= new C(v¯). In FJtaint, the
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attacks have taint tag •, i.e., a ::= new C(•, v¯).
For the sake of brevity, we may elide stacks from FJ-configurations in the following.
5.2.3 Sanity Conditions on Library Methods
As noted before, taint is propagated by library methods according to a user-defined
predicate Prop. We define two sanity conditions for library methods: not undertaint-
ing and not overtainting. The former condition is required in the implementation
in order to meet explicit integrity modulo endorsement, whereas the latter is a good
practice in the implementation of taint analysis tools.
First we define trust equivalence relation between FJtaint configurations in order
to specify sanity conditions for library methods. We accomplish this by definition
of a relation =◦ on configurations that requires identity of high integrity values, but
allows low integrity values to be different.
Definition 5.2.1 The relation =◦ on configurations is the least relation inductively
defined by inference rules in Figure 5.4.
Definition 5.2.2 Let the following hold:
• E[new C(t, v¯).m(u¯)],Σ1→∗E[w],Σ2,
• E′[new C(t ′, v¯′).m(u¯′)],Σ′1→∗E′[w′],Σ′2,
• C.m ∈ LibMeths, and
• E[new C(t, v¯).m(u¯)]],Σ1 =◦ E′[new C(t ′, v¯′).m(u¯′)],Σ′1.
We say C.m is not undertainting iff E[w],Σ2 =◦ E′[w′],Σ′2.
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x =◦ x ν =◦ ν
e1 =◦ e2
e1.f =◦ e2.f
e1, e¯1 =◦ e2, e¯2
e1.m(e¯1) =◦ e2.m(e¯2)
e1 =◦ e2
C.m(e1) =◦ C.m(e2)
e¯1 =◦ e¯2
new C(◦, e¯1) =◦ new C(◦, e¯2)
new C(•, e¯1) =◦ new D(•, e¯2)
e1 =◦ e′1 e2 =◦ e′2
e1; e2 =◦ e′1; e′2
e11 =◦ e21 · · · e1n =◦ e2n
e11 · · · e1n =◦ e21 · · · e2n
∅ =◦ ∅
Σ1 =◦ Σ2 dom(γ1) = dom(γ2) ∀x ∈ dom(γ1).γ1(x) = new C(◦, v¯)⇒ v¯ =◦ u¯ ∧ γ2(x) = new C(◦, u¯)
∀x ∈ dom(γ1).γ1(x) = new C(•, v¯)⇒ γ2(x) = new D(•, u¯)
γ1 :: Σ1 =◦ γ2 :: Σ2
e1 =◦ e2 Σ1 =◦ Σ2
e1,Σ1 =◦ e2,Σ2
Figure 5.4: Definition of =◦ Relation.
Definition 5.2.3 Let C.m be a library methods that is constant. We say C.m is not
overtainting iff Prop(◦, C.m(t1, t2)).
For example, String.concat is not undertainting if the taint propagation pol-
icy is defined as the rule (4.1) in Section 4.2.2, but if it is defined as the predi-
cate Prop(◦, String.concat(t1, t2)) then this library method is undertainting. As
an example of overtainting, consider primitive operation prim(str) to be a con-
stant function over strings with return value 0. Let the OO wrapper for prim be
a library method String.primwrapper such that mbodyCT (primwrapper, String) =
∅, new Int(prim(this.val)) with propagation policy Prop(t, String.primwrapper(t)).
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5.2.4 Illustrative Examples: Incompatibility of
Noninterference and Explicit Integrity
In what follows, we give examples to show incomparability of noninterference and
explicit integrity in FJ. In this regard, Example 5.2.1 demonstrates a program which
satisfies explicit integrity while it is interfering. Conversely, the program given in
Example 5.2.2 satisfies noninterference but not explicit integrity. Example 5.2.3 dis-
cusses a case where the program satisfies explicit integrity modulo endorsement. In
the following examples, method C.sso ∈ SSOs is assumed to be an identity function.
Moreover, the shadow of a is denoted sa.
Example 5.2.1 Let mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) = x, x.m(x), C <: D, mbodyCT (m, D) =
x, new B().sso(new D(′′hi′′)) and mbodyCT (m, C) = x, new B().sso(new C(′′hi′′)). Whether
the user input to TopLevel.main is an object of class C or D, different methods m are
invoked by dynamic dispatch. Let the attack be new C(′′hello′′). Corresponding exe-
cution trace, state transformer definitions, and attacker powers are given in Figure
5.5. Then, according to the composition of state transformers, the attacker power is
preserved. Thus, explicit integrity is satisfied. However, this program does not satisfy
noninterference. Considering trust equivalent initial states depicted in Figure 5.5,
the attacks new C(′′hello′′) and new D(′′hello′′) generate unequal sequence of events
[iev(new C(′′hi′′))] and [iev(new D(′′hi′′))].
Example 5.2.2 Let mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) = x, x.m(x), C <: D, mbodyCT (m, D) =
x, new B().sso(new C()) and mbodyCT (m, C) = x, new B().sso(x). Note that we assume
no fields for classes C and D, and so only objects new C() and new D() are definable. Let
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new TopLevel().main(new C(′′hello′′))→∗f1
TopLevel.main(C.m(new B().sso(new C(′′hi′′))))→∗f2 new C(′′hi′′)
f1(E, γ :: Σ) = ((E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])],
[γ(attack)/this][γ(attack)/x] :: [new TopLevel()/this][γ(attack)/x] :: γ :: Σ), )
f2(E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])], γ′ :: γ :: Σ) = ((E,Σ), iev(new C(′′hi′′)))
f2 ∗ f1(s0) = (s0, iev(new C(′′hi′′)))
pe(s0, f1) = pe(s0, f2 ∗ f1) = {s′ | s′ =T s0}
([ ], [new C(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅) =T ([ ], [new D(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅)
Figure 5.5: Example 5.2.1: The Execution Trace, State Transformers, Attacker Powers and
Trust Equivalent Initial States.
the attack be new C(). Similar to Example 5.2.1, details are given in Figure 5.6. Since
the explicit attacker power is refined to the attack, explicit integrity is not satisfied.
However, this program satisfies noninterference. The attacks new C() and new D()
both generate the same event iev(new C()) considering trust equivalent initial states
given in Figure 5.6.
Example 5.2.3 Let mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) = x, x.m(x), C <: D, mbodyCT (m, D) =
x, new B().sso(new D(′′hi′′)), mbodyCT (m, C) = x, new B().sso(new F().sanitize(x)),
and mbodyCT (sanitize, F) = x, x.endorse(). Let the attack be new C(′′hello′′). De-
tails are given in Figure 5.7. As explicit attacker power is not further refined after en-
dorsement, explicit integrity modulo endorsement is satisfied. However, the program is
not satisfying noninterference, since the attacks new C(′′hello′′) and new D(′′hello′′)
generate different sequences of events.
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new TopLevel().main(new C())→∗f1 TopLevel.main(C.m(new B().sso(new C())))→∗f2 new C()
f1(E, γ :: Σ) = ((E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])],
[γ(attack)/this][γ(attack)/x] :: [new TopLevel()/this][γ(attack)/x] :: γ :: Σ), )
f2(E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])], γ′′ :: γ′ :: γ :: Σ) = ((E, γ :: Σ), iev(γ(attack)))
f2 ∗ f1([ ], [a/attack] :: ∅) = (([ ], [a/attack] :: ∅), iev(a))
pe(s0, f2 ∗ f1) = {s0}
([ ], [new C(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅) =T ([ ], [new D(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅)
Figure 5.6: Example 5.2.2: The Execution Trace, State Transformers, Attacker Powers and
Trust Equivalent Initial States.
5.3 Taint Analysis Instrumentation via
Program Rewriting
In Section 4.3.1, we have defined a rewriting algorithm for both prospective and
retrospective enforcement of taint analysis. Since in this section our goal is to study
the meaning of prospective taint analysis, we define a more restricted version of R
that only focuses on prospective enforcements through check method. In this regard,
the target language, FJtaint, only reflects on prospective checks. The stack-based
semantics of FJtaint is similar to the semantics of FJ, given in Figure 5.1, as the
configurations are defined as pairs of expressions and stacks. One difference is that,
in FJtaint, the integrity event is not generated when a sso is called, but the integrity
is generated after check passes in the body of that sso. Moreover, the expressions
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new TopLevel().main(new C(′′hello′′))→∗f1
TopLevel.main(new B().sso(new C(′′hello′′))))→∗f2 new C(′′hello′′)
f1(E, γ :: Σ) = ((E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])],
[γ(attack)/this][γ(attack)/x] :: [new TopLevel()/this][γ(attack)/x] :: γ :: Σ), eev(γ(attack)))
f2(E[TopLevel.main(C.m[ ])], γ′′ :: γ′ :: γ :: Σ) = ((E, γ :: Σ), iev(γ(attack)))
f2 ∗ f1([ ], [a/attack] :: ∅) = (([ ], [a/attack] :: ∅), [eev(a), iev(a)])
pe(s0, f1) = pe(s0, f2 ∗ f1) = {s0}
([ ], [new C(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅) =T ([ ], [new D(′′hello′′)/attack] :: ∅)
Figure 5.7: Example 5.2.3: The Execution Trace, State Transformers, Attacker Powers and
Trust Equivalent Initial States.
are extended with sequences that evaluate according to the following rule:
Sequence
(v; e,Σ)→ (e,Σ).
Taint analysis instrumentation adds taint label fields to all objects, and operations
for appropriately propagating taint along direct flow paths. We incorporate blocking
behavior to enforce blocking checks at secure sinks. In the next section, we will show
that this analysis satisfies explicit integrity modulo endorsement, assuming that the
library methods are not undertainting.
We redefine the program rewriting algorithm R as follows. Since in our security
model the only tainted input source is a specified argument to a top-level program,
the rewriting algorithm adds an untainted label to all objects. The class table is then
manipulated to specify a taint field for all objects and a check object method that
blocks if the argument is tainted.
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fieldsR(CT )(Object) = Taint taint mbodyR(CT )(check, Object) = x, new Object(?x.taint)
C.m ∈ SSOs mbodyCT (m, C) = x, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x, this.check(x);µ(e)
C.m 6∈ SSOs mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯, e
mbodyR(CT )(m, C) = x¯, µ(e)
Figure 5.8: Axioms for Rewriting Algorithm Restricted to Prospective Measures
Definition 5.3.1 For any expression e, the expression µ(e) is syntactically equiva-
lent to e except with every subexpression new C(e¯) replaced with new C(◦, e¯). Given
SSOs, define R(e, CT ) = (µ(e),R(CT )), where R(CT ) is the smallest class table
satisfying the axioms given in Figure 5.8.
Note that in Figure 5.8, we do not need to explicitly specify a case for endorse()
method body, as µ assigns untainted label for the object returned from that method
(Definition 4.3.1).
5.4 Enforcement of Explicit Integrity
Modulo Endorsement by R
To satisfy explicit integrity modulo endorsement, R is required to be an operationally
correct implementation of integrity taint policy (Definition 4.4.3). The detailed proofs
of operational correctness of R and semantics preservation have already been studied
for substitution-based semantics of FJ in Section 4.4. We avoid to study the same
steps for stack-based semantics here due to the obvious bisimiliarty that exists be-
tween the two proposed operational semantics. Bisimiliarity states that each step of
execution in one semantics can be simulated in zero or more steps in the couterpart
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operational semantics.
In what follows, we show that the rewritten program satisfies explicit integrity
modulo endorsement if the sanity conditions are met. In particular, the library meth-
ods must be non-undertainting. In this regard, Lemma 5.4.1 conveys the core property
to meet such goal.
Lemma 5.4.1 Let (e1,Σ1) → (e′1,Σ′1), (e2,Σ2) → (e′2,Σ′2), e1,Σ1 =◦ e2,Σ2 and
e1 = E[eˆ] such that eˆ is the redex. Then e′1,Σ′1 =◦ e′2,Σ′2 provided that (e1,Σ1) →
(e′1,Σ′1) does not refer to library method computations, i.e., the following conditions
must hold:
• eˆ 6= new C(t, v¯).m(u¯) for some library method C.m and sequences of values v¯ and
u¯, i.e., eˆ is not a library method invocation.
• E 6= E′[C.m([ ])] for some evaluation context E′ and library method C.m, i.e., eˆ is
not a redex within a library method.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (e1,Σ1) → (e′1,Σ′1). Here we study one
interesting case. Let e1 = new C(t, v¯).m(u¯), where mbodyCT (m, C) = x¯.e. We then
have new C(t, v¯).m(u¯),Σ1 → C.m(e), [new C(t, v¯)/this][u¯/x] :: Σ1, assuming that C.m /∈
SSOs. Note that the taint tag • is only assigned to primitive objects during eval-
uation. This can be straightforwardly shown by induction on the derivation of
(e1,Σ1) → (e′1,Σ′1). Therefore we have t = ◦, otherwise C.m ∈ LibMeths which is
a contradiction. If new C(◦, v¯).m(u¯),Σ1 =◦ e2,Σ2 and (e2,Σ2) → (e′2,Σ′2), we need to
show that C.m(e), [new C(◦, v¯)/this][u¯/x] :: Σ1 =◦ e′2,Σ′2.
From new C(◦, v¯).m(u¯),Σ1 =◦ e2,Σ2 we have new C(◦, v¯).m(u¯) =◦ e2 and Σ1 =◦
Σ2. Using new C(◦, v¯).m(u¯) =◦ e2, we conclude that e2 = new C(◦, ¯ˆv).m(¯ˆu) such that
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new C(◦, v¯) =◦ new C(◦, ¯ˆv), v¯ =◦ ¯ˆv, and u¯ =◦ ¯ˆu. Next, we have new C(◦, ¯ˆv).m(¯ˆu),Σ2 →
C.m(e), [new C(◦, ¯ˆv)/this][¯ˆu/x] :: Σ2. Since Σ1 =◦ Σ2, v¯ =◦ ¯ˆv, and u¯ =◦ ¯ˆu we conclude
that [new C(◦, v¯)/this][u¯/x] :: Σ1 =◦ [new C(◦, ¯ˆv)/this][¯ˆu/x] :: Σ2. This implies that
C.m(e), [new C(◦, v¯)/this][u¯/x] :: Σ1 =◦ C.m(e), [new C(◦, ¯ˆv)/this][¯ˆu/x] :: Σ2. uunionsq
Lemma 5.4.2 Let (e1,Σ1) →∗ (e′1,Σ′1), (e2,Σ2) →∗ (e′2,Σ′2), e1,Σ1 =◦ e2,Σ2 and
e1 = E[eˆ] such that eˆ is the redex. Then e′1,Σ′1 =◦ e′2,Σ′2 provided that (e1,Σ1) →∗
(e′1,Σ′1) does not refer to library method computations, i.e., the following conditions
must hold:
• eˆ 6= new C(t, v¯).m(u¯) for some library method C.m and sequences of values v¯ and
u¯, i.e., eˆ is not a library method invocation.
• E 6= E′[C.m([ ])] for some evaluation context E′ and library method C.m, i.e., eˆ is
not a redex within a library method.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (e1,Σ1)→∗ (e′1,Σ′1) using Lemma 5.4.1. uunionsq
In the following, let the state transformer defined over a trace τ in FJtaint be
denoted by st(τ, f).
Theorem 5.4.1 If there does not exist any undertainting library method, then for
any arbitrary program p, R(p) satisfies explicit integrity modulo endorsement.
Proof. Let R(p(a)) ⇓ σσ′. Let st(σ, f) and st(tail(σ)σ′, g). Then, according to the
definition of state transformers, the state transformer defined over σσ′ is g ∗ f , i.e.,
st(σσ′, g ∗ f).
Let the state at tail(σ) be s. In order to prove that R(p) satisfies explicit integrity
modulo endorsement, we need to show that if pi2(g(s)) /∈ Een∗, then pi2(f(s0)) =
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pi2(f(s′)) implies that pi2((g ∗ f)(s0)) = pi2((g ∗ f)(s′)) for all state s′ where s′ =T s0.
This is accomplished by induction on the length of σ′.
When σ′ has length 0, pi2(g(s)) =  and so the result is immediate. For the
inductive phase, we show that the property holds for σ′ of length n + 1, assuming
that for n-length σ′ the property is met. So, let’s assume the state transformer
corresponding to n-length σ′ is g1 and the (n+ 1)’s step defines state transformer g2.
By induction hypothesis we have pi2((g1∗f)(s0)) = pi2((g1∗f)(s′)). The goal is to show
that pi2((g2 ∗ g1 ∗ f)(s0)) = pi2((g2 ∗ g1 ∗ f)(s′)). The only interesting case for the last
step of execution is where a sso is invoked1. So, let the (n− 1)th configuration of σ′
be (E[new C(t, v¯).m(new D(t ′, u¯))],Σn−1) where C.m ∈ SSOs, and thus nth configuration
of σ′ be (E[C.m(new C(t, v¯).check(new D(t ′, u¯)); e)], [new C(t, v¯)/this][new D(t ′, u¯)/x] ::
Σn−1), considering mbodyCT (m, C) = x, e.
Note that if t′ = •, then check halts the execution, and no integrity event is
generated. Therefore, in this case the result is immediate.
Let t′ = ◦. Then, check does not halt the execution, and the integrity event
iev(new D(t ′, u¯)) is generated by g2. By Lemma 5.4.2, since R(p(a)), [a/attack] ::
∅ =◦ R(p(a′)), [a′/attack] :: ∅ for all attacks a′, the invocations to C.check are
trust equivalent. Since the same objects are fed to C.check and the sso C.m, and
SSOs are only applied on primitive objects, if two such untainted objects are trust
equivalent, then they are syntactically equal. Thus untainted object being fed to
C.check under attacks a and a′ is of the form new D(◦, u¯). This completes the proof.
uunionsq
1In the rest of the cases integrity events are not generated and so the result is immediate.
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5.4.1 Discussion
In this section, we exemplify how taint propagation instrumentation of library meth-
ods (in light of Definition 5.2.2 and Definition 5.2.3) affects the satisfaction of explicit
integrity modulo endorsement.
To study the role of undertainting library methods assume we have defined taint
propagation policy Prop(◦, String.concat(t1, t2)) for library method String.concat.
Let
mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) = x, x.sso(x.concat(new String(′′world′′))).
Consider two attacks new String(′′Hello′′) and new String(′′Attack′′). Note that
when concat is invoked for these two attacks, expressions are trust equivalent, given
as the first trust equivalence formula in Figure 5.9. But when library method returns
value the expressions are not trust equivalent (second formula in Figure 5.9), since
the primitive values are syntactically different but untainted in those expressions.
Then explicit integrity modulo endorsement is not satisfied, since attacks generate
different events that refine attacker power: iev(new String(◦,′′ Helloworld′′)) and
iev(new String(◦,′′ Attackworld′′)).
However, if the propagation policy for String.concat is defined as (4.1) in Section
4.2.2, then String.concat is not undertainting, since the expressions are trust equiv-
alent after return. This is due to the fact that syntactically different primitive values
are marked as tainted in those expressions (third formula in Figure 5.9). In this case,
both sso invocations are halted by String.check before generating integrity events,
and therefore explicit integrity modulo endorsement is satisfied trivially.
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TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Hello′′).sso(new String(•,′′ Hello′′).concat(new String(◦,′′ world′′)))) =◦
TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Attack′′).sso(new String(•,′′ Attack′′).concat(new String(◦,′′ world′′))))
TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Hello′′).sso(new String(◦,′′ Helloworld′′))) 6=◦
TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Attack′′).sso(new String(◦,′′ Attackworld′′)))
TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Hello′′).sso(new String(•,′′ Helloworld′′))) =◦
TopLevel.main(new String(•,′′ Attack′′).sso(new String(•,′′ Attackworld′′)))
Figure 5.9: Undertainting Example.
To study effects of overtainting, consider primitive operation prim(str) and its
OO wrapper String.primwrapper with the taint propagation policy given in Section
5.2.3, i.e., Prop(t, String.primwrapper(t)). Assuming
mbodyCT (main, TopLevel) = x, x.sso(x.primwrapper()),
any two attacks new String(str) and new String(str ′) end up invoking String.sso
on new Int(•, 0) in the image of R, but are blocked by String.check in the body of
String.sso before generating any integrity event. This represents the unnecessary
conservativeness of taint propagation policy for library method String.primwrapper.
If the taint propagation policy is defined as Prop(◦, String.primwrapper(t)) (i.e.,
String.primwrapper to be non-overtainting), then given any two arbitrary attacks
new String(str) and new String(str ′), the integrity event iev(new Int(◦, 0)) is gen-
erated, which does not affect the satisfaction of explicit integrity modulo endorsement
by the rewritten program.
Since each primitive operation Op could be defined arbitrarily and the taint propa-
gation policy predicated on Prop for the library method that wraps Op is user-defined,
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satisfaction of explicit integrity modulo endorsement depends on the accuracy of the
user-defined taint propagation policy for each given primitive operation. Therefore,
the framework that has been proposed in this chapter, provides guidelines to imple-
ment semantically sound taint propagation mechanisms that enforce direct integrity
flow policies in the presence of input sanitization.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The major contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• The first semantic notion for retrospective enforcement that enables discussing
sound (Definition 2.5.2) and complete (Definition 2.5.3) audit logs.
• A rewriting algorithm to enforce retrospective measures (Definition 3.2.3), and
prove its soundness and completeness (Theorem 3.2.3).
• The first logical assertion of taint analysis that supports uniform specification
and enforcement of the in-depth dynamic integrity taint analysis policies (Def-
inition 4.2.3).
• The first semantic framework for dynamic integrity taint analysis that is inclu-
sive enough to support functional languages along with imperative ones (Defi-
nition 5.1.3).
In this dissertation, we establish a formal framework to specify and enforce prospec-
tive and retrospective security measures in concert, called in-depth enforcement of se-
curity. In this regard, we address the problem of audit log correctness. In particular,
162
we consider how to separate logging specifications from implementations, and how to
formally establish that an implementation satisfies a specification. By leveraging the
theory of information algebra, we define a semantics of logging specifications. To this
end, we formulate information algebras based on first-order logic (Theorem 2.6.1) and
show that this formulation enjoys information-algebraic properties.
As a major application space for in-depth enforcement of security, we have pro-
vided a general class of logging specifications that employ retrospective security for
the sake of surveillance and accountability. We define a particular program rewriting
strategy for a core OO calculus that supports instrumentation of this class of specifi-
cations expressed in first order logic, and then prove this strategy correct (Theorem
3.2.3). This illustrates how to prove program instrumentation correctness for partic-
ular rewriting algorithms leveraging the proposed auditing semantics. This strategy
is then applied to develop a practical tool for instrumenting logging specifications in
OpenMRS, a popular medical records system. We discuss implementation features of
this tool, including optimizations to minimize memory overhead.
Aiming to leverage in-depth enforcement for ameliorating potentially flawed prospec-
tive mechanisms, we consider integrity taint analysis in the OO language model. Our
security model accounts for sanitization methods that may be incomplete, a known
problem in practice. We propose an in-depth security mechanism based on combin-
ing prospective measures (to support access control) and retrospective measures (to
support auditing and accountability) that address incomplete sanitization. In particu-
lar, we consider sanitization results to be prospectively endorsed, but retrospectively
tainted. We develop a uniform security policy that specifies both prospective and
retrospective measures. This policy is used to establish provable correctness condi-
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tions for a rewriting algorithm that instruments in-depth integrity taint analysis. A
rewriting approach supports development of tools that can be applied to legacy code
without modifying language implementations. We prove that the proposed rewriting
algorithm is operationally correct for the prospective enforcement (Theorem 4.4.2),
and retrospectively sound and complete (Theorem 4.4.3).
Moreover, we propose a semantic framework to model direct flow of data integrity
enforced by integrity taint analysis techniques. In contrast to previous work, this
framework is general enough to model direct flows in both imperative and functional
settings and could be used to study the prerequisites for correct taint propagation.
We use this framework to extract such requirements for our proposed taint analysis
solution and prove the satisfaction of proposed semantic property (Theorem 5.4.1).
This exemplifies the use of the proposed semantics to establish provable correctness
conditions for a rewriting algorithm that instruments integrity taint analysis in the
presence of input sanitization.
6.1 Future Work
Our research on provably correct in-depth enforcement of security policies relies on
the proposed semantic framework for audit log generation that is constrained to linear
processes. This limitation, in practice, restricts the application of our framework to
systems where a single process is responsible to generate audit logs. In our case study
on a medical records system, for instance, audit logging capability is considered as
an extension to the web server program and all preconditions for logging depend on
events in the same program execution trace.
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For example, breaking the glass event is a precondition to log accesses to par-
ticular patient information in break the glass policies. Instrumentation of medical
records web server guarantees correct audit logging as long as such events occur in
the execution trace of the web server. This eliminates the possibility of distributing
authentication and authorization tasks to other nodes of the network. Such restric-
tion encourages us to study the semantics of distributed audit log generation that
underlies correct instrumentation of distributed programs for auditing purposes.
Majority of previous work on audit logging in distributed environments focus on
audit log analysis (e.g., [87]) and security concerns regarding in transit and/or at
rest log information (e.g., [88, 89, 90]). Studies regarding the collection of logs from
multiple monitors in distributed intrusion detection systems is such an example (e.g.,
[91, 92]). But we currently lack any correctness measures for audit logs generated
simultaneously within multiple nodes of a distributed system, where log generation
could depend on events in potentially other nodes. This represents the lack of an
auditing model in distributed systems, by which retrospective measures could be
studied in their fulfillment of accountability goals.
The proposed semantic framework needs to provide a mechanism to specify au-
diting requirements based on concurrent execution traces. Our framework needs to
be general enough to encompass different audit log generation and representation
approaches as its instances. We have already shown the generality of information
theoretic models in this realm [77]. To this end, I am interested to pursue studying
the ways in which these models could be employed to interpret audit logs, specify
auditing requirements and define correct enforcement of retrospective security in dis-
tributed environments. Similar to our current model for linear processes, correctness
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of log in distributed environments needs to be conditioned on the specifications of
auditing requirement through the comparison between the information contained in
the log and the information advertised by those specifications.
We also need to study the languages to specify auditing requirements in distributed
environments as instances of our general model. As we have discussed in the previous
work, Horn clause logic is a proper language for this purpose in linear executions, due
to straightforward modeling of execution traces as sets of facts, sufficient expressivity
to specify auditing requirements and available logic programming implementations.
Therefore, I intend to investigate the employment of Datalog-like languages for the
specification of auditing requirements in concurrent executions.
A formal language model can be used to specify and establish correct enforcement
of retrospective security in concurrent systems according to the developed framework.
This formalism provides a model for developing tools with correctness guarantees.
This model needs to at least enjoy the following features.
• Concurrency: In order to reflect distributed environments, the language model
needs to support concurrent process executions with inter-process communica-
tion capabilities.
• Generality: The language model needs to be sufficiently concise and high level
to describe interactions among processes. Therefore, a wide range of distributed
systems could be modeled with this formalism.
• Universal timing: We need to be able to specify the ordering of interesting
events for the sake of specifying auditing requirements. For example, in break
the glass policies access to particular patient information is logged as long as
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the glass is already broken. In order to implement such specifications, we need
to apply a timing mechanism that is shared among all nodes of the network.
Each step of concurrent execution of processes updates this universal time.
• Named functions: To specify auditing requirements, a fundamental unit of se-
cure operations is required to be defined. Functions can be considered as ab-
stractions of these fundamental units in many languages and systems. There-
fore, the language model needs to support named functions. When a function
is invoked the corresponding function body is required to be fetched and exe-
cuted. This necessitates a codebase for function definitions. Codebases can be
modeled in a straightforward way by mappings from function names to closed
language terms.
• Optimizations: The formal specification of retrospective security enforcement
in concurrent systems needs to address optimizations regarding bandwidth con-
sumption and memory usage for audit logging. High bandwidth consumption
is caused where inter-process communication of logging preconditions becomes
overwhelming. Storing logging preconditions in local memory may cause mem-
ory overhead. In this regard, we need to refrain from communicating and storing
“unnecessary” logging preconditions by each process.
Using the formalism with aforementioned features enables us to deploy distributed
environments that guarantee the correct generation of audit logs according to the
developed semantic framework. Deployment of correct logging capabilities in health
care informatics and intrusion detection systems are examples of case studies that
could be considered as final stages of this research.
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Our work on the correctness of in-depth policy enforcement and extending it to
distributed systems as described above are predicated on given sets of prospective
and retrospective policies. Traditionally, these sets of policies are defined according
to the expert knowledge that realizes the security requirements and mechanics of
the systems being studied. As information systems become more complex in today’s
world, extracting the required policies that dictate the safety and security of data and
code becomes more and more difficult. This encourages us to use machine learning
techniques to identify unified in-depth security policies in legacy systems based on
a history of executions, access denials, security breaches and audit logs. Such a
framework facilitates the long-term adaptivity of legacy systems to the situations that
may require policies to be modified, and paves the way for correct enforcement of in-
depth security policies that are adjustable in the long run, when accompanied with
our frameworks for prospective and retrospective security in linear and concurrent
systems. Generally, this approach opens up a wide array of opportunities for future
security studies with different applications in healthcare, payment systems, security
tools, etc.
In addition to aforementioned research opportunities, multiple theses can be de-
fined on the basis of projects that arise from this doctoral research. These projects
may refer to
• legacy systems in which security enforcement is needed to be improved through
the addition of retrospective measures beside the existing prospective controls.
• legacy systems that require to be hardened against potential vulnerabilities
through in-depth analysis of security.
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• taint analysis tools whose formal correctness results are required to be explored.
Moreover, as legacy systems depend on different technologies and platforms and
for the sake of generality and support for software with inaccessible source code, it
is recommended to define projects that study the deployment of our enforcement
techniques in lower level languages, e.g., LLVM-IR, Java bytecode, etc.
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